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Abstract 
This thesis examines the issue of participation of affected populations in disaster 
relief, which is receiving increasing attention from researchers, planners and 
practitioners. This concern comes out of the widely documented experience in 
development studies that beneficiary participation is essential for programmes to 
succeed. Similar arguments are being applied to disaster relief. However, despite 
much rhetoric, examples of genuine grassroots participation both in relief and 
development continue to be rare. I review the concept of participation in Chapter 
One and, in Chapter Two, the many possible reasons as to why participation of 
beneficiaries continues to be a problematic issue. In Chapter Three, I review the 
concept of humanitarianism and the implications of changes in humanitarian 
assistance on participation. In Chapters Four, Five and Six, I present three case 
studies, different by geographical, socio-political context and type of disaster. All the 
three studies contain material collected through fieldwork involving a qualitative 
methodology. I have indicated, in each study, the range of data collection tools used. 
In Chapter Seven, I compare and evaluate the findings of the three case studies. I 
present overall conclusions of the thesis in Chapter Eight. The main conclusions of 
the thesis are that beneficiary participation continues to be a problematic issue 
because groups that have power derived from ownership of economic resources or 
politics seem unwilling to share that power with the people they seek to assist. Their 
unwillingness to do so has, in turn, many causes including, lack of trust by aid 
organisations of local Power structures and organisations, poor bureaucratic 
orientation, a self-given superiority of moral virtue and technical expertise, and 
sometimes limitations imposed by operational, structural and accounting procedures. 
I argue that some of these limitations could be addressed through financially 
supporting and enhancing the capabilities of member-based grassroots structures. I 
also argue that more effort needs to be devoted to research on how willingness to 
adhere to the ideals of humanitarian assistance can be generated on the part of aid 
agencies and donors. 
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Chapter one. Participation: Historical and theoretical 
context 
Background 
Introduction 
Concerns regarding the participation of people in various programmes and projects 
designed to improve their livelihood statuses seem to be traceable to the field of 
Rural Development particularly, agrarian development. In many developing 
countries, the development of agriculture became the prime post-colonial 
development policy. New governments sought to effect immediate changes to 
colonial agricultural policy and practice, arguing that the former had failed to take 
into account important local realities. 
At the same time, many newly independent states lacked adequate well-qualified 
manpower. This was particularly true in the fields of scientific planning and 
management. This problem arose primarily out of colonial educational policies that 
restricted indigenous populations from attaining not only higher educational levels, 
but also particular types of training. For example, in Malawi, colonial educational 
policy laid emphasis on the acquisition of minimum levels of numeracy and literacy 
for the local population. Such policies were motivated by the need to fill clerical and 
other low-level positions in the colonial administration. Colonial education policy 
was designed to make the African a worker for, and not with, his colonial masters. 
Many developing nations faced similar problems at independence. 
15 
In this regard, part of the process of neo-colonialism was the export of large numbers 
of 'experts' from the West (or the North, and here after used interchangeably) to 
developing countries. External input was rationalised in terms of filling the qualified 
manpower gaps. At this time many governments in developing countries began to 
concentrate their. efforts on sending their citizens abroad and developing their own 
education systems, including the opening up of universities, in order to provide the 
required training. 
A particularly important influence on these processes was modernisation theory, 
which was gaining a lot of popularity in efforts to explain the process of 
development. The basic idea behind this theory was that development was a unilinear 
process of evolutionary change. Developing countries were at a stage similar to some 
stage at which the industrialised countries of the West had been at one point in time. 
Capital in the form of infrastructure and institutional facilities was seen as the prime 
prerequisite for the development process. Traditional material and non-material 
culture was seen as a hindrance, rather than a resource to development. Therefore, 
development would only take place if such traditional elements, especially values 
and technology, were abandoned in favour of Western ones. Such views led to an 
emphasis on the mobilisation of the population through mass education and 
community development programmes to enable developing countries to reach the 
critical 'take off' stage into self sustained growth. Thus, projects and programmes 
designed to smooth the path were formulated by urban administrators and planners 
and little attention was paid to the rural populations who were regarded as traditional, 
even primitive, and who, in a paternalistic way, needed to be educated out of their 
ignorance (Redfield, 1947; Smelser, 1959; Rostow, 1960; Hoselitz, 1960; 
McClelland, 1961; Hagen, 1962; Moore, 1963; Eisensstadt, 1966; Bauer, 1976; 
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Roxborough, 1979). 
In Latin America, an additional concept linked to the development process was the 
'marginality thesis'. This concept held that because of their attitudes and values, the 
poor were trapped on the margins of society and were unable to participate in the 
mainstream social, economic and political processes. The marginality thesis seems to 
have developed from Oscar Lewis' pioneering work on the concept of a 'culture of 
poverty' (Lewis, 1959; 1970; Rogers, 1970). Lewis' argument was that the poor have 
their own subculture with distinct characteristics such as fatalism, lack of deferred 
gratification, lack of ambition, lack of empathy, dependence on government 
authority, lack of innovativeness, mutual distrust in interpersonal relations, etc, 
which barred them from availing themselves to opportunities. 
Empirical research later led to stinging attacks on this concept. Critics argued that the 
poor were not socially marginal but ignored, not economically marginal, but 
exploited, and not politically marginal, but oppressed. It was argued that the poor had 
the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the perseverance of pioneers and the values of 
patriot but that they lacked an opportunity to fulfil those aspirations (Peattie, 1974; 
Perlman, 1976; Lomnitz, 1974; 1977). 
Without doubt, modernisation and marginality ideas influenced early development 
initiatives undertaken by Western governments and donors in developing countries. 
Such initiatives were later characteristically branded 'top-down'. Designing, 
planning and sometimes even implementation of programmes and projects were done 
by western 'experts'. The programmes and projects were then transferred pre-packed 
into communities in developing countries. The concerned communities and 
sometimes even the host governments had usually little if any input in the planning 
process. This approach was based on the then popular idea regarding the 'trickle 
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down' of ideas and technology that would supposedly take place from technocrats 
and other professionals in the West down to their counterparts and even to the 
grassroots in the developing countries. 
The so-called Green Revolution (which perhaps needed to have been a 'green 
devolution' in another sense) is a well-known example of these top-down approaches 
to development. In this particular case 'experts' had determined that the solution to 
the problems of agrarian development in developing countries was the creation of 
High Yielding Varieties of seeds (HYVs). Such seeds were developed under 
laboratory conditions in the West and transferred into the realities of not only 
weather and topographic conditions in developing countries, but also socio-economic 
variations. To date, there is no agreement among commentators on the actual 
successes of the Green Revolution. For while it is acknowledged that gross food 
production increased, particularly in parts of Asia, this increase was not universal 
globally. Furthermore the social consequences of the Green Revolution were not 
always positive. Pearse (1980) argues that there were two main principal failures: 
one was the emergence of more capital-intensive, higher technology farming and the 
other, the increasing dissolution of self- provisioning agriculture. 
A combination of bitter failures of well-intended programmes and projects and a 
decline in the popularity of modemisation theory appears to have set the scene for 
beneficiary participation in development work. Modernisation was seen as an 
ethnocentric theory whose notion of development, based on the experience of the 
industrial nations of the West, was inappropriate to the histories and realities of 
developing nations (Epstein, 1962; Long, 1977; Webster, 1984). So, for example, out 
of the failures and criticisms of the Green Revolution came Farming Systems 
Research (FSR). The latter sought to avoid the pitfalls of the former by making the 
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fanner and his or her physical and socio-economic environment the centre of 
analysis. To some extent FSR attempted to offer the fanner an opportunity to 
participate in the process affecting the shape of his/her form of livelihood. Thus 
Oasaka (1987: 30) states that: 
'Stressing the requirement of understanding the small farmers' environment, 
FSR with its socio-economic component is an attempt to deal with the charge 
that farmers have been losing control of their destinies and decision-making. 
It emphasises a closer relationship between research and the farmer to enlist 
his (sic) participation as much as possible'. 
When development planners and practitioners realised the necessity of the input of 
the people whose lives and livelihood were being subjected to externally assisted 
changes for development programmes to succeed, the age of participation was just 
beginning. 
Turning Point. 
The age of participation was greeted with excitement and enthusiasm. Finally, the 
answer to the failures of planned development in the Third World had been found. 
The turning point in 'paternalistic' and 'ethnocentric' conceptualisation of the 
development process came with what came to be known as dependency theory. Its 
most well known proponent is Andre Gunder Frank (Frank, 1969; 1971; Long, 
1977). Deriving from work in Latin America, Frank's thesis was that 
underdevelopment was a consequence of the conditions under which developing 
countries became incorporated into the world economic system. He identified 
merchant capitalism and colonialism as the initial processes whose results were the 
development of the North and the underdevelopment of the South. It was argued that 
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patron-client relationships existed from the level of the world's metropolises down to 
the rural poor in the developing countries. These relations played a key role in the 
exploitation of the rural masses. Dependency theory then constituted a challenge to 
the notion that underdevelopment resulted from an unfavourable cultural climate 
within the societies of the developing countries. 
Another factor in this change of direction was the debate on the 'limits of growth', 
which drew attention to the destructive nature of sophisticated technological progress 
and the negative effects of industrialisation on the environment, advocating more 
ecologically sound strategies. In addition, demands for employment and the 
satisfaction of basic needs shifted attention to the rural poor (Oakley and Marsden, 
1984: 7). Oakley and Marsden observe that these concerns culminated in the 
adoption of a new development philosophy that stresses the qualitative dimensions of 
development, i. e. values that give a sense of fulfilment. This dimension is not easily 
measurable. Participatory democracy becomes the central element in self-reliance. 
The 'consciousness-gap' between the leaders of society and the masses is narrowed 
and rather than the object of other people's worlds, man is seen as the subject of his 
own world: 
'This philosophy of a "people-based" development "from below" assumes 
that participation is not only an end in itself but also a fundamental pre- 
condition for and a tool of any development strategy. The failure of past 
development strategies is fundamentally linked to the absence of this missing 
ingredient-participation' (p 10, emphasis added). 
Buzz Words. 
Within the field of development studies buzzwords such as 'bottom-up', 'grassroots' 
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and 'people-centred' sprouted and began to flourish to mark the age of participation. 
Cemea (1995: 2) captures the essence of the change when he comments that 'the 
shift from a virtually exclusive emphasis on physical infrastructure to a recognition 
of social structures, and from free swinging ethnocentricity in development 
interventions to recognising indigenous cultures, was part of the shift in the direction 
of actor (people)-centred development projects'. 
However, the popularity, enthusiasm and excitement generated by the new age 
resulted in uncritical acceptance and use of various ideas, including the buzzwords. 
Such uncritical acceptance appears to have persisted to present times, although there 
are also increasing critical voices. Specifically, many have failed to realise that even 
such well-intended buzzwords could be value loaded. So for example, to consider the 
term 'bottom-up', the implicit idea, obscure to many of its users and supporters, is 
that the subjects of development programmes or projects are at the bottom while 
those facilitating them are at the top. The connotation behind everyday usage of the 
words is that those at the top are superior in some way to those at the bottom, or 
conversely, that those at the bottom are inferior to those at the top. Buzzwords such 
as this one do not develop by chance. They reflect the perceptions of those who 
coined them. In this regard Harrell-Bond's argument concerning the basic failing in 
the relief (and also development) process should neither be seen as 'harsh' (Kent, 
1987: 16), nor unexpected. Harrell-Bond's argument is that the failures are 'with the 
ideology of compassion, the unconscious paternalism, superiority and monopoly of 
moral virtue, which is built into it' (quoted in Kent, 1987: 16). 
As regards the term 'people-centred', the implication is that some approaches to 
programme delivery are people-centred while others are not. But if some approaches 
are not people-centred, then what are they centred on? It can be argued that all 
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programmes are people-centred. What matters is which people have been centred and 
in what ways. Very often, claiming that a programme is people-centred does not 
guarantee that all the people in need will be centred. There have been many people- 
centred programmes that have resulted in the further marginalizing of certain groups 
within a community, for instance, women, children or people without proper or 
adequate representation. 
Another buzzword popular in both development and disaster relief is 'target group'. 
Ideally this term is supposed to delimit a particular set of individuals as the intended 
beneficiaries of a particular project or programme. But the application of this term is 
not as easy as it might appear at first sight. It faces similar problems to those 
mentioned above. The major shortcoming here again is that 'target group' assumes 
some kind of social homogeneity of the individuals involved. For example, taking 
'smallholders' as a target group fails to recognise and address the specific needs of 
women farmers and those without supportive structures. Thus, for example, 
agricultural extension in most developing countries was premised on the assumption 
that imparting extension messages to male farmers would benefit the whole 
smallholder category. Yet it was later discovered that women, who account for up to 
70% of food production in developing countries, had been by-passed. Therefore, care 
needs to be exercised when using popular buzzwords to avoid glossing over 
important distinctions. 
Changes in professional input. 
On the professional level, the many failures beleaguering development efforts have 
led to an increasing mainstreaming of sociologists and anthropologists. Cemea 
(1995) observes that the number of these professionals in the field of development 
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planning started to pick up pace in the 1980s, resulting in a number of published and 
unpublished reports and papers on development anthropology and sociology. He 
states that additional factors exerting a powerful influence in mainstreaming these 
disciplines in development planning include the rising public concerns for 
environmental protection, sustainable development and participation, institutional 
development as well as 'the sharpened criticism of development allocation wasted on 
half-baked programmes and backfiring inept interventions' (p. 2). 
Traditionally, economists have dominated the process of planned development. This 
might explain why the traditional conceptualisation of development tended to lay 
emphasis on physical infrastructure and economic, to the neglect of social, processes. 
Sadly, this conceptualisation has not completely disappeared among development 
planners and practitioners. One of the major problems appears to be that, although 
there is an increase in the general recognition of their importance in the process of 
development, there are still very few sociologists and anthropologists in development 
organisations. These are often expatriates who may stay in developing countries for 
short periods. Once they leave or are unavailable there are usually few or no local 
professionals in these fields to take their places. 
Traditional development thinking has so influenced the educational systems in 
developing countries that a university degree in economics is still regarded as the 
most marketable (despite experience to the contrary in some cases). Many 
undergraduates in fact tend to regard anthropology and sociology with a sense of 
contempt, seeing them as subjects that are concerned with less directly relevant and 
practical aspects of knowledge. As a result, the number of economics graduates far 
exceeds those of anthropology and sociology. In fact, some Universities in 
developing countries do not offer any training in Anthropology. 
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Yet it would appear that most talk on participation in the processes of development 
planning and disaster relief management is now centred on the various methods that 
can be used to incorporate the affected populations in these processes. There are two 
aspects here to be considered. Firstly, effective mainstreaming of affected population 
requires an understanding of the social structures and processes of the population in 
question. Arguably, Anthropologists and Sociologists are better placed here than 
other professionals. Secondly, the methods commonly being used to solicit people's 
participation are more familiar to People with this background. This, of course, 
should not be taken to mean that these professionals necessarily promote 
participation, only that when they wish to do so, they have an additional body of 
knowledge from which to draw. 
In sum, it can be seen that work on participation appears to start from a handicapped 
position. The professional landscape is far from even. In addition, as mentioned 
above, the understanding of the very notion of participation is problematic. 
Today, almost every development and relief agency (and sometimes even neither of 
the two) takes participation as a key issue in their programmes and projects. Their 
Mission Statements and programme documents contain declarations indicating the 
commitment of the agency to the participation of their beneficiaries. Beyond 
theoretical declarations, many of them use participatory methods of some sort in 
practice, whether by intention or by default. The degree to which participatory 
approaches are used, and the success thereof, obviously varies among agencies. The 
factors accounting for this variation are many and just as varied. They may include 
the nature of the agency, i. e. whether development or relief biased, the period of field 
experience, the commitment of the leadership of the agency as reflected in its 
organisational. structures and recruitment procedures, the philosophy of the agency of 
24 
the importance and the place of participation in programme delivery, or the nature of 
the project, i. e. whether water and sanitation, nutrition, general food ration, health, 
education, etc., and a host of other factors which, it is hoped, this study will shed 
more light on. 
However, despite the general consensus among development and relief agencies on 
the need for increasing the participation of affected populations in their activities 
there are a number of problems when attempting to achieve this in practice: a) there 
is no agreed definition of participation. b) There seems to be considerable uncertainty 
on why participation is needed. There exists a range of purposes that participation 
can serve but increasingly it appears that many people are not quite aware of this 
fact. c) Although there is much discussion on what needs to be done to increase 
participation, there is very little discussion on how to do it or, put another way, how 
people should participate. d) There appears also to be much uncertainty as to who 
should participate. 
Definition of participation. 
We would agree with several authors who have argued that it is impossible to establish a universal 
definition ofparticipation (Oakley and Marsden, 1984: 18). 
There are severe problems in even just trying to understand what participation is. In 
practice, some of the problems faced in efforts to implement the idea of participation 
stem from this lack of agreement. Yet it is important that some idea of what 
participation is about be developed if the concept is to make sense, let alone be 
implemented. If the quoted statement above is taken to suggest that the definitional 
playground for participation is so wide open as to provide everyone with the freedom 
to develop their own understanding, the inevitable implication is that the scope for 
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criticism will be severely limited, if not eliminated altogether. The troubling task 
then is how to arrive at some form of common (if not universal) understanding of at 
least minimum characteristics of authentic participation. 
Below are presented some illustrative statements of the problems involved: 
'Participation is ... generally understood as a process and not as some kind of 
static end product. And yet when the dimension of time is introduced the 
positions diverge; one school would argue that "participation" can be 
manipulated within the context of the time of a particular intervention; whilst 
others argue the unpredictable nature of authentic "participation" [and] 
although there is unanimity on the importance of "participation" to achieve 
the desired redistribution of the benefits of development, there is less 
unanimity on the nature and content of the "participation" process' (Oakley 
and Marsden, 1984: 18, emphasis supplied). 
Writing in the context of industrial relations, French is quoted as defining 
participation as 'a process in which two or more parties influence each other in 
making certain plans, policies and decisions' (Hebden and Shaw, 1977: 14). Viewed 
in this way, the point is that participation must affect the degree of power that can be 
exercised by different parties. Thus emphasis is not on control, but on influence, the 
difference being that the former permits unilateral action by one party, the latter 
occurs in a social setting in which several parties may participate (p. 13). 
The World Bank, writing in a development context, would seem to share this view 
when it defines participation as 'a process whereby those with legitimate interests in 
a project influence decisions that affect them' (cited Oxfam, 1995: 14. Emphasis 
added). From this definition the Bank suggests that there are different levels of 
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participation namely (p. 15): 
9 Information sharing, where people are put in a position to decide on their 
involvement in a project by being informed about it; 
Consultation, where people are consulted on key issues for them to 
provide feedback to the managers; 
Decision-making, where people influence the development of a project at 
every stage through involvement in its design and implementation; 
4P Initiating action, where people organise themselves to take action in the 
face of a shared problem or area of interest, rather than responding to the 
initiative of outsiders. 
What is not clear from this characterisation of the World Bank by Oxfam is whether 
all the levels need to be fulfilled for authentic participation to have occurred or 
whether there is a minimum number that determines the threshold. Also, the extent to 
which information is shared, people are consulted and involved in decision-making, 
and the methods used, are all important to the outcome of participation. In fact most 
of the uncertainties on participation centre on these aspects. The current outcry is that 
many aid workers have tended to employ these elements in a 'tokenistic' fashion. 
In addition, attempting to apply in practice the phrase those with legitimate interests 
in a project poses problems of interpretation. The question as to whose perspective 
of legitimacy is valid will always linger in the air. This problem, and thus its answer 
also, are not unrelated to the problem of defining beneficiaries in general, which will 
be discussed in detail in later sections. 
In a rural development context, Oakley and Marsden (1984: 19) provide a number of 
working statements on participation that reflect the various understandings of the 
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concept. The basic ideas are the same as those expressed above, although there are 
some statements that are more specific than others. There do not seem to be any 
special definitions of participation in the literature specific to disaster relief. From the 
trend above, however, it can reasonably be assumed that the same ideas expressed 
with respect to other fields apply. 
One of the problems involved in defining participation appears to be that the very 
definition of participation has so far been constructed in a non-participatory way. 
Professionals implementing programmes and academics providing commentaries and 
critiques have unilaterally developed concepts of what they think authentic 
participation should entail. To the best of my knowledge, there appears to have been 
little if any effort to try to understand participation from the point of view of those 
for whom assistance is being provided. Uphof (1985: 486) writes: 'In a real project 
situation... proposals for various kinds of participation should be checked out with 
the intended beneficiaries to ascertain whether they are feasible and acceptable'. 
What this implies is that participation must become a fluid rather than static concept 
that changes according to the particular circumstances of the beneficiaries involved. 
After all, the very objective of participation is to ensure sensitivity to the local 
conditions of beneficiaries. This approach would free practitioners and academics 
from the (unnecessary) need to theorise a priori what authentic participation should 
involve, and then find that they have come up with meaningless or unworkable 
statements of the concept. 
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Why Is participation needed? 
Means or end? 
The distinction between whether participation is a means to an end or an end in itself 
is important to understanding the range of purposes that participation can serve. It is 
argued that interpreting participation as a means leads to a description of a state or an 
input into a development programme. The objective is to achieve previously 
established objectives. Where it is interpreted as an end in itself the reference is to a 
process whose outcome is meaningful participation. Here the objective of the 
exercise is the achievement of power by the powerless so that they can demand more 
participation. Participation in the former sense adopts the strategy of reform and 
improvement while in the latter case structural change is implicitly demanded. 
Viewed in this way Oakley and Marsden (1984) suggest that the ideal situation is one 
which incorporates both extremes, but doubt the probability of this happening given 
the different ideological perspectives reflected by the two positions. 
Both views find support in the literature. For example, Chambers (1985: 515) argues 
that: 
'the case for putting people first... is based not just on ethical grounds, though 
many find the ethical obligations sufficient on their own. It is also highly 
practical. With repeated experience, evidence has built up to demonstrate that 
where people and their wishes and priorities are not put first, projects that 
affect and involve them encounter problems. Experience also shows 
conversely that where they are consulted, where they participate freely, where 
their needs and priorities are given primacy in project identification, 
implementation, and monitoring, then economic and social performance are 
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better and development is more sustainable. There are, and always will be, 
other environmental and managerial factors that influence how well or how 
badly a project does. Irrespective of these influences, evidence shows that in 
rural development, putting people first is a necessary condition for good 
performance whenever local people are involved' (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, then, there are many purposes that participation is intended to, and can, 
achieve. Part of the current confusion and debate on participation appears to stem 
from a situation in which people are losing sight of this fact and focusing only on one 
main purpose. To begin with, to argue that no meaningful participation can take 
place if it is interpreted as a means to an end is to suggest that it is impossible for the 
objectives of the beneficiaries to coincide with those of the aid agency. This may not 
necessarily always be the case. For, despite the fact that the aid agency may have its 
own specific aims, the very fact that agencies and beneficiaries can work together 
means that they have at least a shared ground. This ground is the general desire to 
either save or improve lives and livelihoods. However, aid agencies by their very 
nature also have other objectives to fulfil. What usually differs, and therefore needs 
compromise, are the ways in which this overall objective is to be achieved in a way 
that allows the beneficiaries to benefit but also enables the agency to harmonise 
beneficiary priorities with objectives inherent in their organisational structures and 
operational procedures. In this case participation can become a means of reaching 
this compromise. 
It should also be remembered that the more commonly shared view of participation 
centres on both parties having some power to influence, and not absolute power to 
control, the other. In the context of development and relief, the aid agency has power 
resulting from ownership of resources and technical expertise while the power of the 
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community emanates from its knowledge of local conditions and the priorities and 
values existing within it. In this sense the notion that true participation requires the 
total transfer of power to beneficiaries is both undesirable in principle and not 
feasible in practice. On the one hand, it is possible that the failure of the 'means' 
strategy to achieve meaningful participation may not be so much the result of the 
nature of the strategy itself, but the way in which it is implemented or put into 
operation. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that meaningful participation will 
always result from an 'end' strategy when implemented or put into operation in 
whatever way. The truth is that even where meaningful participation has been 
achieved it is not clear whether the outcome will match the level desired by the 
beneficiaries, given that any project must operate within the resource constrains of 
the aid agency. 
Adams (1984), writing in the context of industrial relations, suggests four general 
categories of purposes that participation can serve, namely democracy, socialist 
ideals, ethics and morality, and productivity and efficiency. These can be used as a 
basis for understanding the role of participation even in development and disaster 
relief contexts. To these can be added public relations, human rights and 
empowerment/capacity building. Clearly, for some of these purposes participation 
can be seen as a means while for others, an end. However, it also appears that for 
some purposes participation can be both a means to certain ends and an end in itself. 
In this case, caution needs to be exercised when making a simplistic 'means-ends' 
dichotomy on the concept of participation. For example, with reference to the 
relationship between participation and empowerment, White (1996: 9) asserts that 
'participation is... at one and the same time a means to empowerment and an end in 
itself, so breaking down the division between means and ends which characterises the 
31 
other types' (emphasis added). 
Productivity and efficiency. 
Seeing participation as enhancing productivity, efficiency and effectiveness is 
perhaps on one end of the extreme where participation is regarded as a means. From 
an industrial relations perspective, research indicates that participation of workers 
increases efficiency through reduced levels of alienation, dissatisfaction, 
absenteeism, high turn over and increased sabotage and labour unrest (Adams, 1984: 
47). In development (and also in relief), White (1996) sees participation in this form 
as essentially serving an instrumental function. In her view, the major aspect of 
participation in this form is the provision of labour by the project beneficiaries, 
which is seen by the agency as local 'counterpart funds', and guarantees people's 
commitment to the project. In the eyes of the local people this form of participation 
is viewed as a cost which is paid for by time taken away from other activities such as 
paid employment, household work and leisure. In a relief setting, this cost may be 
seen in relation to time taken away from pursuing other survival strategies, given that 
relief assistance is often inadequate to address all the immediate needs. 
An example from Malawi illustrates this point (see Chapter Five). There, a WFP 
policy, endeavouring to promote a transformation in gender relations, required that 
family ration cards be distributed in the name of the female spouse. However, flour 
bags for the general ration distribution were too heavy for most of the women to 
carry over the very long distances involved. Therefore, both spouses had to be 
present at a distribution centre, the woman to receive the ration, and the man to carry 
it. Given the long queues and long travelling distances involved, a lot of time was 
wasted in which one of the spouses would have been involved in other survival 
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strategies, such as paid casual work, common at that time. 
Apart from leading to ownership and commitment, participation may also lead to 
effective allocation and use of time and resources as agencies became well informed 
of the priorities of their beneficiaries. Unlike in industry, however, where efficiency 
is always measured from the perspective of the employer, this case is not so 
straightforward in development and relief settings. In the latter, the question of 
efficiency or effectiveness has to be answered in terms of whose perspective. An 
agency may feel that the project was efficient because it fulfilled their targets, for 
example, how much food was delivered, how many babies benefited from a nutrition 
programme, how many tonnes of seeds were delivered and so on. Yet affected 
populations may see the project as inefficient or ineffective for creating disruptions 
in social relations because of the way the project was implemented. For a 
humanitarian programme this is a particularly difficult issue since humanitarianism is 
about doing good. In principle, only the affected populations are in a position to 
judge whether good has been done or not. Participation then, must also be an 
instrument for aid agencies for being accountable to the people they assist. 
Public relations. 
It would be unwise to dismiss public relations as a motive for participation among 
agencies. The literature charting the proliferation of international NGOs makes it 
clear that beneath the rhetoric of co-operation and co-ordination the spirit of 
competition flourishes. On such deadly ground it is important that an agency creates 
a good image of itself. Participation is a good instrument since, like gender equality, 
it is the 'in thing'. Given that 'the assessment procedures of the British Overseas 
Development Administration [now DFID, but also many other donors P. N. ] include 
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checking what steps have been taken to ensure participation of the beneficiaries in 
planning, implementing and monitoring the project it funds' (Oxfam, 1995: 14), 
participation may even be regarded as a survival strategy, not of the poor, but of the 
aid agency. 
More cynically, but perhaps equally true, participation may even be used to 
legitimate decisions, policies and practices that had already been decided would 
happen with or without participation. But if it can be said that these aspects of the 
project were implemented in a participatory fashion, then the agency will gain 
credibility and respect. White (1996) sees participation in this form as essentially 
nominal where the groups of people involved mainly serve the function of display. 
Tbus, even though the requirements by donors for participation are nobly conceived, 
the absence of any mechanism to ensure that not only participation has occurred, but 
that it has also occurred appropriately, raises serious questions about their role in 
promoting the process of participation. And given that inappropriate forms of 
participation may even be destructive to communities, the extent to which donors and 
aid agencies achieve their very aim of helping to build or rebuild communities can 
also be fundamentally questioned. 
Democracy. 
'The fightfor political democracy is a proud strand in the history of many countries .. andjew people 
would question that democracy in itself is a good thing, a value' (Adams, 1984: 42). 
Participation is increasingly linked to the promotion of the democratic process, 
strengthening people's capacity to participate in national and international issues. 
Adams (1984) quotes from a European Community 'Green Book' which noted the 
increasing recognition being given to the democratic imperative that those who will 
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be substantially affected by decisions made by social and political institutions must 
be involved in the making of those decisions. In this sense participation could be 
seen as an end in itself since democracy is a value. On the other hand, it cannot be 
denied that the general belief is that institutions function more effectively if they are 
democratically run, making democracy a means to achieving efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
Aid agencies are well aware of their power stemming from their access to, and 
control of, resources and technical expertise. Their staffs are also aware of their 
privileged position vis-A-vis the people they seek to assist. Coming from the West 
where democracy is a deep-rooted value they may feel compelled by their 
consciousness to conduct themselves democratically. They thus get concerned with 
providing their beneficiaries with some kind of voice in the character of the project 
(White, 1996). White's view is that this form of participation is representative. From 
the point of view of the agency it may ensure sustainability by avoiding the creation 
of an inappropriate and dependent project. From the participant's perspective, 
becoming actively involved in their own meetings and in discussions with the NGO 
may constitute leverage for influencing both the shape and the subsequent 
management of the project. 
Ethics, morality and human rights. 
The participation of affected populations in development or disaster relief projects 
could be seen in terms of the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
one of whose tenets states that: 
'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
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spirit of brotherhood. Everyone, as a member of society is entitled to 
realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality' (Quoted in Adams, 1984: 
48). 
Adams notes that this is an ethical and religious position whose essence is that 
dignity, humane treatment, and the opportunity to develop personality and talents are 
a moral right by virtue of being human. Ethics and morality in fact lie at the very 
heart of the humanitarian concept. It is inhuman not to help a suffering human when 
one is in a position to do so. Similarly, it is unethical and immoral to treat others as if 
they were animals or objects. This may explain why many humanitarian aid agencies 
have religious roots. The participation of affected population in projects and 
programmes that affect them constitutes their treatment as subjects or, more 
appropriately, as actors, not objects of the processes of development and relief. 
Empowennent and capacity building. 
A recent development in the literature points to participation as a process of 
empowerment. This interpretation has ushered in a new set of considerations as 
regards the extent to which this is Possible in practice. For example: 
'In theory, empowerment and participation should be different sides of the 
same coin. In practice, much of what passes for popular participation in 
development and relief work is not in any way empowering to the poorest and 
the most disadvantaged people in society' (Oxfam, 1995: 14). 
Oxfarn views empowerment in terms of a process through which individuals gain the 
strength, confidence, and vision to work for positive changes in their situations. It is 
also a measure of the capacity of people to initiate change, whether modest or far- 
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reaching. What is not clear is how these virtues are acquired. Several examples of 
empowerment are given (ibid., p 12). 
A woman gaining the confidence to seek legal protection from her violent 
husband. 
* Landless farmers organising to occupy idle land. 
Urban slum dwellers compelling the local authorities to provide essential 
services, such as water and electricity. 
* Refugees demanding to return to their home 
e Factory workers lobbying for the right to unionise. 
Families forming a committee to campaign for the release of political 
prisoners. 
Oakley and Marsden (1984: 25-26) note that the more common interpretation of 
empowerment equates participation with achieving power in terms of access to, and 
control of, the resources necessary to protect livelihood and quote the following 
statements as illustrative of this understanding: 
"Me promotion of popular participation implies a redistribution of power 
requiring the consideration of political factors, social forces and the role of 
class in historical processes of social change, and participation is concerned 
with the distribution of power in society, for it is power which enables groups 
to determine which needs, and whose needs, will be met through the 
distribution of resources. Also, power is the central theme of participation 
and... participatory social action entails widely shared collective power by 
those who are considered beneficiaries. The people become agents of social 
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action and the power differentials between those who control and need 
resources is reduced through participation'. 
The obvious idea implied above is that participation can never be real or complete 
unless empowerment has occurred. This view invites a number of theoretical and 
practical difficulties. 
Theoretically and by definition, the concept of empowerment automatically assumes 
that the existing state of affairs is one of lack of empowerment. Logically, there can 
be no need for empowerment if people are already empowered. External agencies are 
then seen as catalysts to the empowerment process. The problem seems to be that 
there is lack of clarity as to the source of power that is supposed to be transferred to 
the affected populations. In the absence of such clarity, examples of empowerment 
such as those cited by Oxfam in the paragraph above would seem to suggest that the 
source of empowerment is primarily the acquisition of new knowledge, attitudes, 
aspirations, values and other 'positive' personality traits. The acquisition of these 
aspects will lead to access to resources, primarily of an economic nature. This view 
is inevitably paternalistic, ethnocentric and short sighted at any rate. Frequently, 
people in poverty fail to act in a certain way often precisely because they lack the 
resources and an opportunity to do so. In this sense, access to economic resources is 
not the result of, but a pre-condition for, empowerment. Rather than the other way 
round, it is access to resources that may lead to the acquisition of new knowledge, 
attitudes, aspirations, and possibly values, if necessary. 
Without clarifying the source of power, some of the examples given above by 
Oxfam, might not make much sense. Tbus, for example, a woman in poverty 
situations may not seek legal protection from a violent husband not because she lacks 
empowerment (due to lack of confidence for example), but because she is aware of 
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the consequences of that action. Because of her weak economic position, a woman 
may avoid any action that might end up in divorce, leaving her without sound 
economic support. In marriages under customary law, the man might resolve his 
frustration of a 'confrontational' wife by marrying other wives, and any legal 
decisions taken may not necessarily be in favour of the woman. These consequences 
may not be in her interests. As regards the issue of landless farmers, it is quite 
difficult to see, without stupefying the farmers, how they could stay landless if there 
were idle land lying about. It is equally difficult to see why an external agency would 
be needed to set in motion the process of occupying that land. The example of the 
urban slum dwellers demanding social services faces similar problems. The literature 
on urban studies in developing countries has shown that very often, the major 
reasons why slum dwellers do not press for 'essential' services such as electricity and 
water has nothing to do with lack of empowerment. In many cases such services are 
not demanded because they exert a strain on the already low incomes of the slum- 
dwellers. Studies have shown that low-income dwellers might in fact be willing to 
move out of serviced areas in favour of un-serviced ones where the burden of paying 
for the services is removed (Gilbert and Gugler, 1981). In addition, people in these 
areas may prefer to walk to avoid the costs of using the public transport system. An 
outsider without this knowledge might mistakenly believe that the community lacks 
empowerment to push for public transport. In major cities in Malawi (and possibly 
other cities in developing countries too), the sight of large masses of people trekking 
to places of employment on foot, even with public transport passing them on the very 
way, is all too common. 
The second interpretation of empowerment, as captured by Oakley and Marsden 
(1984), seems to be directly opposed to the first one. In this case, the source of 
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empowerment is access to, and control of, economic resources and the political 
process through which such resources are distributed. Thus, power also stems from 
the deliberate surrendering of the decision-making monopoly held by the external 
agency involved. In other words, participation is linked to structural change or the 
redistribution of basic common assets. 
While this characterisation is more appealing than the first one, there appears to be 
lack of evidence that aid agencies have a serious commitment to transfer a significant 
amount of their power to the people being impacted: 'There is no shortage of 
comment in the literature or analysis as to why participation has not been achieved. 
Some dismiss out of hand the very suggestion that there has even been a genuine 
commitment to participation' (Oakley and Marsden, 1984: 29). In the disaster relief 
context, the question of whose resources is particularly troublesome. Do the 
resources donated for disaster relief belong to the agencies to be dispensed at their 
discretion and on their own terms, or do they belong to the affected people to be 
distributed on their terms? The failure of genuine participation to take place may 
suggest that a good number of agencies take them to be theirs, to be distributed on 
their (agencies') own terms. 
The following example illustrates this point. During the 1998 emergency relief 
programme in south Sudan (see Chapter Four), many agencies were aware that the 
best mechanism for distributing food rations was through the traditional leadership 
system (the gol leaders). These were some kind of clan heads who had jurisdiction 
over a given section of the community. Their position allowed them to have good 
knowledge regarding which individuals were 'vulnerable', and therefore needing 
assistance. Distrusting the effectiveness of this mechanism, one international aid 
agency committed some resources to be distributed in this way but retained a certain 
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proportion of the total amount. After the distribution through the traditional structure 
had been completed the aid agency would then conduct its own independent 
assessments and distribute the remaining proportion to those it believed had been 
bypassed by the traditional distribution mechanism. While it can not be denied that 
there will always be individuals who fail to find representation in traditional 
structures, or for that matter any social structure, such 'macho-man' tactics are 
highly questionable as regards the issue of participation. This action would have a lot 
of questions to answer as regards its impact on social relations within the community 
as well as on the way in which the agency is viewed. In the context of the present 
discussion, this example demonstrates how difficult it is for agencies to start the 
power balancing process. 
Oakley and Marsden (1984) sum up: 
'The development literature is over-burdened with the documenting of 
previous participation strategies, most of which it is accepted have failed in 
terms of giving the majority of rural people any meaningful say in those 
issues which affect their livelihood. The concept of participation as 
empowering is a radical departure from years of more traditional practice. 
Although its conceptualisation is simple and its argument difficult to refute, it 
is correct to say that it both faces formidable barriers and that it is also 
difficult to imagine governments and locally established structures offering 
other than powerful opposition. Historically participation has rarely been 
willingly conceded to previously excluded groups and the encounter between 
opposing forces is the inevitable result' (p. 27). 
Several issues arise from the foregoing discussion. First, it is necessary that the 
advocates of empowerment always make it clear where the power for the poor will 
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come from: is it political, social, economic or all of these? Second, 'empowerment' 
rather than being a positive term can in fact be a demeaning one because of its 
inherent assumptions. Third, resources, opportunity and opportunity cost rather than 
a lack of empowerment account for much of the behaviour of the poor. Fourth, 
empowerment is very difficult to measure. Lack of action on particular issues should 
not always be seen as a sign of lack of empowerment. Finally, empowerment can 
depend crucially on the willingness of existing power structures to share power with 
those previously excluded. 
The dominant sense in which people talk about empowerment appears to be related 
to a sense in which poor people are galvanised to challenge existing social relations 
such as gender inequality or lack of political representation. The agencies seem to 
see themselves as catalysts of this process by providing 'enlightenment' lacking in 
the poor. The problem with this view is that it makes the objectives of participation 
inconsistent. For example, asking women to challenge a system that excludes them 
politically contradicts the objectives of respecting and working with existing 
structures. On the other hand, through their support of existing structures and 
provision of access to opportunities, agencies can succeed in increasing the 
participation of women in such structures. 
Therefore, it appears more useful to talk about capacity building rather than 
empowerment, although a more appropriate term could perhaps be 'capacity 
enhancing', since it is not at all true that poor people lack any capacities at all. Poor 
people have different capacities some of which may not be immediately apparent 
because of their lack of opportunities and resources. In this sense, the job of external 
agencies should be seen as providing support and opportunities for these capacities to 
be realised and enhanced. Capacity enhancing activities should focus on improving 
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poor people's access to economic resources, information, education and training that 
enables them to use existing opportunities and create new ones. These activities are 
what can 'empower' poor people to challenge certain repressive processes. In this 
sense, it is not participation that leads to 'empowerment'; rather, 'empowerment' 
leads to participation. Gradually, participation can transform existing structures in 
response to new demands. 
Who should participate? 
In principle, people who will be affected by the project are the ones who must 
participate or, as others would put it, the beneficiaries of the project. However, this 
statement is far more difficult to put into practice than it might be assumed. I have 
already noted the difficulties associated with the World Bank's phrase, those with 
legitimate interests in a project. Any attempt to define beneficiaries, or those who 
will be affected by a project is accompanied by similar difficult questions: 
beneficiaries or affected in what way? For example, are the beneficiaries of a food 
distribution programme only those who have received the food? Are they the only 
ones who will be affected by the distribution? Are they really the only ones with 
legitimate interests or has this legitimacy been imposed by the agency resulting from 
its own resource constraints and/or priorities? 
The difficulties of identifying those with legitimate interests or those who will be 
affected by the project become worse when it is remembered that, at least with the 
exception of purely medical aid agencies, it is not only lives which must be saved or 
improved in either disaster relief or development, but also, livelihoods. While lives 
can be considered individually, livelihoods are always linked to the social structure 
and process of the community and sometimes even to macro-economic and macro- 
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political processes. In many cases government agents will continue to interact and 
influence people's lives and affect their livelihoods long after the relief or 
development project has 'ended' and the agency staff have left. Some of the actions 
taken may be on issues that directly stem from that project. In such a situation one 
can sympathise with the host governments if they claim to have a legitimate interest 
in the project. 
Thus, whether we consider government or community power structures, it is clear 
that the focus on the individual or a collection of individuals as a unit for analysis for 
development and relief activities will not provide a full picture of who should 
participate in a relief or a development programme. To say that so many metric 
tonnes of food were successfully delivered to a 'target' group of people, for example, 
doesn't say anything about the success of the intervention as a whole. What if the 
way in which delivery took place ostracised the target group from the other 
community members? What if such delivery destroyed existing local marketing 
systems and other systems for co-operation? In some cases, an outsider's 
interpretation of who has a legitimate interest may in fact differ markedly from that 
of the very individuals regarded as having this legitimacy. 
In addition, there are in fact practical reasons why a focus on the view of 
beneficiaries as being individuals should not be regarded with much enthusiasm. The 
basic problem is that this focus leads to an emphasis on using numbers as a measure 
of success. There are two sides to what has been referred to as 'the numbers game'. 
First, aid agencies often operate under severe resource constraints. Because of this, 
small numbers of beneficiaries are always desirable. In many cases, this desire has 
led to what can be called institutionalised mistrust of local assessments of the extent 
of need. This mistrust is based on the alleged lack of objectivity of local agencies in 
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their assessment procedures, sometimes blamed on inadequate technical capacity, but 
more frequently on favouritism, dishonesty and corruption. While one cannot deny 
that such tendencies may sometimes exist, to assume that they always do and then to 
always proceed on that premise goes contrary to experience. Two illustrative 
examples will be cited. 
While doing fieldwork in south Sudan during the 1998 famine relief programme, I 
learned that the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA), the relief wing of 
the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), had produced 
assessments of the food security situation for that year. These assessments showed an 
impending famine and the need for external food assistance. However, the magical 
international media had not yet vindicated the situation and the SRRA was, after all, 
a representative of a rebel movement. The assessment was, of course, rejected even 
by the international aid agencies working in the area. Analysis of the famine later 
showed that, even without the fighting which triggered it, the SRRA assessment had 
been fairly accurate of what was going to happen. Yet nothing had been done until a 
report had been featured on television broadcasts. 
In Malawi (see Chapter Five), floods devastated many areas in the southern part of 
the country in 1997. Government conducted an assessment of the extent of 
destruction and need for external assistance and launched an international appeal. 
The United Nations (UN) responded by sending the Department of Human Affairs 
(DHA) team from Geneva. In contrast to the government's assessment that had relied 
on its ground-based network, the DHA team relied on a helicopter, thus literally 
avoiding the grassroots. Thus the poem was right on the mark: 
[International bureaucrats as well as] 
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... students seeking Ph. D. s 
believe that everyone agrees 
that rains don't do for rural study 
-suits get wet and shoes get muddy 
(Chambers, 1983: 20). 
Aware of the limitations of their action, but still suspicious of the government 
figures, the DHA team recommended certain areas for immediate relief assistance. It 
also recommended that assistance should be extended to all other affected areas only 
after a verification of the government assessment, to be conducted by an inter-agency 
team of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This verification exercise proved 
to be one of the key factors why the relief process in general failed to be effective. In 
spite of the time and resources invested, the results of the verification exercise were 
later abandoned principally for failing to be representative and the agencies, 
including the World Food Programme (WFP), were forced to revert back to the 
government figures in most cases. 
The two examples have been cited to suggest that, for reasons linked to resource 
constraints, agencies tend to use numbers as the overriding criterion for defining 
beneficiaries. And because numbers must match available resources, the mistrust of 
assessments by local structures is inherent (in-built). 
Yet when it comes to reporting on the outcome of the project, big numbers are 
desirable, if not essential. Prendergast (1996: 3) observes that all aid agencies, 
whether UN, donor-government or NGOs, are under constant pressure to present a 
picture of the huge amounts of aid inputs delivered to a target population as having a 
direct impact on savingý lives. The result is that logistical targets become ends in 
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themselves. He argues that quantitative, rather than qualitative, assessment is dictated 
by reporting and fund-raising priorities resulting in the burying of nuances and 
portraying of tonnage of commodities delivered as the measure of success. 
The foregoing observations lead to the argument that, to be effective, communities, 
rather than individuals, should form the basis for relief operations (it appears to be 
mostly already so in development). The principal mandate for deciding who should 
participate and how, should lie primarily with the community decision-making 
structure. It is true that, as agencies might fear, not all people in need will be 
represented in this way, but more harm will be done if the agency were to take on 
this responsibility. Even during disasters, the social structure usually remains 
relatively intact. Considering beneficiaries only in terms of numbers of individuals 
and ignoring the importance of the local power structure and the social structure 
within which such individuals exist assumes that the affected population has no 
capacity for decision-making, understanding the needs of the different groups of 
people in the community and caring for their own vulnerable individuals. In making 
this assumption, 'one is accusing the social structure of that society of having 
descended into Hobbesian chaos' (Harragin, 1998: 3). 
How can people participate? 
Clearly, even if the right participants have been identified, how they participate is 
crucial if participation is to achieve its various objectives. The very fact that there are 
a number of purposes that participation can serve suggests that there must also be a 
range of ways in which people can participate. In general, the form of participation 
chosen will determine the degree of involvement and should reflect the purpose of 
participation. The task here is thus to identify the various forms of participation or 
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involvement and attempt to link them to what they can achieve. 
It must be stated at the outset that how people wish to participate in a project will 
depend on their own assessment of the benefits of being involved as well as the 
opportunities and risks they can identify. Therefore, it is inappropriate to define 
beforehand ways in which people ought to participate. Any ideas discussed here 
should therefore be regarded merely as an attempt to clarify some of the hazy issues 
rather than as a prescription for practice. 
I suggest in Chapter Four that making a distinction between mental and physical 
involvement may be a useful starting point. While seemingly obvious, this distinction 
is sometimes taken for granted and, thus, its importance overlooked. Some of the 
problems attached to the understanding of participation in fact seem to relate to a 
failure to consider this distinction. 
It has already been noted, for example, that the common interpretation of 
participation lays emphasis on the ability of the affected population to influence 
decisions that affect them as a key and perhaps the sole aspect. Even the four levels 
of participation suggested by the World Bank, namely, information sharing, 
consultation, decision making and initiating action, refer primarily if not solely to 
the mental aspects of the process. Yet clearly, physical involvement in the various 
activities of the relief process is also necessary. This necessity emanates not least 
from the insufficient supply of labour usually at the disposal of aid agencies. It can 
be argued and demonstrated that without the physical involvement of the community 
the relief process might encounter many problems. For example, community security 
arrangements for relief food stocks in south Sudan, which relied on community 
members as guards, proved to be more effective than one that used agency-employed 
staff. 
48 
Since it has been suggested that the community, rather than the individual, should be 
paramount as the basis of relief activities, mental participation refers to the process 
by which the 'mind of the community' (more like Durkheim's conscience collective) 
should be engaged at all levels of the relief process. This means providing real 
opportunities for people either to say how they feel on decisions that have already 
been made so that adjustments can be made or, wherever possible, to provide 
opportunities for the people's say before decisions are made. Physical participation, 
on the other hand, centres on labour contributions by communities. 
It can be argued that so far, in spite of the rhetorical premium placed on the former 
interpretation of participation, the latter has in fact taken precedence, especially when 
seen from the point of view of many field staff. While influencing decisions is the 
key aspect in the common interpretations of the participation process, in practice the 
answers one gets to the question how did people participate in the project? often 
reflects the physical aspect of the process. Responses to this question obtained in 
field studies in south Sudan and Malawi provided the following examples: 
In a Nutrition programme: People constructed feeding centres using local 
materials, that women helped in the management of the centres by cooking 
food for the children, pounding grain, drawing water, helping to weigh 
babies etc; 
In a general ration programme: that they acted as porters atfood distribution 
sites. Here, some would even claim that an aspect of women's empowerment 
was introduced because the agency employed a policy of using them, and not 
men as porters. It was also sometimes said that people participated as guards 
for the food stocks pending distribution. 
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In a Psychosocial trauma programme: that they helped build the centres for 
children to be treated in. 
The list of such answers can go on and on. Of course, it is also true that sometimes 
one gets answers to the effect that some representatives of the community attended 
this planning meeting or that co-ordination workshop. However, this happens less 
often than the physical involvement, and in many cases it occurs when the agency 
has encountered a problem that it is failing to deal with. So for example, in one case 
in south Sudan, community members were invited to attend an inter-agency 
workshop because the agencies had discovered that some people were not being 
reached in the food distribution programme. In another case, an agency held 
meetings with male members of the community after discovering that women who 
were attending feeding centres were having domestic problems with their husbands. 
There were many other such examples. 
For participation to be successful, equal emphasis should be placed on both mental 
and physical involvement. These aspects of participation can be seen as mutually 
reinforcing. Greater levels of mental involvement (information sharing, consultation, 
decision making etc. ) will lead to greater commitment in labour mobilisation, while 
greater levels of physical involvement (provision of labour at various levels in the 
programme) may lead to a sense of ownership, which may facilitate mental 
involvement. In all cases, however, communities must be given opportunities to 
express the forms of participation they feel appropriate and necessary to benefit 
them. This does not suggest that agencies must agree with everything communities 
suggest. The resultant practice should be based on a process of negotiation, and not 
manipulation, between the agency and the community, taking into account the key 
concerns of each. 
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The more frequent question that has been asked, however, relates to how people can 
participate in the 'mental sense'. This question can be examined by making reference 
to the different levels of participation mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. 
Information sharing and consultation. 
The word sharing at this level of the participation process is important. Some refer to 
the same process as information gathering. The difference in practice can be 
profound. Ideally this is the level at which the agency should learn things about the 
community it wishes to assist as well as the community learning more about the 
agency. Very often, only the former applies, i. e. the agency only gathers the 
information it perceives necessary for its pre-conceived purposes. The agency rarely 
tells the community about itself, for example, the policy framework within which it 
operates, its operational procedures, resource as well as staffing limitations, 
entitlements etc. However, a correct picture of the agency can go a long way towards 
preventing the creation of 'wrong' expectations in the community. 
Agency staff may assume that local people are not interested or do not have the 
faculties to understand the operational aspects of their organisation. In addition, 
agencies may fail to realise that knowledge regarding resources, objectives, 
affiliation, operational procedures etc., may help the community in its own 
assessment of what is achievable, or to understand why certain decisions and actions 
are being taken. This can have a profound impact on the success of the programme. 
For example, during a disaster relief programme in Malawi (Chapter Five), 
communities that understood that relief items were not being provided by the 
government had less difficulty understanding why relief was being targeted and were 
less likely to associate the programme with local and national politics. Those without 
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this knowledge accused the government of favouritism. In one extreme instance, this 
resulted in the traditional leader of a particular community barring relief from 
reaching his area. 
As in participation as a whole, information gathering and consultation can be done in 
various ways and for various purposes. Information can be gathered to fill a 
knowledge gap, to facilitate an action already in process or even to legitimate an 
action. For example Harragin (1998: ii) observes that: 'Aid agencies in South Sudan 
work in an information-poor environment because of a profound lack of 
communication with the local population. The tendency is therefore to latch onto any 
information that tries to present local perspectives and twist it to fit the preconceived 
solutions that agencies come up with'. This is one of the reasons why the notion of 
sharing rather than gathering information holds more appeal. 
Methods of gathefing1sharing information. 
Of approaches claimed to be 'participatory' and 'empowering', Rapid Rural 
Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) are the most well known 
and increasingly becoming popular. Their variants are Participatory Assessment 
Monitoring and Assessment (PAME) and Participatory Action Research (PAR). 
Thus: '... an agency committed to women's empowerment may find RRA/PRA 
techniques immediately appealing... ' (Oxfam, 1995: 129). Some people appear to be 
caught in some kind of frenzy about them. Some bilateral and multilateral donors 
even make them a pre-condition for funding. Robert Chambers and associates at the 
Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex are credited with 
popularising RRA. 
In recent times however, RRA and PRA have come under considerable scrutiny. For 
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example: 
'It is sometimes claimed that PRA is a tool for people's 
empowerment. However, the transfer of power is not a matter of 
appraisal techniques; power has to be deliberately relinquished by the 
people and the agencies that hold it ... Unless people are involved in the 
planning, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes 
affecting them, the danger is that NGOs may be using RRA/PRA 
techniques in a cynical way, as a one-off exercise in participation, or 
that they are simply unaware of the extent to which their intentions 
are undermined by their actions' (Oxfam, 1995: 13 1). 
Ngujiri (1998: 446), who argues that 'participatory methodologies are double-edged 
swords that can be used to destroy or to build the capacities of those upon whom they 
are used', echoes this criticism. In his view: 
'Asking people to say what their problems are, using all sorts of participatory 
methodologies is tantamount to asking them to say how useless, weak, empty, 
powerless and worthless they are in order for them to qualify to be helped. 
Yet this, to many, is called community involvement or participation. It would 
be correct to say that the community has participated in its own destruction in 
that after listing their problems, real, discovered and unreal, they discover 
how useless they are and feel worse off than before the exercise. They 
actually discover how poor they are and feel they seriously need external 
support. This is a negative discovery and however real or otherwise it may be, 
it can disempower or depress a community. Negative discovery works the 
same way three people can have a bad effect on you by separately telling you 
that you look ill. At the end of this you most likely end up feeling ill and 
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wanting medical attention. It is as serious as that' (ibid., p 468). 
Ngujiri's argument is especially relevant in cases where, after conducting the 
exercise, the agency finds that it has no or inadequate resources to implement the 
programme in accordance with the 'will of the people'. Then all the agency can 
display is a spirit of 'open heart but empty pockets'. 
Leurs (1997) reviews some of the main challenges facing RRA/PRA. First, he notes 
that these methods are being used differently by different kinds of people and for 
different purposes. Some are using them as a research methodology, some as a tool 
for project appraisal and others as part of a process of participatory development. 
Obviously this is likely to lead to a certain level of confusion and lack of clarity as to 
just what these methods can and should achieve. Lack of clarity on the context and 
purposes for which RRA/PRA are being used is likely to result in inappropriate 
nature and levels of training, as well as its facilitation. The main challenges currently 
facing PRA are with regard to: 
" Introducing and spreading PRA in communities, especially as regards the 
training and supporting of local facilitators, as well as ensuring that 
experience is shared. 
" Introducing PRA into development organisations and projects faces 
problems of unfavourable policy environment, lack of enthusiasm with 
PRA due to the hierarchical culture of management, or conflict with 
existing top-down planning and evaluation mechanisms, as well as 
inflexible or inappropriate accountability requirements of donors, central 
ministries and politicians. 
* Quality and quality assurance are difficult to achieve. 
54 
* Lack of methodological critique of PRA. 
Despite being perhaps the most popular, RRA/PRA are not the only methods used in 
development and relief contexts. Appraisal and information gathering can take many 
forms. These can be informal or formal. The following is a list of some of these 
methods (Oxfam, 1995: 118-150): 
* Meetings and visits. 
e Consultation. 
9 Workshops 
9 Technical advice. 
9 Capacities and Vulnerabilities analysis (CVA). 
4, Gender Framework Analysis (GFA). 
* Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 
e Logical Framework Analysis (LFA). 
* Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA). 
9 Social and Financial Cost-benefit Analysis. 
Chambers (1985: 523-526) produces an even more comprehensive 'menu of 
methods' 
These include: Secondary data reviews; direct observation; do-it-yourself, key 
indicators; semi-structured interviews; key informants; group interviews; chain of 
interviews; transect and group walks; mapping and aerial photographs; diagrams; 
ranking, stratifying and quantification; ethnohistories; stories, portraits, and case 
studies; team interactions; key probes; and questionnaires. As Chambers himself 
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observes, most of these methods involve outsiders learning from, and sometimes 
with, rural people but they are not necessarily participatory in nature. 
Decision-Making. 
In general it can be said that it appears relatively easier to find ways of involving 
people at the levels of information sharing or gathering and consultation. These two 
levels of participation do not necessarily involve the sharing of power between the 
agency and the affected population. This is perhaps the reason why these two levels 
happen relatively more often. The real problem appears to start at the level of 
decision-making, where power is an issue. The question that must be asked here is 
simply this: how can people participate so that they are able to influence the 
decisions taken at every stage of the project? Framed in this way, however, this 
question assumes that the answer simply lies in the manner of participation. As the 
discussion of empowerment has shown, there has to be a genuine willingness of the 
agency to surrender some of its power to the affected population. 
In terms of understanding how people can participate in the decision-making process 
it is important to clarify the process itself. Decisions about the various stages of the 
project are usually made either at the headquarters or the regional office level. In 
emergency situations, issues leading to the making of decisions may sometimes be 
discussed during relief co-ordination meetings. These meetings usually take place a 
safe distance away from the affected areas. Wherever they take place, there is usually 
a remarkable absence of any representatives of the communities to be assisted. It 
appears that no concerted efforts are made to find out who the communities feel 
would be in a position to represent their interests and then include these people in the 
various decision- making fora. Excuses to do with language ability might sometimes 
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be given but this usually ignores the fact that within many communities there are 
certain local professionals in the fields of education (such as primary school 
teachers), health, forestry, local government etc who can be recruited as translators. 
In some cases failure to include affected people in decision-making fora has nothing 
to do with problems of language. 
During the disaster relief programme in Malawi in 1997, for example, the District 
Commissioners (DCs) of the two districts that were receiving assistance suggested 
that some of the monthly inter-agency planning and co-ordination meetings be held 
in one of the two districts rather than the main commercial city where these meetings 
were being held. The DCs reasoned that this would allow agency and government 
staff to have a first hand experience of the situation, which would have allowed them 
to appreciate some of the arguments presented by them (the DCs). Additionally, they 
suggested that holding meetings in the affected areas would have enabled many 
traditional leaders to attend and present their thoughts on the relief programme. 
Everyone agreed that this was a very good idea but nothing was done to respond in 
practical terms. 
In 1998 in south Sudan co-ordination meetings were taking place at the Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS) base in northern Kenya. There was no evidence that traditional 
leaders attended these meetings. What they attended were meetings held at the 
implementation level by agency field staff and their contributions were therefore 
limited to presenting ideas to already pre-decided agenda. Moreover, it was not clear 
whether field staff were mandated to handle these contributions on their own, and if 
so, with what room for manoeuvre or if mechanisms existed to provide feedback to 
their regional and head offices. 
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Initiating action. 
It was mentioned earlier that this is the level at which people spontaneously organise 
themselves to take action because of a shared problem or area of interest, rather than 
respond to inducement from outside agencies. It is true that communities may 
spontaneously initiate action in order to respond to certain environmental or social 
changes. However, the influence of access to resources and knowledge of new 
opportunities in limiting the actions of the poor should not be forgotten. So rather 
than using all sorts of participatory approaches to get the community to recognise its 
problems and start considering ways of solving them, the most empowering action by 
the agency may be simply to make the community aware of what resources it is in a 
position to offer and under what conditions, or/and new opportunities that may have 
arisen beyond the community setting. 
This information alone can propel the community into organising itself in various 
ways in order to access the resources. Such organisation can spark other types of 
action as well. The community will usually be in a position to judge whether the 
resources or the conditions under which they are offered are beneficial or disruptive. 
If the latter is felt to be the case the community may choose not to participate. As 
White argues (1996: 12), 'Participation is not always in the interest of the poor. 
Everything depends on the type of participation and the terms on which it is offered. 
In [some] cases... exit may be the most empowering action'. Rejecting the idea that 
those who do not 'participate' are passive she argues: 
'People have always participated... on the most favourable terms they can 
obtain. They wait with a mixture of expectation and scepticism what the new 
agency in their area is offering, and what it will want in return. They have 
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opted in or out of projects as they suited their interests. At least some of what 
agencies may see as project 'misbehaviour' can from another standpoint be 
viewed as their co-optation from below' (p. 14). 
Some writers have used the term 'Shared Social Learning' to provide a wider 
interpretation of what is commonly known as 'beneficiary voice'. 
'By "Shared Social Learning"... we mean the process and the products of 
people working together to discover and understand actual and preferred 
practice, about, in the case of humanitarian programmes, best ways of 
meeting immediate survival needs in times of severe stress. Meeting these 
needs may be through understanding of, and support for, "coping 
mechanisms", emergency relief goods, providing humanitarian protection or 
contributing to peace-building processes, or all of these' (Apthorpe and 
Atkinson, 1999a: 12). 
This interpretation can also be applied to development situations, if one chose to 
separate relief and development. Interpreted in this way the issue of beneficiary voice 
should not be methodologically constricted: 'Rather we would suggest that "shared 
social learning" by a variety of methods is desirable and possible, where there are no 
counterproductive effects, whether this is exactly "participatory" or not' (Apthorpe 
and Atkinson, 1999a: 9). 
In summary, for development and relief to be successful, agencies need to have 
adequate knowledge of the communities selected for intervention. Participatory 
methods of information gathering and appraisal should be used wherever possible. 
However, there may well be non-participatory methods that can contribute to the 
process of understanding communities. Therefore, over-emphasis on participatory 
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methods should not blind people about these. 
The scope of the research. 
As shown in the foregoing sections there are a number of theoretical issues that 
surround the issue of participation. In disaster relief, empirical testing of many of 
these issues tends to be limited to experiences of particular aid workers who may or 
may not slant their reports in line with their purposes for producing such reports. 
This study is an attempt to provide, based on three case studies, an expanded 
understanding of the multiplicity of issues that relate to participation. While it is true 
that the concept of participation is difficult, if not impossible, to define it would also 
be difficult to do a systematic study of something that cannot be defined or at least 
described. Since we know, however, that disaster relief involves an interface between 
aid organisations and their workers, governments (or de facto organisations) and the 
people that have been affected by a disaster, this study took as the premise for 
understanding participation, the theoretical notion of the ability of all of these actors 
to influence decisions regarding the ways in which assistance is provided. 
Based on this notion the study attempted to use empirical data to address the 
uncertainties that surround the concept of participation, namely: 
a) Why is participation needed? Despite the general agreement that ethically, 
participation is in itself a good thing, is there evidence that disaster relief 
programmes are more effective when delivered in a participatory fashion? In 
what ways can 'effectiveness' be meaningfully understood? What can be the 
role of participation itself in helping us to understand 'effectiveness'? 
b) How can people participate in an emergency situation? Do disasters or 
emergencies require emergency-specific methodologies or methodological 
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tools? In what ways might concems that issues such as time pressures, or 
complex political situations might limit the extent of participation be 
justified? 
c) Who should participate? Should participation be limited only to people who 
receive assistance from agencies or in other words those 'targeted' for 
assistance? If not, who else should participate? In what ways can such people 
be identified? Who are the vulnerable? How can they be appropriately 
identified and assisted in the context of limited resources within which aid 
agencies operate? How useful is the 'social structure' as a realm for 
participation in emergencies? 
d) What other issues besides the uncertainties listed above limit participation? 
What processes foster participation? 
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Chapter Two. Participation in Development Practice: a 
review of the state of the art with reference to some 
empirical examples. 
Introduction 
If participation is an evolving concept defying any simplistic definitions and 
interpretations, the concept of development is not any different. Historically and at 
present, there have never been any easy answers to the question, what is 
development? There appear to be as many interpretations of development as there are 
of participation. For example, at an annual Xavier Institute Convention held in 1991: 
'Speakers were not unanimous in interpreting the term "develoPment". One 
section of them viewed it in terms of economic prosperity and the other in 
terms of social upliftment. A few others looked at it as a process which 
enhances human potential' (Xavier Institute of Social Service, 199 1: 1). 
This division in fact represents the major rift between academics and professionals 
globally. In such a scenario, it should be obvious that the double-barrelled concept of 
participatory development should face formidable problems of interpretation. Some 
have conceptualised participatory development, seen in terms of sustainability, as a 
process by which people, communities and countries gain voice and move towards 
enhanced autonomy, going from passiveness or submission to negotiated action 
(Schneider and Libercier, 1995). This definition is useful because it tells us that there 
are several separate, if linked, levels at which the attainment of voice and enhanced 
autonomy is to be understood i. e. at the level of individuals, at the level of 
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communities and at the level of a country as a whole. This means that to implement 
participatory development we must endeavour to comprehend the different 
processes, agenda, values, needs, hopes, fears, aspirations and priorities held at each 
level, with regard to the dynamic nature of these. Given that ideas regarding 
participatory development are likely to vary across the different levels, policy makers 
and practitioners should attempt to bridge the gap in ways that will not make one 
group the sole loser. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with participation in emergency relief, rather than 
development contexts. However, it is important to review the concept of participation 
within the context of development because of the traditional relationship with 
emergency relief. This relationship has led to a lively debate as regards how to 
reconcile the two both in theory and in practice. Theoretically, commentators have 
grappled with issues regarding exactly where emergency relief ends and where 
development begins as well as inherent variations that exist between the two. 
Practically, it is normally the case that many international NGOs and government 
agencies are involved in both relief and development and sometimes find it difficult 
to distinguish between relief and development activities. As a matter of fact, many 
development NGOs actually started off as relief NGOs, and it appears somewhat 
paradoxical that relief should learn from development rather than the other way 
round. Methodologically, questions have been raised as to whether the same 
participatory methods (if) used successfully in development settings can and should 
also be used in relief situations. In both development and relief, if more so in the 
latter than in the former, doubts exist about the practicality and benefits of 
participatory approaches, in addition to the question of whether such approaches are 
also empowering, as sometimes claimed. 
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Apthorpe and Atkinson (1999a: 11) argue that these comparisons are pertinent when 
considering the potential for participatory approaches in emergency situations since: 
'17here is no a priori reason why these should borrow uncritically from what 
is not only a substantively and situationally different area but also one in 
which far too much has been claimed in theory... At the same time there is no 
a priori reason why humanitarian programmes should not be able to learn 
much from becoming more collaborative and consultative than they are... the 
principle conclusion this synthesis paper reaches is that the more 
collaborative and consultative humanitarian programmes become the better, 
both ethically and practically'. 
The process of development (as also that of emergency relief) has been undergoing 
an evolutionary process. Traditionally, development was theoretically seen in terms 
of economic growth. Such growth was regarded as a means through which the 
society's economy would meet the basic consumption needs of its population, 
particularly the underprivileged groups. Subsequent perspectives on development 
drew attention to the need to raise the self-awareness of the people rather than 
educating or indoctrinating them, giving them the power to assert their 'voice', and 
stimulating their self-driven action to transform their reality. In addition, some views 
appeared to draw on Marx's ideas of the self-emancipation of oppressed groups, 
while yet others saw development as the release of people's creativity (Rahman, 
1995). According to Rahman, 'such radical theoretical or philosophical conceptions 
of popular grassroots mobilisations have, however, lacked a political theory for 
macro-level social transformation, without which the micro-level assertion of 
popular power and release of people's creativity remain heavily circumscribed' 
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(Rahman, 1995: 25). 
Thus, even in practice, a major challenge is to find a balance between development 
in the macro sense, for example at the level of the nation, and development in the 
micro sense, that is, at the level of small communities or even groups of individuals. 
On the one hand, it is quite well known, for example, that high levels of economic 
growth measured in terms of indices such as rising GDP and GNP per Capita levels 
do not necessarily mean an improvement in living standards for the majority of the 
poor people. (Professor Raymond Apthorpe, in a personal communication, suggested 
that a more accurate social indicator of development should be GHP, i. e. Gross 
Happiness Product! ). On the other hand, peasant demands and their view of 
development may not be one that necessarily increases production at the national 
level. This contradiction may be at the heart of situations in which governments are 
caught up in the rhetoric for participation and increased peasant decision-making, 
while in reality they continue to pursue a production-focused development approach. 
The language of participation has become so part and parcel of development 
dialogue that it almost sounds redundant to state that many organisations are 
advocating it. The manuals and policy documents of almost all international as well 
as local NGOs contain phrases expressing the agencies' commitment to participation. 
Participatory development has also received a major boost from vigorous support 
from other international development agencies, most notably, the World Bank. 
Several UN agencies also actively promote participation either through funding and 
facilitating the implementation of devolution programmes, funding participatory 
projects or sponsoring research and academic enterprise into the concepts of 
participation and development. Included among these agencies are the United 
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Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development (UNRISD). Four of these agencies, the FAO, the ILO, UNIFEM 
and the WHO, are members, under the chairmanship of the ILO, of a United Nations 
Task Force on Rural Development charged with the specific task of promoting the 
concept and practice of people's participation in rural development as well as in 
other UN programmes. 
There are also budding regional forums calling for popular participation in 
development. For example, the Arusha Conference on Popular Participation in the 
Recovery and Development Process in Africa issued the African Charter on Popular 
Participation in 1990. In Asia, the Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty 
Alleviation made a call to make participatory development a central strategy, 
arguing, based on mounting evidence regarding the behaviour of low-income 
producers, that this will not only lead to poverty alleviation but will also maximise 
the rate of economic growth (Rahman, 1995: 26) In addition, several universities 
have established institutes or departments which promote research and dissemination 
of knowledge on the concept of participation. Most notable among them are the 
Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom 
and Cornell University in the United States. 
But so far, despite strong and growing endorsement of participatory development, 
cases of successful implementation of genuine participatory programmes and 
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projects are rare. The concept of participatory development appears to suffer from an 
apparent paradox. On the one hand, there seems to be a consensus that participatory 
development offers the potential to succeed where the earlier approaches to 
development failed, namely to ensure that the underprivileged groups in society are 
not by-passed in the development process. On the other hand, there are increasing 
out-cries that participatory development continues to fail to achieve extensive 
application. The question that many are attempting to answer is why. 
The Politics of Participation. 
To the question why participation fails to gain wide application in practice, there are 
many answers. Some answers would seem to suggest that this is so because those 
who are in control of resources do not believe that economic and social development 
can be internally, rather than externally, induced. Many have seen participation as an 
instrument that can be used to induct people into the economic and cultural systems 
of the West. Furthermore, there is an apparent lack of commitment to make the 
necessary structural reforms that will accord peasants or the urban poor access to and 
control of resources. Rahman (1995: 26-27) argues that: 
'Participatory development is far from being adopted in practice anywhere in 
a way which leads to major structural reforms and the transfer of resources 
away from those vested interests that control dominant social and political 
structures towards underprivileged people. Dominant lobbies in the Southern 
countries are accepting PD (Participatory Development) as at best a poverty 
alleviation strategy, to be implemented sporadically at the micro-level, and 
then only by mobilising the resources of the poverty groups themselves, 
supplemented by donor support, rather than redirecting the mainstream of 
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development resources to support PD on a national scale. Mainstream 
development efforts supported by the great bulk of foreign development 
assistance remains very much non-participatory, and poverty-augmenting 
rather than poverty-alleviating' (emphasis supplied) (Rahman, 1995: 26-7). 
In particular, the author notes that the World Bank's structural adjustment 
programme followed by many countries as a condition for the Bank's assistance is 
not concerned with participatory development, among other things. He argues that 
reliance on the virtue of the free market in allocation of resources favours the 
specific consumption needs of the affluent rather than those of the poor. In many 
countries the results of the programme have included, among others, the worsening 
of the growth performance in the private sector and in the public sector development 
efforts, and the dominance of bureaucratic and technocratic approaches that don't 
favour the poor. 
Doubts 
It is important to note that within the overwhelming endorsement of participation, 
and despite the fact that many declare their convictions regarding its benefits, it 
would seem that there is some level of doubt among some as to the benefits of 
participation. For example: 'Research should be undertaken to try to determine the 
net benefits of participatory practices. This research should include a test of the 
hypothesis that lower borrower commitment and low levels of popular participation 
often lead to high costs later because of low impact or project failure' (Bhatnagar and 
Williams, 1992: 5). Similarly, Picciotto (1992: 1) comments that, as regards the 
concept of participatory development, 'more examples are needed to beef up the 
theory and more theory is needed to illuminate an elusive development reality'. 
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In some cases, this uncertainty seems to stem from difficulties involved in 
identifying and quantifying the benefits of participation. Thus: 'This problem is most 
evident when examining ongoing projects, especially those still in the early stages of 
implementation; participation related benefits may not be seen until several years of 
implementation have yielded evidence on, for example, the quality and likely 
sustainability of the project activities' (Rietbergen-McCracken, 1996: 18). These 
views may be a clue to a situation in which many tend to endorse participation 
simply in order not to be seen to go against the tide, but deep down are neither 
convinced about the benefits of, nor committed to, genuine participation. In part this 
may also explain why there is so much rhetoric and limited practice in participatory 
development. 
Lack of government interest 
In some cases, it seems that resistance or lack of enthusiasm for participation is 
generated by fear of losing political control and economic benefit, especially in the 
case of government officials of the host country and local elites. Oakley et al. (1991: 
11-12) note that there are several structural obstacles to genuine participation. 
Firstly, a political environment that results from an ideology that prefers controlled 
decision-making to encouraging openness or views from the citizens can inhibit 
participation. Secondly, genuine participation can be severely curtailed by a political 
system that does not put local administration mechanisms and decision-making in the 
mainstream. Thirdly, participation can be thwarted through tensions that can be 
generated by the friction between mechanisms promoted by the state on the local 
level, aimed at achieving centrally planned objectives, and the development efforts 
generated informally at the grass-roots level. Fourthly, participation can be frustrated 
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by the legal system, especially when information on legal rights is not disseminated 
to the poor and where legislation governing the right of legal associations of different 
groups of poor workers is withheld. In such a situation efforts by the poor to build 
organisations to represent their interests will be severely limited, as they would be in 
a situation where legislation gives the government sweeping powers to disperse 
'unlawful assemblies'. 
Reviewing a number of studies documenting the experience of the World Bank and 
other stakeholders on participation in development projects, Reitbergen-McCracken 
(1996: 4) observes that 'in several of the projects studied the proposed participatory 
approach met with resistance from government officials... and limited the success of 
the implementation of the approach'. In the case of a Rural Development Project in 
Ecuador, the writer reports that government interest in utilising the participatory 
approach during the early stages of the project was based on seeking financial and 
labour contributions from the beneficiaries rather than on achieving more meaningful 
participation. In addition, there was weak commitment on the part of government 
officials in the implementing agency because of their lack of adequate involvement 
during the preparation phase of the project and also because they had little 
experience with participatory approaches. During a change in leadership in the 
implementing agency brought about by elections, more traditionally minded 
ministers replaced many who had supported the participatory approach. 
Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) have argued that governments may offer varying degrees of 
resistance with respect to different sectors of the economy. According to this 
argument, governments are, for example, more likely to accept or tolerate 
participation in sectors that do not directly jeopardize the position of local elites and 
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state agents. Such fields include public health and areas whose success requires the 
active participation of local people such as population control and environmental 
control. The authors note that participation in the field of public health is gaining 
ground with support from international organisations such as the WHO and 
UNICEF. Similarly, the increasing magnitude and seriousness of environmental 
problems, the inability of government to address them and international advocacy of 
sustainable development approaches have persuaded governments to be more open to 
participatory approaches. 
To be sure, it is important on the theoretical level that the functioning of the state be 
seen in a proper perspective to gain a proper understanding as regards its dealings 
with its population. Here again, the argument put forward by Stiefel and Wolfe 
(1994: 211) is most illuminating: 
'The state has probably never encountered such diverse ideological attacks 
and threats to its functioning since the genesis of the modem nation-states 
two centuries ago. Radical proponents of participatory development and 
empowerment theories tend to see in it a main cause of continued poverty and 
inequality, and pursue, consciously or not, an anarchist utopia from which the 
state would be absent and where only the 'people' or the 'community' 
remains. Their opponents from the right join them in this almost visceral anti- 
state attitude. They advocate further dismantling of the welfare state, 
deregulation and privatisation, and argue for the inherent curative and 
productive virtues of the free market and of individual initiative. Historical 
evidence suggests that both assumptions about the role of the state may be 
wrong and that a healthy state is probably indispensable both for the 
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development of the free market economy and for the functioning of a 
participatory democratic sYStem. 
From the standpoint of this inquiry into participation, whatever the recent 
upheavals and confusions, the state and its agents remain key actors in the 
development game at the national and sub-regional levels. And key questions 
relevant to the "organised efforts of the excluded" remain the extent to which 
the state can become willing and able to promote or tolerate such efforts, and 
the conditions under which state agents can help the excluded achieve more 
control over their own livelihoods and an authentic voice in shaping their and 
the county's future'. 
Local elites. 
The argument about local elites is that when they stand to lose a position of 
advantage socially and economically as a result of a more participatory approach to 
the development of their community, they are more likely to offer resistance. 
According to a study of the Northeast Rural Development Programme in Brazil by 
Kottak et al., for example, (Reported by Rietbergen-McCracken, 1996) high state- 
level commitment to participation was undermined by the behaviour of a municipal- 
level politician. The politician had obtained substantial economic gains through 
middleman activities. The formation of a local association aimed at regulating the 
sale of local products put middlemen in a disadvantaged position. In an effort to 
protect his privileged position the politician accused the association of being linked 
to the Leftist Workers' Party in an attempt to arouse state-level opposition and 
reduce the flow of resources to the project. 
72 
It would be erroneous, however, to hold the view that all local elites are opposed to 
all forms of community participation in all circumstances. To begin with, there is no 
consensus on the model of state-society relations that depicts local elites as obstacles 
to the democratisation of authority and greater participation in development (Mitra, 
1992). Viewing local elites as a dominant force that accumulates benefits because of 
their control of land, capital and high social status, is just one alternative. This model 
contradicts alternative models born out of research findings in some parts of the 
world. With reference to the case of India, for example, Mitra argues that there exists 
tremendous internal diversity in the social origins of local leaders. In addition, the 
base of their political support may be fragile and variable, frequently dependent upon 
their ability to 'deliver the goods'. 
The author argues that the available evidence in India shows that there has been a 
steady broadening of the political arena, considerable turnover of leadership and the 
entry of hitherto excluded groups into the political process. Concluding his argument 
regarding the relationship between the peasantry, local elites and the state, Mitra 
(1992: 209-211) contends that: 
'The field data presented here question the apparent supine and abject 
surrender of the peasantry by drawing upon their ability to manipulate the 
environment to their benefit; to engage in a covert guerrilla war against their 
enemies with "weapons of the weak", and even to find allies within the state 
structure who devise policies that seek to balance central planning with local 
knowledge and welfare... the crucial intermediaries in this process of social 
change and development transformation of their economy are local elites... 
they are political actors, situated'at the interface of the modem state and 
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traditional society, of modernity and tradition and of individual rationality 
and group solidarity... engaged in a two-way interpretation of norms and 
political demands. Their methods range between acting as brokers in national, 
regional and local elections, lobbying and contacting the bureaucracy and 
higher political elites for the allocation of material resources and seeking to 
bolster their demands through rhetoric and occasional spells of radical 
protest'. 
Mitra's argument regarding the role of local elites in lobbying for the allocation of 
material resources is supported by the writings of Gilbert and Gugler (1981) who 
noted that their absence in poor urban neighbourhoods could result in the absence of 
an articulate voice leading to their neglect by the national bureaucracy. 
The apparent contradiction in the experiences of the behaviour of local elites seem to 
call for an investigation into the forces that lead them to behave in a particular way. 
On the one hand, it might be true that individual elites would seek to maximise the 
advantages of their privileged position by opposing changes that lead to the loss of 
that position. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the predominant view that 
local elites are likely to behave in this way may lead, especially when international 
agencies are involved, to unwarranted prejudice, suspicion and hostility being 
directed against them. Thus, instead of being treated as partners in the development 
of their community, they may be treated as obstacles and be excluded from genuine 
participation. In the end a self-reinforcing situation can arise as the local elites 
attempt to react to the sentiments and treatment directed against them. 
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Mistrust. 
It is clear from the literature that there is usually a general mistrust between various 
stakeholders in the development process. For example, Rietbergen-MacCracken 
(1996: 4), contends that 'in many instances, the relationship between beneficiaries, 
NGOs, and government (and in some cases, the World Bank) has been, at least 
initially, based on mistrust and suspicion. ' She cites a case from a study of a waste 
management programme in Nepal to demonstrate that such mistrust could be based 
on previous failures experienced by communities. 
However, it must be stated that such mistrust is usually mutual rather than 
unidirectional. There are various reasons why the World Bank and other external 
agencies are wary of government officials. While they may lack the necessary skills 
and incentives, one of the most frequently implied, if not openly mentioned, causes 
of mistrust and suspicion is that government agents are, allegedly, frequently corrupt. 
Indeed, such allegations sometimes are justified on the basis of reports in the press, 
regarding the misuse of donor funds by top government officials. In addition, 
external agencies frequently view 'government and its bureaucratic apparatus as 
essentially hostile to the whole notion of reducing central control, devolving 
decisions to local level and supporting demands made by rural people for the kinds 
of radical changes that might be required to find lasting solutions for the poverty they 
suffer' (Oakley et al., 1991: 20); and, despite the fact that there are some government 
ideologies that overtly promote people's participation, such as those of Tanzania, 
Ethiopia and the Philippines, 'governments are inevitably the main protagonists of a 
top-down approach to development and the object of much critical comment on the 
effectiveness of big, donor-supported development projects' (ibid., p. 22). 
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Governments may also be suspicious of the international donor community for 
various reasons, some of them bom out of previous experiences. For example, there 
are no shortages of reports in the media showing leaders of governments in 
developing countries accusing foreign envoys of wanting to run their governments 
for them. Such leaders sometimes argue that foreign envoys lack the internal 
knowledge necessary for the proper assessment of the feasibility of new ideas. In 
some cases, political leaders may see ideas emanating from the international 
community as potentially dangerous with respect to their hold on power. In other 
cases, these leaders are not happy with the inflexibility of the international 
community in terms of which programmes to support. There are also cases in which 
government leaders feel that the international community is more likely to heed 
proclamations made by internal opposition and watchdog groups on isolated and 
specific incidences, even if such proclamations are not justified in the context of the 
wider political processes. The issue of 'strings' attached to aid given to developing 
countries is also another well-known grounds for government mistrust and suspicion 
of the international community. 
The Role of International Organisations. 
'International organisations, technical co-operation agencies, and above all international lending 
institutions such as the World Bank, regional development banks or the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, at times exert a decisive influence on national policy' (Stiefel and Woft, 
1994: 220). 
While not wishing to exonerate governments from the damning accusation that they 
stand in the way of people's participation, it would be unfair to regard them as the 
sole villains in this unfolding drama. To begin with, Rahman's discussion has 
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already made it clear that many governments in the developing world have been 
forced to adopt structural adjustment programmes, which have nothing to do with 
participatory development, as a precondition for the World Bank's financial 
assistance. Secondly, most government staffs in developing countries continue to be 
trained in top-down models of planning and administration. Furthermore, 
organisations, particularly the World Bank, appear to put a premium on training 
economists in order to enhance economic management in developing countries. Such 
actions can only serve to entrench government agents deeper and deeper into top- 
down, non-participatory approaches. 
Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) note that there is still a wide gap between rhetoric and 
reality in the behaviour of many international agencies. While they strongly advocate 
participation in their pronouncements, a good many of them still tend to concentrate 
exclusively on economic and technical factors to the neglect of political factors and 
realities. In addition, despite theoretically regarding development as a historical 
process, these organisations continue to plan and implement their activities within a 
traditional, a-historical 'project approach'. The following quote sums up the state of 
affairs aptly: 
'Studies conducted recently in various international organisations, both at 
headquarters and in the field, show that instances of real participation as 
defined in this book continue to be rare. When it comes to the practical 
implementation of development policy, international organisations invariably 
tend to put aside the "empowermenf' rhetoric and revert to traditional 
"beneficiary" or "target group" participation... International organisations 
continue to have few direct contacts with the actual grassroots communities... 
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their main partners remain government agencies at central, and possibly down 
to the district levels, other international agencies, international NGOs, and 
consultants and technicians. The gap between rhetoric and reality is 
particularly pathetic in those organisations and agencies that like to maintain 
a progressive image: while the organisations' top management and their 
governing bodies call for extensive beneficiary participation in all projects, 
and while their policy departments translate and legitimise these calls within 
a flamboyant rhetoric, the agencies' staff at headquarters and in the field are 
confused or ambivalent, do not know how to translate participation into 
reality within concrete projects against often practical and political obstacles, 
and finally put it aside as one of these new "soft" elements that complicate 
development projects, introduce factors of risk and unpredictability and 
create difficulties in implementation. What remains is in most cases a 
traditional top-down and non-participatory approach which focuses on the 
achievement of physical and financial project targets, sanctified in 
appropriate statistics, albeit within a new rhetoric' (Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994: 
225-226). 
Clearly, the key question to be asked is why, despite little action, international 
organisations continue with this 'flamboyant rhetoric'. One possibility could be that 
this rhetoric is simply an artificial costume designed to make them look good in the 
eyes of the poor in relation to their (the poor's) governments who are believed to 
have let them down. Perhaps international organisations hope that by turning up the 
volume of rhetoric they are acting as a spokes-person for the poor and putting 
pressure on governments to act. However, this tactic is unlikely to be successful 
since with increasing globalisation, the actions of these governments are heavily 
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dependent on the development agenda, mostly not sympathetic to participatory 
development, of the very same organisations that are generating the pressure. 
It would also appear that international organisations and governments alike fail to 
transform rhetoric into reality because their staffs are caught up in bureaucratic 
systems that are not conducive to the promotion of genuine participation by the poor. 
Korten and Uphof (1981), for example, argue that bureaucratic reorientation is 
needed as a way of fostering participation in rural development. In their view, the 
attitudes of superiority and paternalistic postures assumed by many staff can be 
understood not just in terms of personal dispositions: 
'Here too we must be careful not to blame the victim. In part, and sometimes 
in large part, the observed behaviour and manifest attitudes of government 
staff grow out of the bureaucratic context in which theyfind themselves: the 
role expectations communicated through training programmes and contacts 
with their superiors, the performance measures against which they are 
assessed, the structure of rewards and the kind of sanctions focused on them. ' 
(Korten and Uphof, 1981: 5, emphasis supplied). 
Korten and Uphoff are not alone in making this argument. At the Annual Xavier 
Institute Convention (Xavier Institute of Social Service, 1991: 5), 'most speakers 
seemed to agree with the view that bureaucracy is nothing but hypocrisy and is the 
fundamental obstacle to (participatory) development'. 
Over and above attempting to change the attitude and values of aid workers, the 
authors argue that 'the more important part involves changes in job dej7nitions, 
performance criteria, career incentives, bureaucratic procedures, organisational 
responsibilities and the like' (Korten and Uphoff, 1981: 6, emphasis supplied). 
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The authors argue that prevailing bureaucratic practices and the procedures and 
reward system that support them tend to be reinforced by three value equations, all of 
which are often mistaken, reflecting deeply held assumptions regarding the nature of 
the development process: 
That expenditure = results: 'Even though experience suggests that there is little 
association in the social realm between the size of government expenditure and 
the results achieved from that expenditure, administrators and technicians 
throughout the system are under inexorable pressures to act as if there were such 
an equivalence to design programmes and implement them with all possible 
speed so that they and their superiors can report X amount of progress in terms of 
X amount of money spent' (Korten and Uphoff, 198 1: 10). 
That education = superiority: Here, the authors contend that the assumption that 
formal education makes the possessor superior and that his or her judgement and 
values should prevail vis-A-vis those with less education, is unwarranted. 
According to this argument, the knowledge of a well-educated person may be 
necessary but not sufficient for programme planning and implementation. On the 
other hand, while local knowledge in unlikely to be sufficient, it is almost always 
necessary. A blend of the two is thus needed. 
* That Projects = Development: In this instance, it is assumed that development 
will be brought about by a series of finite, discontinuous actions with discreet 
time-bounded outcomes dependent on special temporary injections of external 
funds. Planning and implementation are regarded as two separate activities. This 
is in contrast to an alternative view that sees development as a continuing process 
of changing relationships where development resources are defined more broadly 
than just mere capital, and where planning and implementation are seen as a 
80 
continuing, iterative effort to deal with changing obstacles and opportunities 
(ibid., pp. 12-13). 
While the emphasis of this argument by Korten and Uphoff is government staff, the 
same is also true for staff working in international organisations. They usually have 
very high levels of formal education and are frequently addressed as 'experts', which 
is likely to make them feel superior, and they too have to report to their superiors 
who expect results based on pre-determined methods of assessment. Thus, this 
conclusion is just as relevant for staff in international organisations as it is for 
government staff. 
'We also believe that the commonly observed lack of commitment and 
imagination among the personnel of development agencies is more a 
consequence of bureaucratic systems which treat creative behaviour as 
dysfunctional than a reflection of any inherent qualities of their personnel' 
(Korten and Uphoff, 1981: 14). 
However, even this explanation still begs the question why the type of bureaucratic 
reorientation advocated by Korten and Uphoff has failed to occur. Is it because such 
reorientation is not compatible with the broader and fundamental aspects of the 
current form of the capitalist system? And given that there has not been much 
success with participatory development in previous and existing socialist contexts, is 
it perhaps the case that new forms of capitalism or socialism are needed for broad- 
based participation to occur? 
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The Practice of Participation. 
Problems emanating from theoretical dispositions such as those discussed above can 
be distinguished from views that suggest that there are some external agencies that 
are not only convinced of the benefits of participation, even if non-quantifiable, but 
also that they genuinely believe in the capacity and efficacy of indigenous groups 
and their institutions to initiate social and economic development. For this group of 
people, the will exists but practical factors constrain their actions. 
Cost and 77me 
The World Bank explored the idea that participation makes projects more costly than 
would otherwise be the case. Referring to a study done by Hentschel, Rietbergen- 
McCracken (1996: 3), notes that participatory projects cost the Bank ten to fifteen 
percent more, on average, than non-participatory ones. Workshops, consultations and 
the hiring of participation experts mainly constituted the additional costs. The author 
implies, however, that this additional cost is likely to have been under-estimated 
because only identifiable and measurable costs could be included. Costs that could 
not be measured included, for example, staff time spent in negotiating with sceptical 
governments to adopt a participatory approach, meeting with local organisations, 
strengthening their capacity, and building links between different stake holders. In 
addition, the writer argues that time-accounting procedures are often done in a way 
to mask the costs of an expensive operation by referring some of the time spent to 
other, lower cost projects. However, the study is also reported to have shown that 
there was no significant difference between participatory and non-participatory 
projects in terms of overall time elapsed between project identification and 
disbursement of funds, with some participatory projects actually disbursing quicker 
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than non-participatory ones because of the former's increased stakeholder 
commitment and better project performance. 
ExpeiWsel Methodology 
One of the most frequently encountered obstacles to participation is, it is claimed, 
lack of adequate numbers of personnel within implementing agencies who have the 
relevant skills to use participatory approaches in development and relief projects. 
'Clearly, if project staff are not provided with the necessary skills and incentives to 
work in a participatory way with local communities, their willingness and ability to 
do so will be severely hampered' (Rietbergen-McCracken, 1996: 4). Referring to a 
study of community management of rural water supply in Indonesia undertaken by 
Smith, the author noted that NGO staffs were generally better trained in facilitating 
community action than their government counterparts. As a result, the former were 
flexible and responsive in their approach. By contrast, the latter were less qualified, 
needed to cover more communities, resulting in a more top-down approach involving 
only village leaders or a small group of the local elite. 
Such findings have led some to undertake a critical exploration of the precise skills 
that are needed for enhancing participation. In reviewing the experience of the World 
Bank on participatory development in 20 of its projects, Bhatnagar (1992: 20) argues 
that expertise in any one academic field did not appear to be critical for promoting 
participation. Rather, 'participatory approaches seem often to have resulted from the 
personal commitment of individual project managers, whether these have been 
economists, financial analysts, urban planners, sociologists, engineers, 
anthropologists, demographers, management experts, public administrators, lawyers, 
psychologists, political scientists, or architects. ' According to the writer, World Bank 
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project managers have identified cultural sensitivity, negotiating skills, vision, 
perseverance, conviction, and practical work experience as some of the key character 
traits to the development of a participatory approach. Practical experience is arguably 
the most critical missing ingredient. The key issue therefore appears to be how to 
reorient existing staff, given the Bank's limited capacity to hire new staff. 
Certain aspects of Bhatnagar's argument appear to raise questions that beg answers. 
The argument is set up as follows: 
'If it can be demonstrated that individuals with certain characteristics are 
essential for the success of participatory projects, then the presence of those 
characteristics should be a criterion in the selection of many Bank staff. And 
if it can be shown that the motivation and skills in question are acquired 
rather than inherited, it would be useful to identify what in these individuals' 
previous experience makes them people-centred' (1992: 20). 
To begin with the writer appears to be making the assumption that practical work 
experience is the only generator of the required motivations, character traits and 
skills in individuals, negating any relevance attached to academic or professional 
training. This argument seems to overlook the fact that social scientists, particularly 
sociologists and anthropologists, have played a key role in the development of the 
whole notion of bringing people to the centre of the development process. Moreover, 
the premium put on individual character traits would tend to overlook factors that are 
generated by the environment within which promoters of participation operate. And 
if it is true that academic or professional training and the social-political 
environments do not play a key role at the project implementation level, then it 
should follow that the key elements mentioned above should always be present in 
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people who have had experience with participatory approaches. Since this is clearly 
not the case, the only other possible explanation is that the character traits in question 
are inherited rather than acquired. If the latter is true, then it is obvious that the quest 
for a wide application of participation is based on chance, and therefore limited 
primarily because of this fact. It is true that personal commitment, vision, negotiating 
skills and other personal attributes play a key role in the ability to use participatory 
approaches, but based on experience and findings by others, it would be a mistake to 
ignore the role played by training. 
Nevertheless, regardless of what makes some individuals more oriented towards a 
participatory approach than others, the question that continues to perplex many is: 
what precisely constitutes a participatory methodology? For example, although they 
claim that 'there are now sufficient examples of participation in practice in 
development projects for us to begin to discern elements of methodology prevalent in 
this practice' (Oakley et al., 1991: 205), Oakley et al. also note that 'one of the more 
difficult tasks in a review of project practice is to identify clearly the methodology 
used in the implementation of participation' (p. 210). And although 'project files (of 
agencies) reveal further detail of this practice and give us glimpses of the actual 
methodological tools used to promote participation' (p. 205), 'these, however, are 
scattered randomly across agencies and projects and few have systematically 
attempted to analyse the practice and present a coherent methodological statement' 
(p. 206). In a similar vein, Cernea (1992: 96) argues that 'no matter how intense or 
loud, the advocacy for people's participation in development programmes remains 
gratuitous rhetoric if it is not translated into a how-to social methodologyfor making 
popular participation real' (emphasis added). 
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Drawing from information contained in the Project files of a number of development 
agencies, Oakley et al. (1991) then set out to extract and isolate the tools for a 
participatory methodology. And drawing on their work (pp. 205-229) the following 
paragraphs attempt to provide a summary of these tools. The terminology of tools or 
instruments for a participatory methodology is important to grasp because frequently 
such tools or instruments have been regarded as being synonymous with the 
methodology itself, 
In beginning, the authors note that different methodologies of implementation result 
from different interpretations of participation, of which three can be identified: (a) 
Projects which methodologically follow a conventional project-planning cycle and 
seek to make it more participatory: in these types of projects participation is either 
non-existent or tokenistic, with an emphasis on participation in benefits; (b) Projects 
which methodologically seek to involve people in externally managed development 
projects: here, participation is still interwoven to conventional practice but the 
methodology is explicit and emphasis is on organisation, the promotion and 
development of people's awareness, and increasing their involvement, to participate 
primarily in physical activities; and (c) Projects which seek to promote a base for 
continuing people's participation: These are projects in which emphasis is on 
developing, over a period of time, a base among people, and in which the 
methodology unfolds and responds to the different stages of the process. 
Cernea (1992: 96), identifies the specific elements of a social methodology for 
implementing popular participation as including: the identification of social actors 
who will carry out the programme; the conceptualisation of the programme goals and 
participatory principles, in line with the needs of the social actors; the organisation of 
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adequate linkage systems and forms of co-operation between government agencies 
and the grassroots social actors; the establishment of information and communication 
patterns and procedures for joint decision-making, particularly regarding financial 
resource allocation and priority selection; and mobilisation through structures and 
authority mechanisms endogenous to the group of social actors. 
Several authors have undertaken to pinpoint the actual tools, or tool-kit or software 
that can be used to implement a participatory methodology (Chambers, 1985; 
Apthorpe, 2000; Cernea, 1992; Oakley et al., 1991; Oxfam, 1995). 1 referred to most 
of these in Chapter One. The following section, relying primarily on the work of 
Oakley et al. (1991), is a summary of the bases for many of the tools, as well as an 
attempt in some cases to give empirical examples. 
Economic or physical activities: In principle, these are seen as important because in 
addition to providing immediate tangible benefits, they also serve as a basis for 
building up and strengthening the future base for participation, through the 
development of group cohesion, solidarity and organisational skills. Involvement in 
physical economic activities is seen as part of a broader process of participation and 
as a way of beginning to involve people in the larger process. 
This approach appears to have been at the heart of the People's Participation 
Programme (PPP), a strategy launched by the FAO in 1980, based initially on the 
realisation of the need to mainstream participation in rural development by the World 
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD), and the 
successful implementation in the late 1970s of the Small Fanner Development 
Programme (SFDP) in Nepal (Bortei-Doku, 1991: 61). The key elements of PPP are 
said to be: a) a focus on the rural poor; b) self-organisation and self-reliance; c) 
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income-and-employment generating activities; d) small homogeneous groups; e) the 
existence of a Group Promoter (GP); f) Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation 
(PME); and the building up of capital through the provision of credit and promotion 
of savings. In the context of Ghana, where PPP first found its establishment on a 
pilot basis, the stages of implementation consisted of a baseline survey, selection and 
training of group promoters, formation of groups, provision of credit, establishment 
of income-generating activities and PME. 
The PPP methodology generated a number of key issues. Firstly, the process of 
group formation seemed to have emphasised quantity rather than quality. While there 
was a boom in the number of groups, there was no corresponding growth in key 
aspects such as self-reliance and sustainability, and several were dormant rather than 
dynamic. Secondly, the role of the GP, as is usually the case with any other type of 
facilitator, was clouded in mist. To begin with, project pressure resulted in a shift 
from a principally facilitating and educating function to an administrative one. 
Perhaps as a result of this shift the groups tended to see the GPs' role in the light of 
potential economic benefits and accepted their role on the basis of this potential. In 
addition, not only was there a considerable turnover of GPs, but also they did not 
exhibit the supposed dynamism to reflect changes in the degree of self-reliance 
among the groups. 
A key issue as regards these outcomes appears to be the fact that the whole PPP 
approach hinged on the provision of credit and the establishment of income- 
generating activities. The assumption that poor people need credit continues to 
flourish, despite suggestions from some studies that the poor actually find credit from 
formal lending institutions, with its bureaucratic procedures for repayment, 
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burdensome. It is true that the provision of credit is an easy way to mobilise people 
into fonning groups but the consequences of this strategy, as regards participation, 
can be less than desirable. In the Ghanaian case, it was found that it was difficult to 
withdraw from offering the credit without seriously undermining the project: 'There 
is evidence that the project's staff at times became bogged down in the sheer 
demands of credit management and that the availability or otherwise of this credit 
was the only motivation for some groups to continue to meet' (Bortei-Doku, 1991: 
73). The lesson here is possibly that while access to credit is important for 
participation to occur, the provision of that access should be integrated with other 
initiatives that can enable the poor to service the credit. In addition, bureaucracy 
should be kept at a minimum. 
Project group meetings and discussions: As opposed to the traditionally-styled 
meetings, which merely aim at communicating information to people of pre-agreed 
programmes, meetings, held regularly and conducted on the basis of equal 
partnership between group members and project staff, are aimed at promoting an 
authentic participation function as a forum for involving people, creating awareness 
of issues and solutions and serving as a basis for a more formal structure that exhibits 
solidarity, cohesion and unity of action. Ile characteristics of such meetings include 
among other things, use of local language, pace and style fitting the people's way of 
life, open ended in nature and sometimes an apparent lack of structure. 
Workshops, seminars and camps: While traditionally these activities are used merely 
as forums for formal knowledge transfer, as instruments of participation they must be 
characterised by: the absence of domination by the facilitator; the relating of theory 
to practical, everyday life experiences; the absence of pre-determined answers and 
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theories which aim to offer quick-fix solutions; and the ability of participants to 
structure or restructure the workshop's content and outcomes based on their 
experience and lessons learnt from the exercise. 
Popular theatre and song: as opposed to being used to try to persuade people to 
adopt certain views or undertake particular action, as instruments for participation, 
these activities should aim at challenging people to look critically at their situation 
and think about ways of changing or improving it. These activities should be entirely 
participatory involving people at every stage, for example, in story construction, as 
actors and stage managers and so on. 
Bible Circles: 'Given the widespread involvement of the Christian Church in 
development at the grassroots level... the emergence of a theology closely associated 
with participation as an act of liberation, it is not surprising to find Bible study as a 
means for furthering people's awareness and involvement' (Oakley et al (1991: 226). 
Small group Media: Here, equipment such as video, puppetry, sound slide 
productions and photographs is used to promote people's involvement. However, the 
high levels of capital investment as well as technical skill required for operation limit 
the use of such equipment. Consequently, its use has tended to be limited to urban 
areas. 
Public meetings and campaigns: These are usually useful for provoking interest on 
specific issues in the general population and for seeking people's possible 
involvement in developing solutions. Such meetings and campaigns aim to have a 
widespread immediate and powerful impact upon a large group of people on a 
particular issue. Follow-up with other instruments of participation may be needed to 
sustain their initial impact. 
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One writer (Dichter, 1992) has argued with respect to World Bank funded 
participatory programmes that the existing literature on participation answers the 
basic questions: which institutional devices to promote participation are most 
appropriate in different situations? How can government extension services become 
more demand responsive? How can governments encourage popular participation 
through public policies to NGOs? However, he believes that the critical issue missing 
from the literature, and one that needs to be addressed, is the question of quality: 
'While we know a great deal about participation, we don't act on what we 
know, and when we do, we compromise on the basics far too often. Thus 
perhaps what can be of help on the institutional front is not a set of "how 
to's, " but rather a guide to some of the cultural mismatches inside institutions 
(including the Bank) that result in poor quality promotion of participation, 
and some suggestions on how to alter this situation' (Dichter, 1992: 91). 
Dichter's own contribution to this task is to identify a number of mismatches that 
compromise the quality of participation 
First, he draws our attention to a mismatch between Artistry and Science. On the one 
hand, there is a tendency among many to focus on the higher ground of technical 
rationality. On the other hand, there is lack of enthusiasm to venture into the messy 
swamp of the indeterminate zones of practice. In other words, professionals are 
called upon to be flexible in their approach to development practice in order to be 
responsive to changing circumstances and processes rather than adhering to some 
pre-formulated blue print. 
'It is perhaps because of our unconscious attachment to the norms of 
technical rationality, and our resistance to the messiness of the swamp, that it 
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is difficult to cross over to quality in practice. For in practice, popular 
participation is a messy business... if we were to break out of the confines of 
technical rationality in which we quite naturally take refuge, we might be 
freer to deal with the artistry needed in the swamp... we are talking about the 
art of development rather than the science of it' (p. 92, emphasis supplied). 
Second, Dichter (1992) draws our attention to a mismatch between process and 
technique. This situation arises when implementers, especially NGOs, sometimes 
because of their over-zealous inclinations about participation, make the process rigid 
by transforming it into a technique or a checklist mentality. Participation thus 
becomes a mere routine and emphasis is upon the letter, rather than the spirit of 
participation. 
In similar vein, Abed (1992: 32) has argued that: 
'A development project needs to be flexible enough in its planning and 
implementation to allow for participation. Flexibility leaves room for 
operational modifications that might be needed during the project cycle. The 
main barrier to participatory development lies in the prevailing blueprint 
approach to programming and implementation' (emphasis added). 
In practice, the negative effects of the blueprint approach have manifested 
themselves in many projects. In one example, Sanders (1991) argues with reference 
to a soil conservation programme in Lesotho that one of the main reasons for limited 
levels of people's participation was the programme's rigid framework that could not 
allow for changes that occurred during the course of the project. 
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Third, there is a conceptual mismatch between the individual and the community. 
Dichter (1992) notes that in much of the literature on popular participation, the 
community rather than the individual is both implied object and subject. He argues 
that our neglect of the individual makes us prone to diverting our attention away 
from the very purpose of participation, which is to get individuals involved, to help 
them to have choices, to empower them as individuals, even though they may be in a 
group. In addition we make ourselves prone to falling into the trap of thinking that 
individuals are fundamentally different. 
While Dichter's grounds for focusing on the individual are well appreciated, it is also 
important to keep in mind the problems for participation that are brought about 
because of this focus. In the case of emergency relief, for example, I have already 
shown how a focus on individuals leads to using numbers as a measure of success. it 
can also be argued that it is the very realisation that individuals are not 
fundamentally different that makes it possible for us to use the community as the 
object and subject. 
Finally, the quality of popular participation is compromised by a mismatch between: 
'Participation as an element of development and participation as the basis 
for development: Following the tendency toward technical rationality, we too 
often make popular participation another element of the development process 
that we must watch closely, add onto projects, and apply according to 
specially desired guidelines ... In the business world, for example, for all its 
own disjunctures, there was never a time when getting people to buy the 
company's product was just another element of the company's work. It was 
the entire reason for being. Similarly, in all grass-roots development, where 
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people do not have stake (do not "buy in" to a project) or begin to perceive 
their stake to be less worthwhile than before, projects will fail' (Dichter, 
1992: 93). 
To conclude this section, it is clear that, although some may hold doubts, there is an 
overwhelming endorsement, based on many different studies, of the value of 
participation. Moreover, many practitioners are not entirely unaware on how to 
promote it. Thus: 'When the reams of paper on the subject [of participation P. N. ] are 
put aside, we development professionals sense intuitively that participation is a good 
thing, and we know how to foster it' (Dichter, 1992: 89). Nevertheless, professionals 
and other practitioners need constantly to review the issues discussed here in order 
not to lose sight of the key issues that affect participation. 
Case Studies 
Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: an attempt at institutionalisedparticipation. 
The case of ujamaa villages in Tanzania, which involved the deliberate 
establishment of self-sustaining communal settlements, has been a subject for much 
comment with varying degrees of criticism and praise. It is regarded as one of the 
most outstanding examples of attempts at establishing institutional ised grass-roots 
participation. There are as many lessons learnt from the implementation of ujamaa 
villages as there are commentaries. The study reviewed here has been chosen for its 
relevance to issues of participation discussed in this chapter. 
Fortman (1980) argues that, despite stated government commitment to the concept of 
grass-roots participation, there was still a wide gap between rhetoric and reality. For 
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example, limited government enthusiasm with people's participation manifested 
itself in the predominance of a bureaucratic definition of development and increased 
government interference and control in the so-called ujamaa villages. 
Firstly, she notes that in terms of the former, there has been a gradual replacement of 
the word 'ujamaa' with 'production. ' In addition, in an apparent attempt to stimulate 
production, there has been a reactivation of colonial by-laws mandating minimum 
individual acreages and good cultivation practices, with the possibility of fines or jail 
sentences for their infraction. Furthermore, 'not only has there been no legislative 
force applied to communal acreages, but the amount of individual acreage has 
sometimes precluded participation in communal farming' (p. 78-9). The author also 
notes that an important reason for the bureaucratic predominance is the fact that 
funding for development plans is controlled at the national level, which leads to 
regional programmes reflecting national priorities: 
'There is also a whole range of decision making processes that are carried on 
outside the planning structures which have the effect of reducing the scope of 
village decision-making. These include "operations, " localised demonstration 
efforts and the simple exertion of authority by lower level government and 
party leaders... In a strict sense it could be said that in these cases government 
officials are making village decisions' (Fortman, 1980: 79-80). 
Secondly, the writer argues that government may use coercion to demonstrate the 
point to other villages that it is ultimately in control. She gives the following case to 
support this argument: 
'A rather extreme example was in Mtwara village, which was considered a 
model village but was -a fishing village, and therefore its agricultural 
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production was less than district officials desired. District and ward officials 
led the villagers into claiming that they had a 90-acre communal farm. When 
a district official came to inspect the alleged farm, he found the claim to be 
untrue. A field force unit was then marched in armed with rifles, which they 
did not use, and hoes, which they did. The villagers were forced to cultivate 
and plant all 90 acres. Not only was a large demonstration farm established, 
but also a demonstration of the power of the state and the fruits of non- 
compliance was made' (p. 80). 
While this might have been an extreme example, it would appear that the use of force 
was fairly widespread. As noted by Stiefel and Wolfe (1994: 121), 'between 1973 
and 1976 the army was used in a major campaign to relocate half or more of the 
county's rural population, more than six million people, in some 8,000 ujamaa 
villages. ' 
Furthermore, Fortman (1980) shows that government control of villages occurred in 
other ways including, for example, the use of various contributions to government 
projects and programmes; the establishment of a certain amount of control over 
village leadership which happens through (a) control of the leaders themselves, and 
(b) the insertion of government personnel into leadership positions; and (c) the 
intimidation of the opposition, especially when it speaks against government 
coercion and control of peasants. 
Peasant scope for decision-making is limited and mostly succeeds when the issues 
raised are personal rather than seriously challenging policy. This manifests itself in 
various tactics including (Fortman, 1980: 86-89; Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994: 120): (a) 
passive resistance, as in the case of the ndiyo Bwana attitude, where peasants display 
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an attitude of acceptance, understanding, even enthusiasm, followed by resistance of 
varying degrees of passivity; (b) non-action, as in the case of operation Vijiji 
(villagisation) where a dramatic drop in maize production is believed to have been 
caused primarily by the reversion to subsistence production by peasants in response 
to the disruptions brought by the operation; (c) token effort; (d) 'unfortunate 
accidents' or, in other words, sabotage, as in the case of a village in the region of 
Iringa, which, upon being forced to grow tobacco by the government, 'cured it at 160 
degrees Celsius, thereby curing it of all commercial value'; misunderstanding of the 
instructions, which may be seen as a more sophisticated form of sabotage, a case in 
point being a village, during the colonial era, where villagers claimed that the 
extension agent had told them to boil their cotton seeds before they planted them; (e) 
active resistance, usually rare; (f) pre-emptive development, where a village starts a 
project and then appeals to government for help to finish it; and (g) bargaining, 
which could also be seen as blackmail, for example, in the case of a village which 
refused to send its women to the ujamaa farm until the government completed a 
water supply project promised earlier. In addition villagers may use a squeaky wheel 
technique where vigorous and incessant complaining can be used to influence the 
transfer of disliked officials, an example being in one case where, wanting to get rid 
of a road foreman who had refused to employ the relative of a party branch 
chairman, the villagers loudly complained that he had indulged in adultery and 
corruption. 
Concluding on the scope of peasant decision-making in the Tanzanian case, Fortman 
argues that: 
'The power of the villagers has not increased all that much since colonial 
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times. It is not that all development resources are being exploited to support a 
luxurious life style for a small elite. To the contrary much effort has gone into 
improving life in the rural areas. But these efforts are made according to the 
definitions and timetable of outsider bureaucrats. Such officials tend to try to 
neutralise peasant involvement in decision-making, as it tends to be 
unpredictable, time-consuming, and sometimes contrary to central 
government policy. Hence it is in their interest to keep the peasants under 
control either through largesse, coercion or manipulation. Development has 
become an administrative task, rather than the grass-roots effort described in 
the writings of Nyerere. Peasants have nominal entry into the decision- 
making system, but de facto they have practically none' (p. 85). 
Fortman's analysis succeeds in demonstrating the dominance of the bureaucratic 
definition of development, the control exercised by the government machinery on 
peasants and the resultant limited scope for peasant decision-making. It is not clear, 
however, from this analysis whether, and in what ways, the peasants themselves felt 
that they had become relatively worse off as a result. Moreover, her view is not 
universal. Some believe that, in spite of the existing problems, peasants in Tanzania 
have more than nominal entry into the decision-making process. For example, Maeda 
(1982: 31) writes that, although many hoped-for results have not been achieved for 
various reasons, 
'through the emerging ujamaa village structures an increasing number of 
peasants are being involved in making and implementing decisions that affect 
their lives and the general welfare of their communities. likewise, the 
decentralisation of the government administration has had the effect of 
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allowing the masses the opportunity to influence both government's actions 
and, though more indirectly, the government's behaviour at the local level'. 
A Small-scale Fanning Project and Rural Credit and Savings Projects in Sri 
Lanka: a case of NGO-supportedparticipation in targetedprojects. 
In a study of a small-scale farming project in Sri Lanka, Fernando (1995) found that 
a major determinant of participation was the amount of resources and the resultant 
message that the implementing agency was able to put on offer to the potential 
participants. Initially, having no financial resources to offer, the aid agency relied on 
ideological appeal to attract people's participation. The result of this strategy was an 
initial boom of enthusiasm followed by a steady decline in the number of 
participating farmers. Acquisition of financial strength enabled the agency to change 
its message from an ideological appeal to a hardheaded economic one. This strategy 
resulted in a gradual, but sustained, increase in the number of participating farmers 
and villages. 
The writer points out that an important correlate of this success was that group 
organisation followed, rather than preceded, economic activity. This finding is a 
rebuke to usual development practice that proceeds from the assumption that the 
poor are a homogenous group that can easily be organised around a particular 
economic activity. He points out that the group normally known singularly as the 
poor could arguably be divided into three categories at the very least, namely, the 
very poor, the middle poor and the not so poor. He argues that when group 
organisation precedes economic activity those who are less poor among the poor find 
an opportunity to dominate the others and establish patron-client relationships. In 
addition, this finding lends support to the argument I made earlier, that 
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empowerment leads to participation, rather than the other way round. In this 
example, the agency 'empowered' the people by offering opportunities that were 
previously lacking, enabling the people to galvanise into participation. Note that an 
earlier approach, based only on an ideological appeal, failed to sustain participation. 
In the second study, a review of a rural credit and savings project showed that a 
major barrier to participation was a mismatch between the quantum of aid provided 
and the number of families it was supposed to reach, a problem which the author sees 
as lying at the very heart of the international aid system. In this particular case, the 
donor had typically stipulated the number of villages, even families that were 
supposed to benefit from the project. The result was that financial rewards offered by 
the project were too small to motivate large numbers of families to participate 
genuinely. 
In the third case, a rural women's savings, credit and micro-enterprise development 
project was introduced in a village that already had a tradition of grass-roots 
organisations for the mobilisation of community resources for community purposes. 
The leaders that had emerged before the project started had been motivated by a 
spirit of sacrifice and voluntary action, expecting only prestige and recognition in 
return. 
'The evidence makes it abundantly clear that participatory processes were 
present in the village. The community was able to identify its needs and work 
out its own solutions; there was no passive mentality among the people; 
external animation was not always needed to release the creative energies of 
the poor, who were capable of organising themselves on their own' 
(Fernando, 1995: 176). 
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However, the need to seek external funding after the project had commenced led to 
the emergence of a new generation of leaders who assumed the role of village 
brokers linking the community to external sources of funds. These were motivated by 
economic gain. In accordance with the expectation of the funding agency, the 
implementing NGO disregarded these village brokers in favour of the previous 
generation-type village leaders. In addition, the NGO demanded group cohesion 
through a humanist spirit of caring and sharing as well as equal participation in 
planning, implementation and sharing of benefits. This conflicted with many 
people's realisation that the funds would be obtained only through the application of 
brokering skills and not village leadership, dedication and voluntary service. 
Gradually, the leaders of the Community Based Organisation (CBO) who were not 
interested in a brokering were edged out of their positions, some survived by 
developing brokering skills, while others began to wield power rapidly and emerge in 
positions of leadership. The overall end result was the fragmentation of the CBO into 
different sections wielding different degrees of power. Those who wielded the most 
power were regarded by the NGO as genuine leaders and were supported through 
leadership training programmes that only served to strengthen their position and 
increase their benefits at the expense of the others. 
Interviews later showed that all the players were aware of what was happening but 
avoided raising the issues for various reasons reflecting their own interests. The 
members of the CBO, for example, stated that they deliberately avoided denouncing 
the obvious inequities and lack of participation because they did not wish to 
antagonisc the self-elected leaders, especially since even the most equitable 
distribution would have benefited most members only marginally. NGO officers who 
had worked on the project stated that they too failed deliberately to take any 
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coffective measures because of the fear that antagonising the power caucus could 
easily lead them to link up with a competing NGO that was working in the same 
area. In addition, the NGO's priority was to attract a second round of funding by 
demonstrating that it had succeeded in the first phase. Interviews with senior officers 
of the donor agency revealed that the agency's main concern was the taxpayers of its 
own country, where the funds had been generated, that the aid had benefited a large 
number of poor third world families. 
Fernando's study provides a good illustration of issues likely to dominate in an 
attempt to promote participation in the 'project context'. Clearly, one of the most 
important issues is that various players in the development game are motivated by 
different agenda, values and priorities. Therefore, the type as well as extent of 
participation allowed or pursued will be in accordance with these aspects. What 
comes out clearly also is the fact that as a result of this situation the participation of 
the population for whom the project is intended can be severely limited, or even 
disrupted. 
The study underlined the importance of a good resource base if genuine and 
sustainable participation is to be achieved. Goodwill on the part of aid agencies is not 
enough. People will participate if their access to resources bridges the gap between 
reality and aspiration. The study also shows that projects likely to promote genuine 
participation are those that offer relatively high potential for economic improvement. 
In this regard aid agencies should move away from the practice of spreading 
resources thinly over a large 'beneficiary population' in order to meet the donor 
quantitative targets. Instead, they should allocate resources in such a way as to offer 
individuals substantial economic benefit: 'When the economic stakes are high, 
people struggle to participate, and the internal that (sic) which is generated prevents a 
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small group from restraining the participation of others in order to draw a greater 
share of the benefits themselves. Under these circumstances, ideology and rhetoric 
have no role in the participatory process' (Femando, 1995: 180). 
In addition, Fernando's study demonstrated that introducing economic activity before 
group formation prevents those that are less poor from dominating others and 
establishing patron-client relationships. He also suggests that it is important to take 
into account inequalities in skill, entrepreneurship, connections with the outside 
world etc. in efforts to promote participation. Such variations may mean that the way 
a community may perceive equitable participation may be different from that of the 
aid agency. 
Development Dialogue: What relevance for Emergency Relief? 
In attempting to understand the emergence of the need for ensuring the participation 
of affected populations in disaster relief, it is important to refer briefly to the debate 
on the differences (or similarities) between relief and development. One dominant 
view is that there is a real difference between the two. Relief is principally viewed in 
terms of charity and development as something that has moved beyond that. Others 
see development and relief as being two ends of a continuum. I would argue that 
there is scope for a third perspective namely that relief, especially when considering 
poor countries, is actually part and parcel of the development process, even though 
this does not suggest that assistance for the two should be given on similar terms. At 
least two points can be made to support this claim. 
First, it can be argued that the social, economic and environmental conditions of 
certain poor communities already constitute a state of emergency. An emergency 
does not become one only when a starving child has been featured on BBC or CNN 
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television, or when a UN-agency has declared a situation so. The existing conditions 
may already be undesirable and what are sometimes known as emergencies refer 
merely to a change in degree. This poses a troubling question: how can external 
agents justify their action of determining the threshold when an emergency begins? If 
development and relief are to be truly 'people-centred', then only the affected 
populations have the right and mandate to decide when an emergency begins. Are 
communities incapable of determining their own humanitarian needs? Obviously, 
there are those who argue that leaving communifies to determine their own needs 
results in a 'list of unrealistic demands'. This view comes about largely either 
because the agency does not have adequate resources to address those needs or 
because the 'needs assessment' procedures have not been done properly by agencies. 
A properly conducted needs assessment exercise, one that involves fully the 
community concerned, and explains the volume of resources at the disposal of the 
agency, should have less likelihood of generating a 'list of unrealistic demands'. 
Secondly, if it is agreed that capacity building and the construction of sustainable 
livelihoods are major development goals, then relief could be seen as a development 
activity which ensures the preservation of these aspects under conditions of severe 
stress. Should large numbers of people who have acquired different skills and ideas 
die because of a sudden rise in the mortality rate or should community social and 
economic structures be incapacitated, this would mean that the development process 
has been curtailed. 
Thirdly, there is a tendency among some people to think that relief applies only to 
the period immediately following a disaster. Such are the people who argue that the 
relief programme in south Sudan has moved to the development phase because it has 
now lasted more than ten years. However, this view ignores the important fact that 
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any situation requiring relief intervention will have several stages, namely: "the 
emergency phase", a "rehabilitation phase" and a "post-rehabilitation" phase. 
Activities and approaches may vary according to these stages. This consideration for 
example, is a criticism of the view that participation is difficult in relief programmes 
because of time constraints. The rehabilitation and post-rehabilitation phases of the 
programme need not necessarily be so urgent as not to present opportunities for 
participation. Moreover, it will be shown (see Chapter Six) that it is possible for 
participation to occur even in the emergency phase of the relief programme. 
The idea of the 'relief-development continuum' is a subject for increasing attention 
and debate, the details of which it is not necessary to dig into presently. But it is 
generally accepted that a well-implemented relief programme might pave the way for 
more successful development programmes. Stated another way, a poorly 
implemented relief programme could put any forthcoming development efforts in 
jeopardy. Thus: 'For instance, the relief products could depreciate the local market 
and make the beneficiaries dependent on the external assistance. In order to avoid 
this, the relief operation needs to find distribution mechanisms which are appropriate 
to local culture and society, involve local people in administration and organisation, 
and are gender-sensitive' (Kimura, 1996: 56). On the other hand, a successful 
development programme might help to better relief. For example, with respect to 
participation, a successful participatory development project/programme might have 
strengthened community structures and processes of representation allowing it to 
cope better with the distribution of relief materials. In addition, a good development 
programme can in fact be seen partly as disaster mitigation in so far as it addresses 
issues that prevent a disaster from exerting maximum impact. 
To sum up the issue, the following argument by Payne (1998: 173) is apt: 
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'For any agency, trying to build up capacity from a base of emergency relief 
work requires a considerable degree of pragmatism, a sense of realism, and 
the ability to remain flexible. In the current climate, it is increasingly 
unhelpful to pigeonhole programmes as either "relief or development". In 
situations of extreme instability, when funding is uncertain and there are 
threats to the physical security of the programme, nothing is ever really 
normal. For emergency workers in south Sudan, for example, instability is the 
norm, yet the programme of response may be of a long-term nature. Perhaps 
the terms "relief' and "development" should be redefined to take account of 
the concept of "working in turbulent contexts" '. 
Similar views could be expressed with regard to very poor communities, where 
turbulence does not necessarily result from instability related to war but to weather 
conditions or disease. In such situations also, things are usually not really normal. 
At the conceptual level, the basic features of relief and development are essentially 
the same. Thus, although it is generally the case that relief is short-term and 
development long-term in nature, both tend to involve outside intervention and an 
interface between indigenous populations and foreigners. Both start from a position 
of power imbalance where a disproportionate amount of power rests in the hands of 
those with resources at their disposal, in this case the foreigners. Little wonder then 
that most of the same issues that arise with regard to development are also true for 
relief. For example, if we recall Harrell-Bond's (1986) argument regarding the 
failures of relief, she identifies the attitude of superiority of moral virtue as the key 
factor. In addition, many of the politics of participation encountered in development 
contexts also feature in emergency relief. The mistrust that exists between donors 
and governments in the development context is also replicated in relief. In the latter, 
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the problem of mistrust has been a continuing cause of lack of agreement of the 
numbers affected by a disaster and in need of assistance. Donors frequently dispute 
figures generated by host governments or other local counterpart organisations on the 
basis of fears that such numbers would have been inflated for ulterior motives. 
Moreover, some observers have held the view that in many relief programmes, 
donors only pay serious attention to immediate relief needs but show considerable 
lack of enthusiasm for rehabilitation and preventive measures. This reluctance only 
leads to keeping poor governments in a perpetual position of dependence on donors. 
In the case of the 1998 relief programme in South Sudan (see Chapter 4), donors and 
other aid agencies disputed reports prepared by a local organisation, denying the very 
existence of famine. They later agreed with that report only after CNN had featured a 
story depicting the extent of the famine. This led some to raise questions as to the 
role of the affected population in arriving at the very assessment of whether a famine 
exists or not. 
There is also much rhetoric in relief about participation, especially on the part of 
donors and international NGOs, that does not match the level of action observed in 
the field. The policy documents as well as programme and project documents of aid 
agencies contain statements indicating how committed they are to participation. 
However, most such statements are very general in nature, failing to demonstrate 
exactly the ways in which the agencies will ensure implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of the participatory process itself. Indeed, most of the evaluations of relief 
work are more about whether the programme measured up to its quantitative targets 
than about the overall qualitative effect on the recipient communities. More 
seriously, there is frequently no input of the recipient population in such evaluations. 
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One report on evaluations (Grunewald, de Geoffroy and Lister, 2000: 21) found that 
'although agencies involved beneficiaries in the actual implementation of projects, it 
was not common for their views to be elicited before projects'. 
To date, there are very few documented examples of cases that demonstrate a high 
degree of involvement of affected populations in relief programmes. To my 
knowledge one of the best examples in this regard was the Oxfarn Ikafe/Imvempi 
refugee settlement programme in Uganda (Payne, 1998). Payne provides a critical 
account of how Oxfarn attempted to foster participation through encouraging the 
formation of structures representative of various groups within the refugee 
settlements. She analyses factors that led to either the failure or the success of 
different initiatives as well as issues pertaining to the extent to which Oxfam. could 
have appropriately acted as a catalyst to some participatory processes. 
Another similarity with the development field is that host governments themselves 
may not actively promote participation in relief for fear of losing control, sometimes 
related to the political agenda. Indeed politics, rather than corruption, may sometimes 
lie at the very heart of the temptation by governments to ensure that the relief 
programme benefits as many people as possible so that they can be seen to be 
providing equitable welfare. 
However, much as there are these similarities, there is also a great deal of uncertainty 
at the methodological level. Specifically, doubts exist as to whether participatory 
methods used successfully in the development context can and should be used in 
relief. For example, Apthorpe and Atkinson (1999a) note that some forums have 
found that participation in relief may not happen more often because it is: 
'regarded as time-consuming in time-pressured contexts and culture, 
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threatens agency control, is difficult to do in conflict situations, (with what 
guidance is available having often) been developed in relation to 
development programmes in stable contexts, (and as a rule is not required by) 
donors (and implementing agencies) who remain preoccupied with upward 
accountability' (ALNAP minutes, Quoted in Apthorpe and Atkinson, 1999a: 
9). 
Yet so far, little has been done by way of systematic assessment of various 
methodologies in emergency to see what works and what doesn't. Thus clearly, there 
is need for more work in this area given the many types of not only disasters, but also 
emergency programmes and socio-political contexts, that exist. For example, it may 
be the case that some of the concerns about participatory methodology may apply 
more strongly to an emergency complex disaster rather than a slow onset natural 
disaster, or to a therapeutic feeding programme rather than a general ration or a seeds 
and tools distribution programme, or in a context where there are weak civic society 
structures compared to where such structures are strong. 
In any case, questions of methodological compatibility between development and 
emergency relief would have more justification if participation in development had 
attained broad-based implementation. The fact that this has not been the case and, 
perhaps more importantly, the fact that the forecast for this to happen is bleak, means 
that perhaps there is need to focus equally strongly on the politics of participation as 
on its methodological concerns. Clearly, the emerging methodologies reviewed in 
this chapter will not achieve much without the political will to change attitudes, 
behaviour and to share power. On the other hand, efforts at developing 
methodologies need to continue to prevent methodological inadequacy from 
becoming a scapegoat to genuine participation while the real barriers lie elsewhere. 
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Conclusion. 
Much of the literature shows that that there is agreement that the concept of 
participation in development continues to suffer from a wide gap between rhetoric 
and practice. What is more disturbing is that there is little evidence to suggest that 
this situation might change for the better. In concluding their book, whose title asks 
the question whether popular participation is a utopia or a necessity, Stiefel and 
Wolfe (1994: 238) state that: 
'Unfortunately, our exploration suggests that there are as many answers as 
there are collective social actors and that the different interpretations of 
"development" and "participation" internalised by these actors perpetuate the 
"dialogue of the deaf ". 
Further, they also assert that: 
'The decade and a half since UNRISD decided to inquire into participation 
has brought astonishing transformations but has confirmed the dominance of 
a "development" that seems very doubtfully compatible with the organised 
efforts of the excluded. The coming decade will bring its own surprises' 
(ibid., p. 242). 
It is not certain as to whether one of the surprises anticipated by Stiefel and Wolfe 
will be a proliferation of genuine broad-based grass-roots participation. Such 
uncertainty is based partly on observations such as those made by Bonvin (1995: 7) 
who, noting that participatory development has been on the development agenda 
since the 1950s and the 1960s, albeit under the disguise of community development, 
argues that: 
'Participatory development is no "quick fix" but a learning process which 
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takes time, resources, imagination and sometimes courage to implement. It 
requires behavioural change on the part of many actors, calls into question 
old habits and often reveals conflicts of interest because of the need for power 
sharing'. 
So far, it would appear that attempts to achieve participatory development have taken 
two distinct forms. Firstly, there have been attempts to institutionalise participation. 
In this context, the main aims of participation appear to be related to democratic 
governance where people who lack political power are offered an opportunity to 
participate in influencing the decisions made at state level. The government appears 
to be the main player with the international aid community as both coaches and 
referees. In the second instance, there are attempts to promote participation through 
the introduction of targeted, relatively small-scale development projects. Here, the 
primary aim appears to be the raising of living standards through the provision of 
opportunity for access to economic or other Physical resources. In this context, the 
main actors appear to be NGOs, but also increasingly, the World Bank. For "ample 
with respect to a review of World Bank projects, Paul (1988: 2) defines community 
participation as 'an active process by which beneficiary/client groups influence the 
direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their 
well-being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance and other values they 
cherish'. 
From the case studies presented in this chapter, it is clear that one of the principal 
conclusions that can be made is that a major barrier to genuine participation in both 
contexts is a lack of convergence of agenda, priorities and values between those who 
own and control economic and political resources and those that need access to such 
resources in order to better their lives. For genuine participation to occur, those that 
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control resources and hold power must change their attitudes and behaviour and 
demonstrate the sincerity of their concern for the poor by relinquishing some of their 
power to the latter. Without this power sharing, poor people will continue to become 
not merely spectators, but victims of the development game since, unlike 
conventional sport, non-participation means becoming worse-off. 
The key question to be asked then is why these changes are not occurring. The fact 
may well be that those with control of resources are really not interested in sharing 
them in a way that is meaningful to those that need access to them. This may not 
always necessarily reflect personal inclinations but rather the requirements of the 
system in which development and disaster relief take place. 
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Chapter Three. Non-humanitarian Humanitarianism: 
implications for participation of changes within 
humanitarian assistance. 
Mutant Humanitarianism. 
Theoretically, the motives and principles underlying the concept of humanitarianism 
should remain unchanged in both time and space. It is believed that it is part of the 
nature of humans to be kind towards each other. Kindness is therefore the sole basis 
for humanitarian action. This kindness can be expressed through voluntary 
expenditure of effort, time and material resources to relieve human suffering. It is 
inhuman i. e. against the nature of man not to relieve the suffering of others when one 
is in a position to do so. Ibis is the basis for the so-called humanitarian imperative. 
In other words, failure to relieve human suffering when one can do so is a crime not 
simply against the suffering person, but against self and thus, ultimately, against 
humanity itself. 
However, the way in which deeds of kindness are performed can harm paradoxically 
the very individual for which such deeds are intended. The Egyptian hermit Abba 
Paphnutius is quoted as saying that 'I have seen a man on the bank of a river buried 
up to his knees in mud and some men came to give him a hand and help him out, but 
they pushed him further in up to his neck' (Ward, quoted in Slim, 1997: 245). In 
order to avoid this happening, the 'recipient' must become a full participant in the 
process of humanitarian action rather than a passive object. A review of the history 
of the concept shows that, in practice, the traditional conceptualisation of 
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humanitarianism has gradually become muddled with motives that are not 
necessarily humanitarian. The result is that the scope for participation for recipients 
of humanitarian assistance has been severely curtailed. By and large, recipients of 
humanitarian assistance have become objects rather than subjects or actors of the 
process. 
While the history of humanitarianism appears to be as long as that of mankind itself 
there has been an evolution of the concept to the extent that many aspects associated 
with it have been transformed beyond the realms of traditional practice. Ile biggest 
transformations appear to have taken place in the twentieth century. The most 
important change was perhaps the increase in volume of international humanitarian 
assistance. Traditional and ancient humanitarian assistance tended to have been 
circumscribed to the borders of relatively small communities. 'Modem' 
humanitarianism involves much greater volumes of material transfer, more people 
involved in the administration of such materials and wider geographic movement. It 
also involves contact between peoples who differ substantially socially and 
culturally. 
Crucially, perhaps as a result of these changes, modem humanitarianism also 
involves motives other than humanitarian. We can identify several factors that have 
contributed to this 'loading' of humanitarianism with non-humanitarian motivations. 
The two most important ones appear to be the increasingly important role played by 
NGOs in acting as intermediaries for the dissemination of donor resources and the 
increasing use of relief as an instrument of foreign policy. In addition, the 
phenomenal increase in the volume of humanitarian assistance has taken the form of 
one-way traffic from industrialised Western countries to poor Third World countries. 
114 
This one-way traffic appears to have generated views of patron-client rather than 
partnership relationships, leading to the dominance of Western ethnocentrism in 
humanitarian operations. By definition, a patron-client relationship excludes the 
participation of the client in decision-making. Tberefore, in these patron-client views 
may lie the root to the problems of participation. 
As humanitarianism has continued to evolve in a world where countries are 
demarcated by political boundaries, questions of state sovereignty have arisen. 
Where internal conflicts exist within such states, questions of sovereignty have in 
turn given rise to questions of neutrality and impartiality on the part of the 
intervening parties. Its central location in the international system has led 
humanitarianism also to become entangled in a whole series of non-humanitarian 
concerns grounded in international politics. To the extent that there are increasing 
cases where international political concerns are given primacy over humanitarian 
considerations, it seems fair to start questioning whether we have in fact not 
witnessed the demise of humanitarianism in its traditional sense. 
The central location of humanitarianism in the international system has tended to 
marginalize its humanitarian concerns while mainstreaming political ones that have 
their base in the economic, strategic and political interests of the rich nations. This 
marginalisation plays a key role in inhibiting broad-based participation of people 
affected by disasters. The dominance of Western ethnocentrism leads to much 
humanitarian assistance being conducted on the bases of western values and ideas 
regarding the determination of need, efficiency, vulnerability, entitlements etc. In 
addition, there is little evidence to suggest that the circumvention of national 
governments in favour of NGOs to act as intermediaries for resource transfer has 
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succeeded in making humanitarian aid more relevant by increasing the participation 
of the affected populations. 
The role of Northern NGOs 
One of the major changes in international humanitarian assistance in the twentieth 
century was a shift from direct transfer of resources to recipient governments or 
communities by donor communities, to the use of NGOs as intermediaries. From the 
1980s onwards, international NGOs increasingly acted as vessels for channelling 
donor funds and also for administering, together with UN agencies, the planning and 
implementation of humanitarian programmes. The NGOs occupied a similar position 
as regards the administration of international development aid. Macrae (1996: 7), for 
example, notes that the proportion of emergency aid allocated to governments by the 
European commission fell ftom over 95% in 1976 to only 6% in 1990. 'Donors no 
longer automatically accord recipient counties with having either the legitimacy or 
the capacity to respond to emergencies; indeed, they are increasingly being seen as 
part of the problem. Thus NGOs have become a means of maintaining international 
engagement in war-affected countries, and of providing a political buffer between 
donor and recipient governments'. 
In similar vein, De Waal (1997: 79) argues that 'the humanitarian international was 
transformed in the 1980s... as donor governments began to channel emergency funds 
through NGOs, deliberately circumventing African governments, they radically 
changed the nature of institutional humanitarianism'. Commenting on the same issue 
Edwards and Hulme (1995: 4) contend that 'NGOs have always provided welfare 
services to poor people in countries where governments lacked resources to ensure 
universal coverage in health and education; the difference is that now they are seen 
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as the preferred channel for service provision in deliberate substitution for the state' 
(emphasis supplied). 
Borton (1993) suggests several reasons that account for the increasingly dominant 
role played by NGOs in resource allocation. These include: the poor economic 
performance of many developing countries, especially in Africa, which left state 
structures weakened and led to the need for alternative channels for allocating 
emergency aid; the perceived flexibility and speed of response of NGOs and their 
greater accountability to the donors; political instability in many areas which not 
only reduces the efficiency of government agencies but also introduces risks of 
diversion of emergency assistance from intended beneficiaries to combatants; and the 
limited scope for intervention, especially during the cold war, by the UN where 
nation sovereignty was disputed, which left only the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs as alternatives. 
The rise to prominence of NGOs as channels for donor funds is but an indication of 
the increasing erosion of state sovereignty in poor countries. Macrae (1996: 6) argues 
that since 1980, sovereignty has been eroded de facto and de jure. Western countries 
have reasserted their right to intervene in the affairs of sovereign governments in the 
Third World. This has been particularly the case in the humanitarian sphere where 
Western nations have been more willing to intervene on humanitarian grounds, 
sometimes without the consent of governments and with the use of force. 
Macrae suggests that in the light of this trend, humanitarian action is yet to answer 
the following questions: 'under whose authority and in whose interests is the 
international humanitarian intervention organised? Who is defining these interests 
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and mediating potential conflicts of interests between humanitarian, political and 
military objectivesT (p. 7). 
Immediately following the NGO-boom in the 1980s there seemed to have followed 
uncritical acceptance of their role with regard to fulfilling the mission that lay 
beneath the whole essence of the NGO movement. Such uncritical acceptance gave, 
and still continues to give, a picture in which 'NGOs are seen as the "favoured child" 
of official agencies and something of a panacea for the problems of development 
[and perhaps emergency relief P. N. ]... official agencies (and the supporters of 
Northern NGOs) often see NGOs as a "magic bullef 'which can be fired off in any 
direction and, though often without very much evidence, will still find its target' 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 5). 
Do Waal (1997: 79-80) notes that relief NGOs are varied in terms of ethos and 
methods for example, between operational NGOs and non-operational ones who 
work through local partners. Some refuse government funding while others subsist 
almost entirely on official subcontracting. He notes that while less bureaucratic and 
technically ambitious than the official agencies, and while disavowing legal 
mandates in favour of energy and flexibility, the specific obligations of relief NGOs 
to the poor are just as tenuous. And yet, 'the moral logic of charitable famine relief 
assumes an identity of interest between the NGOs and famine-vulnerable people'. He 
warns that 'specific NGO successes mask strategic failures. NGOs tend to focus their 
efforts in areas in which they have specific skills, or which make for good publicity, 
such as feeding centres and orphanages... the charitable market is unable to fill the 
full spectrum of relief needs'. 
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Seaman (1995: 20-21) notes that there exist a number of different 'relief mentalities'. 
At one extreme is the view which defines the effects of disaster and relief needs 
purely in material terms, e. g. the number of trauma cases, the numbers of people who 
are thin or who need immunisations, etc. The role of international relief is thus seen 
to centre on planning and acting in a quasi-military way to meet these needs, through 
the provision of medical personnel, blankets, shelter or whatever seems appropriate. 
The belief behind this view is that the effectiveness of international disaster relief 
depends crucially on the speed of response and formalised planning, and with the 
idea of a politically 'neutral' humanitarian response. The basis of such a view is a 
model that sees a population affected by an emergency as essentially passive and 
entirely dependent on international relief for its survival and well-being and that 
relief is confined only to the saving of life. 
The competing but less popular view is that the need to meet physical or material 
needs timely should not blind relief providers to other factors that determine whether 
the assistance provided is regarded as efficient or not. This view is based on 
mounting empirical evidence that the stereotype of an affected population 
ineffectually waiting for relief is both an oversimplification and routinely 
confounded. 
The difference in these two positions has led to two different operational procedures. 
The first tends to a standardised and short-term response, especially in the case of 
medical teams, which sometimes lead to actions varying from 'inefficient to the 
absurd'. The alternative view, sometimes called the 'developmental' approach to 
relief, takes into account the fact that the greater part of the work will be done by the 
population of the country concerned. Tbus, it tends to seek synergy between 
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international relief and local efforts and to be more relevant, efficient and effective. 
Unfortunately, it is usually assumed, erroneously, that most International Non 
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) adhere to the second mentality of disaster 
relief and that this is reflected in their operations. 
De Waal (1997) argues that non-governmental and official agencies are alle in that 
they do not commission public evaluations or publicise their internal assessments. 
The demands for fund-raising and institutional survival make it imperative not to 
admit failure. The competition is for funds, not successful famine prevention. NGOs 
contemptuously reject professional standards and self-regulation. 
'One result is that there are no formal barriers to entry to the relief NGO sector: 
literally anyone can start an NGO, obtain funds by public appeal or other means 
and try their hand at running feeding centres, clinics or orphanages. NGOs are 
therefore increasingly becoming subject to manipulation by donor governments' 
(p. 80). 
In similar vein, Edwards and Hulme (199: 6) argue that there is no evidence to 
support claims that NGOs and GROs are 'close to the poor' partly because 'internal 
evaluations are rarely released, and what is released comes closer to propaganda than 
rigorous assessment'. Can they therefore truly be expected to represent the interests 
of the poor? And in this light, is the circumventing of governments in favour of 
NGOs justified? Chapter Two shows that participation has remained a rhetorical 
exercise, this, despite the participation of NGOs in the development sector for a long 
time. Is there a case for arguing for a rethink of the role of the state in the 
administration of emergency relief and development in general? 
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While there appears to be a general agreement that NGOs play an important role in 
service provision and 'welfare', an analysis of issues of performance and 
accountability raises some questions regarding the extent to which the provision of 
these services occurs in a way that helps to fulfil their stated missions and mandates, 
especially with regard to participation. In the present context, specific questions 
relate to the extent to which the operation of NGOs is participatory in a way 
significantly different from, for example, public or government agencies. Edwards 
and Hulme (1995) show that many uncertainties exist with regard to assessing the 
performance and accountability of NGOs. With regard to performance, they argue 
that NGOs 'often perform less well than their popular image suggests' (p. 8) 
especially in terms of 'poverty-reach, cost-effectiveness, sustainability and popular 
participation (including gender), flexibility and innovation' (p. 6). Dependence on 
official funding for many NGOs leads to emphasis being laid on service-provision 
rather than advocacy and participation. 
A key aspect of NGO legitimacy is the issue of accountability. One of the basic 
reasons why official donors have deliberately circumvented governments is the view 
that NGOs are more accountable and thus, generate confidence. However, Edwards 
and Hulme (1995) distinguish between two forms of accountability namely, 
functional accountability involving the accounting of resources, resource use and 
immediate impacts; and strategic accountability, which involves the accounting for 
the impacts of NGOs on the actions of other organisations and the wider 
environment. They point out the multiple accounting responsibilities that NGOs and 
GROs have, namely, 'upward' accountability to their trustees, donors and host 
governments; and 'downward' accountability to their partners, beneficiaries, staff 
and supporters. 
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Clearly, these multiple accounting responsibilities have a bearing on participation. 
For it is clearly the case that the objectives, agenda, priorities and even values of 
NGOs as organisations but also their staff as individuals, do not always coincide with 
those of the people they seek to assist. In addition, the need for NGOs to respond to 
the accounting requirements of their trustees, donors and host governments may 
draw them away from the realities of their beneficiaries. In reality, NGOs in fact 
mostly pay more attention to 'upward' accountability. Accountability 'downwards' is 
a messy business because it involves qualitative and often subjective assessments of 
the impact of NGO actions on the livelihood of those assisted. Uphoff (quoted in 
Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 9) argues that 'NGOs cannot be formally accountable to 
their beneficiaries, however much they want to be'. 
Macrae (1996: 9) asserts that despite the fact that NGOs provide an important source 
of service provision and advocacy which complements that of donor and recipient 
states, they 'cannot replace states, and that in the absence of the political and legal 
framework provided in theory by states it is unclear how NGO provision can be 
organised in such a way as to ensure equitable coverage and accountable provision' 
(emphasis added). 
Following from the fact that NGOs can not substitute the state as regards the 
equitable distribution of scarce resources; that NGOs have conflicting 
accountabilities, with accountability to their donors likely to dominate over 
accountability to their recipients; and that the rise of southem NGOs puts the current 
role of Northern NGOs in doubt; it seems to be the case that there is room for 
rethinking the role of the state or other de facto institutions in humanitarian 
emergencies. 
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Edwards and Hulme (1995: 14) suggest that lack of knowledge regarding the 
changing nature of GRONGO accountability is a serious matter given that 
GRO/NGO claims to legitimacy are premised at least in part on the strength of the 
accountability, particularly to the 'poor: 'If NGOs are becoming more responsive to 
external concerns, what is happening to the links to their values and mission, and to 
their supporters and others - through which they claim their right to intervene in 
development... recent doubts expressed by Southern NGOs about the advocacy role 
of NGOs in the North (speaking 'on behalf of the poor') provide one illustration of 
this difficult issue'. 
Critics make several conclusions as regards ways in which NGOs and GROs could 
be helped to stick to their stated goals and mission. Two of them are particularly 
relevant with regard to the discussion in this chapter: One is that problems relating to 
organisational growth and accountability may best be handled by a partnership 
approach which emphasises participation, learning, reciprocity and transparency. 
They argue that it may be better to channel official donor funds to NGOs and GROs 
through an independent public institution, which can protect them from undue donor 
influence. Secondly, they reiterate the importance of negotiation among stakeholders 
as a key issue in improving accountability among NGOs. Beneficiary communities 
must take centre stage in this negotiation: 
'Increasing the involvement of grassroots constituencies is the only way to 
correct the weaknesses of downward acceptability... increasing the 
involvement of grassroots stakeholders also opens up the prospect of major 
changes in roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, and should not be 
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undertaken by agencies who have no serious commitment to reform in their 
own institutions and structures' (Edwards and Hulme, 1995: 221. ). 
They argue, in addition, that informal mechanisms should be given serious 
consideration since they are sometimes more effective than formal ones. 
Tylor (1995: 93-94) makes a similar argument saying that, with respect to 
information gathering during humanitarian interventions, difficulties frequently 
experienced could be addressed by involving 'the affected people themselves in the 
collection of data and for international organisations to help by providing the 
technical assistance to do this'. There are always ways of measuring trends towards 
food deficiency, levels of malnutrition and also the likely future availability of 
necessary foodstuffs, given probable local harvests and likely alternative provision. 
This would be part of the process of evaluating what have been called 'entitlements' 
to various provisions. The point has been stressed that involving local responsible 
individuals in this is also helpful as a way of sustaining order and preserving a sense 
of self-reliance. The national political authorities might not, however, welcome such 
direct links between international organisations and citizens. They would expect to 
be involved in the system's establishment and management, thus reducing 
confidence in the information gathered. 
Humanitarianism muddled and muzzled. 
The rhythm of the discussion in this section is well set by Macrae's (1996: 1) 
observation regarding the complexities of humanitarian assistance: 
'The complexities of the humanitarian landscape and of the international relief 
system seem to militate against the formulation of a clear consensus on the 
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meaning of and scope of humanitarian action in the late twentieth century. The 
broad terrain occupied by humanitarianism is characterised by a multiplicity of 
actors, including disaster-affected people, each of whom promote different 
objectives, appeal to diverse (often self-ascribed) mandates, and operate 
according to different rules of engagement. In the midst of so many different 
claims, the universality of humanitarian values and principles is itself being 
questioned'. 
One of the immediate casualties of this increase in complexity of the humanitarian 
terrain is the use of the term humanitarian itself. Increasingly, it has become 
necessary to distinguish between humanitarian assistance and humanitarian 
intervention. At first sight the two concepts might appear to refer to the same 
process. But when reviewing literature, it is clear that the two concepts have different 
meanings. In general, humanitarian assistance refers to the process of providing relief 
materials to people affected by disasters, whether natural or complex. The provision 
of such materials may involve the deployment of security forces with the sole aim of 
protecting relief materials where a situation of insecurity prevails. The term 
humanitarian intervention is increasingly being used to refer to the deployment in a 
country, usually of foreign military forces, in order to prevent or stop a serious 
violation of fundamental human rights abuses, particularly involving a threat to life 
(Verwey in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 8). However, the two authors note 
that even within this context, the meaning of humanitarian is not as straightforward 
and different views exist. 
The aim of making this distinction is to clarify some of the confusion that might be 
created by the dual usage in literature of the term humanitarian intervention. For 
example, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's book Humanitarian Intervention in 
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Contemporary Conflict is primarily concerned with military intervention whereas 
John Harriss's edited book The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention focuses on 
both issues of military intervention and the provision of relief assistance. Indeed it 
has been noted that sometimes the two terms are used interchangeably and, therefore, 
misleadingly. 
This study is concerned primarily with humanitarianism in the sense of provision of 
relief materials such as food, clothing, shelter etc. to help communities cope with the 
devastating effects of war or other disasters such as famine, floods, earthquakes, etc. 
The task of reviewing the politics involved in providing humanitarian assistance, 
being a subject on which whole books have been published, is too big to be 
accomplished successfully in one chapter of a thesis. Therefore, the aim here is 
merely to highlight the main features of this complex subject for the purposes of 
aiding our understanding of the issue of participation. 
There is no doubt that the moral crisis confronting humanitarianism has resulted in 
part from the loading of humanitarian aid with non-humanitarian motives. This idea 
inevitably sounds contradictory, for if the motive is not solely humanitarian, does the 
action qualify as humanitarian? Henry Kissinger is famously quoted as having laid 
bare the non-humanitarian motives of humanitarian aid: 
'US disaster relief is an important way for the American public, as well as its 
government, to express its humanitarian concerns for those adversely affected by 
natural and man-made disasters. Equally important, disaster relief is becoming 
increasingly a major instrument of ourforeign policy. The assistance we can provide 
to various nations may have a long-term impact on US relations with those nations 
and their friends' (emphasis added) (quoted in Kent, 1987: 8 1). 
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This remark was made early in 1973. Writing twenty years later, Awonoor (1993: 
64) observed that: 
'Sometimes, humanitarian aid is constructed into intimidating and even primitive 
foreign policy objectives. The United States publishes an annual register of 
countries that did not vote with it on all issues. This register is distributed 
dutifully and unashamedly every year to remind every state of their sins of 
commission and omission, with loud hints as to possible punishments or rewards 
to be meted out. During the Persian Gulf debate in the Security Council, Yemen 
was threatened after it cast a vote opposing the wishes of the United States. The 
threats were later carried out, and a small package of assistance for educational 
work in Yemen was withdrawn'. 
Such behaviour is in direct contradiction with the key principles of humanitarian aid 
enshrined in the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief The code underlines the primacy of what is 
called the 'humanitarian imperative'. The prime motivation of response to a disaster 
should be to alleviate human suffering among the most vulnerable. Humanitarian aid 
should be given or viewed as a non-partisan apolitical act. But the fact that 
humanitarian assistance should require a 'code of conduct' is itself a symptom of the 
moral crisis facing the concept and we shall return to this aspect later. 
Approaching relief with mixed motivations is not limited to governments, as in the 
case of the United States. It is also a dominant feature among UN agencies and 
international NGOs. With regard to NGOs, for example, De Waal (1997: 63) argues 
that the humanitarian international suffers from a lack of adequate sociological 
analysis and ethical critique: 
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'Statements of the goals of non-governmental organisations, in particular, are 
commonly taken at face value. It is as though the sociological study of the church 
were undertaken by committed Christians: criticism would be solely within the 
context of advancing the faith itself.. relief agencies, like any institutions, are 
subject to their own requirements for survival and self-justification requirements, 
which may contradict higher ideals. Humanitarianism also masks many very 
mixed personal motives. The challenge of understanding humanitarianism, (and 
indeed reforming it) is to identify the actual forces at work in the institutions that 
have taken on the humanitarian mandate'. 
Macrae (1996: 8-9) observes that international relations are still confined to their 
existing, state-centric framework, while at the same time leaving considerable room 
for manoeuvre for international organisations/donors, UN and NGOs to decide if, 
when and how they will assist particular groups of people affected by conflict. 
'Importantly, these decisions are not necessarily made on the basis of need; but 
rather are subject to the influence of strategic, financial, and institutional imperatives 
within donor countries and relief institutions. That this is the case is reflected in 
differences in per capita allocations of relief to different emergencies between 
countries and over time. 
Humanitarianism in time and space. 
Isaac (1993) notes that, despite the general tendency to associate humanitarianism 
with the twentieth-century West, 'it is a universal phenomenon manifested globally 
and throughout the ages' (p. 13). He argues that this universality applies both in the 
case of humanitarianism as a feeling of concern for and benevolence toward fellow 
human beings, and humanitarianism as practical generosity or philanthropic activities 
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to promote the well-being of others. Despite having been formalised in the twentieth 
century, humanitarianism has a long history, having its roots in different religions 
and cultures. For example, he notes that ancient Egyptians carried out benevolent 
acts that were seen as having great importance in the eyes of their gods. Similarly, 
divine will lay behind the performance of benevolent acts in ancient Mesopotamia. 
According to the author, however, it is in ancient Judaism that benevolent acts were 
widely institutionalised and received much emphasis. He gives various references to 
the Hebrew Bible to show how, in ancient Israel, giving was not merely a voluntary 
act but a religious obligation. In similar fashion, references are given from the New 
Testament of the Bible and from the Koran to show that Christianity and Islam, both 
bom out of Judaism, inherited, albeit with different emphasis, the values of their 
predecessor. Indeed in many Christian denominations various structures exist, 
particularly in the form of women's caucuses aimed at rendering acts of charity to 
suffering humanity. Examples included the Dorchas women in the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church and counterpart women's groups in other denominations. Isaac 
(1993. ) argues further that humanitarianism is held equally as an important religious 
value in the other major religions of the world, namely, Hinduism and Buddhism. 
In addition to humanitarianism being found in all religions, Isaac argues that it is also 
found in all cultures. To this end, he refers to records that show how in many African 
cultures, food was gathered during times of good harvests to be shared with the 
hungry during periods of famine. He writes: 
'Contrary to conventional wisdom, most African peoples who are followers 
of traditional (i. e. non-Christian, non-Moslem) religions share a great deal of 
religious and cultural beliefs and values. Their world-view is essentially 
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sociocentric, not individualistic. Emphasis is not on the private but often the 
common good. Anthropologists have been impressed by the value of human 
life among many African peoples' (Isaac, 1993: 18). 
The author notes that non-African peoples have similar traditions. 
As regards the issue of participation, this background is important because it calls 
into question authoritarian, non-participatory approaches to humanitarian assistance 
that proceed from the assumption that affected communities do not know how to 
identify their own vulnerable individuals and how to assist them. Partly, such 
approaches appear to have been influenced by increasing poverty levels in the South, 
which have resulted in massive inflows of humanitarian assistance from the North. 
For example, Isaac (1993: 18) argues as follows: 
'Today, Africa receives so much humanitarian aid that the world does not 
view Africans as philanthropists. Much of Africa has seemingly become so 
impoverished that African humanitarianism is invisible. Nonetheless, 
Africans are still very active, if not in financial aid, then in human energy and 
mutual assistance. To this day, an important institution of the Oromo in 
Ethiopia is called dabo, a communal assistance system of farmers at the time 
of ploughing, sowing, weeding and harvesting. It is a social and moral 
obligation for every adult in a village or surrounding regions to participate in 
dabo. Likewise, the sanbate among Christian Ethiopians is an old mutual 
economic assistance system. Similar systems exist elsewhere in Africa'. 
In addition he argues that the value of giving is also reflected in folklore: 
'Concern only for oneself is valueless. Greed is not only ridiculed, but is also 
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regarded as a sure path to spiritual and perhaps physical death. The story of the 
tragic end of three greedy men, who fear even a single fly from sharing their food 
and plot against each other for total possession of the remnants, is found 
throughout Africa' (p. 18). 
In one of the scenes in the Hollywood film Yhe gods must be crazy, an African 
bushman kills one of the goats of a settler farmer. When the settler farmer confiscates 
the animal, the bushman's interpretation is that the farmer does not want to share it, 
so he kills another one! The idea of private consumption simply didn't exist in the 
bushman's way of life. This may have been only a picture show, but it was not a far 
cry in so far as some such communities are concerned. 
The high value placed on sharing and assisting members of the community who lack 
resources to sustain life is common, not only in African cultures, but also throughout 
other cultures that are poor in material terms relative to the West. Ilis notion appears 
to be quite ironic in the sense that apparently, the poorer the community, the more 
generous, (as a community) and vice versa. 
However, despite the fact that we find the humanitarian spirit universally in space 
and in time, it would seem that the meaning of the concept of humanitarian aid has, 
in the twentieth century, shifted to almost becoming synonymous with the North 
helping the South. Perpetual absolute poverty conditions in the latter have tended to 
overwhelm the coping capacities of such societies in large-scale disruptions of their 
livelihood. What has developed is a whole industry of disaster relief geared at 
enhancing such coping capacities. As we have seen, the development of the 'relief 
industry' has been accompanied by many complexities, plunging humanitarianism 
into a moral crisis. 
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Humanitarian Umpires? 
The more established of the attempts to deal with the apparent moral crisis facing 
humanitarianism include: the Codes of Conduct of the International Red Cross and 
the Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief-, the Steering Committee 
for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), the standard response packages of the MSF, 
and the UK group People in Aid Principles for the Recruitment and Management of 
Relief Workers; the SPHERE project; the Humanitarian Accountability Project; and 
the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), based 
in the UK's Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Some of these efforts are 
examined briefly below. 
The Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Relief. 
At the heart of this code of conduct are the principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality. These principles are particularly problematic in the context of complex 
emergencies, which involve political and military conflicts. Neutrality requires that 
relief be distributed without taking sides in hostilities either ideologically, or through 
participation of any kind. Impartiality requires that assistance should be on the basis 
of need alone and not on any other criteria. The principle of impartiality is based on 
'an absolute morality that people in need should be assisted simply because that is 
the right thing to do; it is an expression of the fundamental dignity and value of all 
individuals' (Leader, 2000: 18). However, these principles have led to different 
forms of dilemmas for relief agencies in situations where, for example, affected 
civilians are also involved in perpetrating violence or where it is clear that relief 
given to affected communities is finding its way to soldiers participating in the 
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conflict: 'Where it is the poor and marginalised, themselves victims of violence and 
injustice, who have become perpetrators, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify 
clearly who are the "good guys" and who the "bad". Is it, therefore, feasible or 
desirable to distinguish between the "deserving" and "undeserving" victim in order 
to allocate relieff (Macrae, 1996: 4). 
Neutrality also poses problems where engaging with one of the parties in the conflict 
is necessary for a successful humanitarian programme. Some agencies (see Chapter 
Four) have used this principle to justify their exclusion from participation of certain 
individuals affected by the emergency, sometimes to the detriment of the relief 
programme itself. 
This code of conduct is voluntary. Adherence to it depends on the will of the aid 
agencies. Some Of its tenets also need interpretation and, at times, agencies interpret 
them to suit their actions. 
The SPHERE Project 
The SPHERE project was established in 1997 as a programme of the Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and InterAction with Voice, ICRC, 
and ICVA. It set itself the task of developing a set of universal minimum standards in 
what are regarded as core areas of humanitarian assistance, namely: water supply and 
sanitation; nutrition; food aid; shelter and site planning; and health services. Its stated 
aim is to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters, 
and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response. 
However, although the project claims that is sets out for the first time what people 
affected by disasters have a right to expect from humanitarian assistance, it is 
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doubtful if the minimum standards are shared across different types of communities. 
Arguably too, the minimum standards set out by the SPHERE project are in fact not 
met in many poor communities in normal times. To this extent, many poor 
communities can therefore be classified as needing humanitarian assistance even 
when there is no particular event-led emergency. In addition, it would appear that the 
success of the SPHERE project depends to a large extent on the resources at the 
disposal of agencies to meet these 'minimum standards' or their willingness to 
commit the necessary resources in accordance with the SPHERE framework. But 
perhaps more importantly, it is not clear how participation of the affected population 
will be a key feature at the operational level. 
ALNAP 
The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) is an 
international interagency forum established in 1997 with the aim of improving 
learning and accountability across the humanitarian system. Its mission statement 
states that: 'ALNAP, as a unique sector-wide active-learning membership network, is 
dedicated to improving the quality and accountability of humanitarian action, by 
sharing lessons; identifying common problems; and, where appropriate, building 
consensus on approaches' (ALNAP, 2002). Its activities are structured around 
themes that include: making the evaluation process more effective; strengthening 
accountability frameworks for the humanitarian system; and improving field-level 
learning mechanisms. Participation of affected populations is a key concern in the 
second theme, that is, of strengthening accountability frameworks for the 
humanitarian system. It was under this theme that the work that forms the basis for 
Chapter Four of this thesis was carried out. Another piece of work was a synthesis 
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study on social learning (Apthorpe and Atkinson, 1999b). In addition, at the time of 
writing of this thesis, ALNAP had embarked on a global study which would 
specifically look at the issue of participation of affected populations in a wide variety 
of geographical areas as well as different types of emergencies. This work was based 
on the realisation that downward accountability to beneficiaries and "affected" 
population was clearly inadequate. ALNAP also embarked on the development of an 
agenda on mapping accountability as well as developing an annual published Survey 
of Accountability and Leaming in the Humanitarian System. 
The Humanitarian Accountability Project 
The Humanitarian Accountability project started off as the Ombudsman Project, bom 
out of the broader debate of accountability in humanitarian assistance. At a meeting 
held in 1997 in London, the World Disasters Forum noted that 'few existing 
structures encourage humanitarian agencies to be accountable to their clients... while 
humanitarian actors have to respond to a wide range of interested bodies to whom 
they are accountable, the current system is in no way accountable directly to 
beneficiaries or claimants of assistance' (Ombudsman Project Working Group, 
2000a: 1). While the different 'tools' mentioned have provided for a basic guide on 
how to respond to humanitarian emergencies, a major limitation has been the absence 
of any organisation to enforce adherence. A consortium of UK-based NGOs in 
response to this concern launched the Ombudsman project. Its vision was an 
ambitious one: 'to act as an impartial and independent voice for those people affected 
by disaster and conflict... to provide a mechanism through which the concerns of 
people affected by disaster and conflict can be raised and addressed within the 
humanitarian community' (The Ombudsman Project leaflet, no date). The need for 
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the establishment of the Humanitarian Ombudsman provides another indication that 
NGOs have not succeeded in acting as voices for the poor, or at least that thus far 
there has been no mechanism to ascertain this role. 
I 
Proponents of the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project were by no means under any 
illusions regarding the likely difficulties inherent in the concept. 'Research thus far 
has signalled numerous challenges to establishing an Ombudsman's office that 
should be addressed in any future pilot project stage' (Ombudsman Project Working 
Group, 2000a: 4). The key areas of concern included how to ensure beneficiary 
access; how to design a system that is not muddled by bureaucratisation; balancing 
facilitation and regulation in a such a way that it does not encourage 'an adversarial 
environment that places the Ombudsman, beneficiary agencies, or even donors, in a 
confrontational dileninia'; how to obtain international jurisdiction and international 
consensus; and financing. 
Indeed, it was subsequently concluded that, while the project should concentrate on 
providing a mechanism for identifying and addressing the concerns of the poor, a 
4policing' or compliance component mechanism was not appropriate. The word 
'Ombudsman' was regarded as a key source of the confusion regarding how the 
project would operate, hence the change to 'the Humanitarian Accountability 
Project'. Nevertheless, many difficulties still remain. As the project's Working 
Group notes, much of the critique has been based on: 
&a consensus that accountability to the rights of beneficiaries must be 
strengthened, while at the same time acknowledging that the obligations and 
responsibilities of specific humanitarian actors are currently not clearly 
defined. Any mechanism to enhance accountability must find its role within 
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contexts where uncertainty prevails regarding the respective roles of states, 
NGO's, the UN, and donors, as well as taking into account and respecting the 
survival strategies of those people targeted by humanitarian assistance. 
Improved accountability must ultimately rest between a state and its citizenry. 
The extent to which the international humanitarian community should and 
can temporarily relieve a given state of these burdens is not clear in current 
emergency practice ... The majority of questions that have emerged from 
Phase II are not related to whether a mechanism for improved accountability 
is necessary, but are concerned with how it can actually work in practice. 
Many questions and challenges have been posed which can only be answered 
through a programme of practical field-testing. Thus, the majority of people 
involved in the Phase 11 International Stakeholder Consultation have agreed 
that the concept must now be properly tested to demonstrate whether or not it 
can achieve its objectives and add value to humanitarian practice' (The 
Ombudsman Working Group, 2000b, Section 2.3 and 3.1). 
In general it can be argued that, from the point view of accountability, one of the 
major challenges of the humanitarian accountability project will be how to reinforce 
a balance between upward and downward accountability on the part of NGOs. The 
fact that the project has had to shift from the character of a 'policeman' to one of 
merely promoting accountability not only makes it difficult to see how it will be 
different from the others, but also demonstrates the difficulties involved in 
attempting to control the behaviour of aid agencies. 
It is likely that efforts to chip away the rough edges of humanitarianism will continue 
but there are also serious questions to be addressed. To begin with, the existence of 
some of the instruments developed to ensure that humanitarianism remains 
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humanitarian, such as the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, do not seem to have succeeded in 
their objectives. In fact, there are cases in which, in order to reach certain groups 
affected by disasters, the abandonment of some of its basic principles has been called 
for. It would seem that it is fair to look at the various instruments aimed at 
safeguarding the purity of humanitarianism simply as curative medicine, and in this 
case, apparently not very effective ones, not least because the medicine is to be taken 
voluntarily and many choose not to take it. It seems the case that the causes of the 
disease continue to be ignored. In Pathology, the answer to the question why people 
continue to get disease is not because there is no medicine. Similarly, lack of 
institutions or instruments to act as umpires of the humanitarian process cannot be 
regarded as the primary reason why the concept continues to suffer from a moral 
crisis. The increase in numbers and types of stakeholders involved in humanitarian 
assistance has brought a myriad of motives, principles, operational procedures and 
concerns that have distorted the concept of traditional humanitarianism. Dilemmas in 
complex emergencies, for example, where an agency hesitates to render assistance 
because such assistance will filter down to the perpetrators of suffering, are based on 
the erroneous assumption that humanitarian action exists also to solve political 
problems. This is why some have accused humanitarian assistance of providing a 
convenient cover for political inaction. 
It seems that the sure way to cleanse humanitarianism of its moral impurities is to 
reassert the principle of kindness for humanity as the sole motivating factor. This 
means that political and other goals must be addressed by means other than 
humanitarian assistance. This can only succeed not on the basis of an increasing 
number of watchdogs only, but also on the basis of a conscious effort on the part of 
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donors to abandon all non-humanitarian motives in humanitarian assistance. In 
addition, the key to accountability to people affected by disasters is the willingness 
by aid agencies and donors to listen and act upon the concerns of such people. As we 
have seen, humanitarian behaviour and instincts already exist in poor communities. 
The international humanitarian system should learn to build on these, rather than to 
impose all sorts of new notions. So far, there is little evidence that such will exists. In 
addition, given that the involvement of stakeholders with different values, priorities, 
principles and motives will continue to dominate the humanitarian landscape, the 
need to re-define and re-conceptualise humanitarianism seems inescapable. This 
process needs to reflect the views of people affected by disasters. However, the 
realisation of these suggestions as well as the success of mechanisms for enhancing 
the accountability of aid workers and agencies, will continue to depend on their 
willingness to follow the guidelines provided by these mechanisms. Just how to 
generate this willingness seems to be the key question. 
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Chapter Four. Participation in a complex emergency: 
the case of south Sudan 
Background 
As indicated in the foregoing chapter, the development of various mechanisms has 
been an important part of current efforts to increase accountability and efficiency in 
humanitarian programmes. I reviewed the most well known of these that are most 
relevant with regard to the issue of participation and they included, among others, the 
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP). At its 
fourth meeting in October 1998, the ALNAP noted that a recurring theme of 
discussion at its meetings had been the need to improve accountability to those 
affected by disasters and humanitarian crises. Subsequently, the ALNAP steering 
committee approved the working up of a proposal which would establish more 
effective methods for incorporating the views of disaster-affected populations and 
beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance into the design, monitoring, reporting and 
evaluation mechanism of donor organisations, UN agencies, NGOs, the Red 
Cross/Crescent Movement and the local authorities. It was noted that current 
examples of good beneficiary consultation/participation by agencies appear to be 
atypical and lack the level of consolidation that can be operationally useful and 
institutionally feasible (Record of the Meeting, ALNAP Secretariat, November, 
1998). 
This situation presented the need for a study which would draw from experiences in 
a wide ranging set of circumstances globally to arrive at some form of 'best' 
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practices as regards beneficiary consultation/participation. Before that study could 
begin it was felt necessary that preparatory work be undertaken that would give a 
clearer articulation of what 'the problem' actually was and to identify the benefits of 
greater involvement of beneficiaries. This preparatory work would also aim to 
establish the normative framework against which agency practices might be judged - 
what is appropriate at what stage of an emergency, and under what circumstances. 
The first step in this preparatory work towards a global study on 'beneficiary voice' 
and humanitarian programmes was an ALNAP Synthesis Study undertaken jointly 
by Raymond Apthorpe and Philippa Atkinson (Apthorpe and Atkinson, 1999b), on 
what they have termed 'Shared Social Leaming', that is, leaming in which listening 
to the affected population plays an important part, and where such populations are 
treated as subjects and not objects. A study on the experiences of some British NGOs 
in involving beneficiaries in their programmes during the 1998 famine in south 
Sudan constituted a second step towards this envisaged global study. I undertook this 
study in March and April 1999. Both studies were premised on the need for 
humanitarian programmes to respect their beneficiaries and that there is much to be 
gained from consultation, participation and other social leaming methods as regards 
the design, management, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian programmes. 
Historical and political context of South Sudan. 
The political conflict in Sudan has a long history. One account traces the origins of 
the conflict to the nineteenth century when the Egyptian conquest of Northern Sudan 
changed the nature of the existing forms of taxation and land rights, opening new 
opportunities for the economic exploitation of the people of the South by the people 
of the North who had since become Muslim through trade and other contact with the 
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Middle East (Johnson, 1997). Johnson points out that the North-South divide was 
essentially social and political in nature until the introduction of Jihad by the 
Malidyya of 1881-1898 who fought against both the non-Mhahdist Muslims and 
non-Muslims. 
Prior to independence a distinguishing feature of Sudan, according to Johnson, was 
the absence of an active broad-based nationalist movement. Such a movement had 
been made unnecessary by the fact that the process of independence for Sudan was 
initiated by the outcome of international considerations rather than nationalist parties. 
Thus, nationalist parties turned to the religious sects, being the only organisations 
with broad membership. 'National politics in the North thus became organised 
around sectarian parties, who made little effort to develop a nationalist ideology 
embracing secularist Muslim as well as non-Muslim' (P4-5). 
The causes of the current conflicts, however, seem to be closely connected with the 
process of independence. Independence in south Sudan was based on the condition of 
the devolution of considerable administrative and political powers to the southern 
region. However, the southern Sudanese formed their own Federal Bloc in 1957 after 
the Northern Parties had rejected the federal system of government immediately 
following independence. The imposition of a policy of Arabisation and Islamisation 
in the south by the Military government of the North-South division only resulted in 
a southern rebellion, which later escalated into full-scale civil war in the 1960s. 
Economic hardships during the 1970s and 1980s increased the north's interest in the 
oil-rich southem areas, fuelling the confrontation between the two sides. 
Keen (1999) argues that the northem Arab minority essentially employs divide and 
rule tactics to suppress rebellion among the black majority of the south. This strategy 
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has mainly been achieved through the Government of Sudan (GoS) policy of using 
politically restive militias to fight the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and 
destabilise the south. For example, northern Bar el Ghazal has been a target of 
sustained Murhalin attacks during most of the 1980s, reaching their peak in 1986 and 
1987. 
Increased confrontation between 'insider/outsider' factions plus increased pressure 
on President Nimeiri from Northern Sudanese who were opposed to the creation of 
the Southern Region later led to the division of the Southern Region into three power 
blocs, namely Bar al Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. Subsequently, political 
developments led to the formation of general guerrilla units with support from 
several former army officers including John Garang, William Abdallah C661, Samuel 
Gai Tuk and a serving officer, Major Keribuno Kuanyin Bol. Efforts were later made 
to unify these groups into one army. However, some leaders who wanted the 
separation of south Sudan were opposed to the SPLM/SPLA's stated goal of 
'revolution'. The army had therefore inherent disunity. 
However, the army managed to hold together because the attempt to establish an 
Islamic State in Sudan by Sadiq Al Madhi, who succeeded Nimeiri, alienated the 
southerners. Moreover, the new government was opposed to the creation of a single 
southern region. The SPLA managed to consolidate by changing its policies and 
winning some of the tribal militias to its side. However, the fall of the Mengistu 
government in Ethiopia in 1991, which had supported the SPLA, precipitated new 
problems. The Mengistu regime had been influential in supporting factional dissent 
within the SPLA, some actions of which had been the detention of some factional 
leaders such as Keribuno Kuanyiri Bol and Arok Ilon Arok. The fall of Mengistu 
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gave these and other leaders who had been calling for reforms within the SPLA the 
opportunity to re-affirm themselves. This event culminated in an announcement on 
the radio in 1991 of a coup against John Garang, who was the leader at that time. The 
period from 1991 to the present time has been characterised by defections out of and 
re-defections into, the SPLA by the various factions. The SPLA continues to attack 
towns held by the government - the most recent of which was the occupation of 
Rumbek town in 1997. The government also launches its own offensives, particularly 
in the dry season. 
Operation Lifeline Sudan. 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was created in 1989 by the UN as a humanitarian 
programme aimed at 'assisting internally displaced and war-affected civilians during 
an ongoing conflict in a sovereign country, as opposed to refugees beyond its 
borders' (Karim et al, 1996). It came into existence after the failure by the 
international community to prevent the 1988 war-related famine in Bar el Ghazal. It 
set out to operate on the principle of neutrality, guaranteeing access to all war- 
affected population whatever their location. However, immediately following its 
establishment GoS began to see it as benefiting the SPLM/A while the SPLM/A saw 
it as benefiting GoS. This problem contributed to a change starting from 1992 in the 
nature of OLS in the direction of increased formalisation. increasingly, UN co- 
ordination is seen as confined to south Sudan only while in the North, GoS is seen to 
play a leading role. With regard to participation, some agencies have tended to see 
OLS as restrictive because of its failure to cover all geographic areas requiring 
humanitarian assistance. Consequently, such agencies have chosen to operate outside 
the OLS umbrella in order to be able to reach out to areas that lie outside it. 
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Study Design. 
This study attempted to identify empirically types of participation by beneficiaries 
and their communities over a geographically and socially limited area (i. e. south 
Sudan). This was achieved through analysing the experiences of some of the 12 
United Kingdom (UK)-based NGOs covered by the Disasters' Emergency 
Committee (DEC) evaluation of the south Sudan humanitarian programme in 
consulting with the beneficiaries and involving them in the planning, management, 
monitoring and evaluation of their humanitarian programmes. Secondly, an attempt 
was made to draw out some conclusions regarding the circumstances in which it is 
appropriate, feasible in practice and desirable in principle for agencies to utilise 
consultative and participatory approaches and the circumstances under which it is not 
appropriate, or not required, to utilise such approaches. The study also included an 
analysis of factors, on a broader (perhaps structural) level that might exert limitations 
to agencies as regards beneficiary involvement. Finally, the study attempted to draw 
out any evidence of the benefits or disbenefits to programme quality of utilising 
participatory approaches. 
Specifically, the study addressed the following questions: - 
* How were beneficiaries defined, identified and reached? 
" What were the types of participation utilised and why? 
" What is the relationship between humanitarian space and participatory space? 
" Are programmes more effectively delivered if participatory? 
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* Is there value-added beyond the programme if humanitarian assistance is 
delivered in a participatory fashion? 
Method of study. 
The method of study involved working in conjunction with ETC (a UK-based 
consultancy firm) in their overall evaluation of the UK DEC humanitarian appeal in 
South Sudan. I was a member of a three-person team among the four teams of ETC 
on the evaluation. While the other members of my team focussed on the evaluation 
of the programme, I conducted, independently, a study focussed on participation. 
Three main activities were involved: a preparatory period at the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) in London and North Shields (with ETC) during which 
background information was obtained and the field protocol produced; three weeks 
of field work in Nairobi and Lokichoggio (Kenya) and south Sudan plus one and half 
weeks of further analysis and write up in London and North Shields. In Nairobi, I 
held semi-structured interviews with key personnel at the regional head offices of the 
UK NGOs included in the study. These were Oxfam, SCF, CARE, Merlin, Concern, 
Christian Aid, World Vision, Tear Fund and MSF- Holland; the third activity was 
on-going use of documentary information available on the south Sudan humanitarian 
programme. 
Various documents were reviewed including the following: 
* 48 Hour, Four Week and Final Programme reports by the agencies to the DEC. 
e Agency programme and project reviews and reports. 
9 OLS reviews and consultancy reports. 
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General articles on participation and humanitarian programmes, including the 
draft ALNAP Synthesis Study (Apthorpe and Atkinson, 1999a); and 
* Field reports on various programmes such as nutrition, livestock, water and 
sanitation, and seeds and tools distribution. 
Fieldwork. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews at Regional Office level aimed primarily at 
establishing a broader picture of the programme and obtaining information on areas 
in south Sudan where the NGOs were operational as well as a list of field staff to be 
seen in both Lokichoggio and south Sudan. In Lokichoggio contact was made with 
the NGOs mentioned above. In south Sudan, L together with the other team 
members, visited five places, namely Akot, Rumbek, Angangrial, Mapel and Malual 
Kon. Oxfam were operational in Akot and Rumbek, Tear Fund in Rumbek and 
Malual Kon, and SCF in Mapel. During these field visits, I held semi-structured 
interviews with agency field staff and, in a very limited number of cases, individual 
project beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were mostly women attending feeding 
programmes. Only two operational projects were also visited, namely, a therapeutic 
feeding centre and a water project. 
The other teams of the ETC were given the ALNAP field protocol to use on 
programmes undertaken by the other NGOs not covered by our team. This 
arrangement had problems in that not all agencies outside the coverage of our team 
were adequately covered as regards this study. In one case the problem arose from 
lack of access to a particular agency for the ETC team involved. In other cases 
limited time to address the demands of the DEC evaluation left little opportunity to 
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address the issues covered by this study adequately. As a result of these constraints 
only four agencies have been covered in detail. These are Oxfam, Tear Fund, SCF 
(UK) and Concern World-wide. I visited the first three agencies at both regional 
office and implementation site levels. Concern was only visited at the regional office 
level but a fairly detailed coverage has been made possible because of the availability 
of a fair amount of information from programme reports and interviews in Nairobi. It 
should be mentioned, however, that the issues covered by the study are generic to all 
agencies and therefore still relevant despite the limitations in the methodology. It 
must also be stated that cases cited from the experiences of particular agencies are 
dictated by information availability and should not be taken to suggest that other 
agencies did not have similar experiences. 
Another major limitation was inability to contact beneficiaries in any substantial way 
due to time and logistical constraints. Ideally, it would have been helpful to interview 
people who received assistance from the NGOs as well as the various committees, 
women's groups, gol leaders (clan heads), chiefs and SRRA officials that the 
agencies were dealing with. In so far as the views of the beneficiaries are concerned, 
this constituted a shortcoming for the study. Consequently, this study should be seen 
as presenting only a partial view of the issues at stake, namely, an analysis of the 
experiences of the aid agencies. Nevertheless, some beneficiary voices came through 
via reported speech in agency reports or in interviews as regards what beneficiaries 
had said or how they had acted on particular issues. 
Defining Beneficiaries. 
A task force was forined for the specific purpose of identifying vulnerable 
individuals and targeting aid. This task force comprised officials from the SPLM, the 
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SRRA, and agencies from within the OLS. Clearly absent from this task force were 
representatives of the beneficiary communities such as the executive chiefs, the gol 
leaders and representatives of women's groups. The SRRA, which in principle was 
supposed to provide for this representation, could in practice only do so in a limited 
way because of its own interests arising from the fact that, in reality, it represented 
the interests of the SPLM. It was in fact because of this reason that some agencies 
tried to avoid dealing with the SRRA for fear that their neutrality would be viewed as 
having been compromised. The SPLNVSRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and 
Vulnerabilities Task Force identified the following categories of beneficiaries: 
Indigenous community population affected by events such as war raids, or 
famine. These were thought to be most likely to find representation in the 
traditional social structure. 
The internally displaced: these were regarded to be very vulnerable because in 
most cases they were unlikely to have any resources, food or non-food. They 
were also regarded as lacking representation in the social structure and 
therefore more likely to be left out of programmes which used the social 
structure in creating participatory space. 
Returnees: these were people who had left the towns due to fighting and had 
come back to their villages. They were regarded as just as vulnerable as the 
displaced except that they had kin relations to fall back on in the absorbing 
communities. However, the absorption of the returnees led to the depletion of 
resources within the recipient communities, increasing their vulnerability, a 
fact that did not seem to be reflected in the distribution mechanism as only the 
returnees were targeted for relief aid. 
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The old, the sick and the weak: whether returnees, 'indigenous' or internally 
displaced, these were more likely to lack an entry point into participation. 
0 The so-called 'C-130 invitees': marginalized individuals travelling from 
airstrip to airstrip in search of food. These were unlikely to have an entry point 
into participation. 
At the agency level, the definition of beneficiaries varied from agency to agency, 
sometimes depending on the type of the programme. For those involved in 
therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes, nutritional assessments 
(WT/HT and MUAQ played a key role in the defining process. Thus, beneficiaries 
were essentially children under five years of age and pregnant and lactating mothers. 
In several cases during the emergency, some agency staff felt that nutritional 
assessments were quite inappropriate, given the level of suffering observed. In 
addition, the physical make-up of the Dinkas of south Sudan, who are generally very 
tall and slim, posed problems for the traditional nutritional indicator of Weight for 
Height. One agency staff commented that using this indicator, nearly the whole 
population would be classified as malnourished. As a result of these problems some 
agencies did not adhere strictly to the standards set by UNICEF and OLS. In the case 
of orphans and abandoned children, nutritional assessments were thought to be most 
inappropriate. 
A number of agencies, particularly SCF, Merlin and the Diocese of Rumbek strongly 
felt that observation was the most appropriate method for defining beneficiaries at 
the point of entry into the humanitarian programme. For such agencies, the level of 
suffering observed made participation of beneficiaries (in determining the 
vulnerable) inappropriate. 
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One agency defined beneficiaries institutionally. In this particular case, the 
population of a whole parish became beneficiaries. Removal of the need to target 
resulted in reaching the defined beneficiaries quickly and efficiently. However, 
beneficiaries were narrowly defined since church attendance may have affected entry 
into the programme. 
Almost all agencies, but particularly WFP and those that distributed general rations 
and non-food items, made use of the traditional social structure in defining their 
beneficiaries. In this case relief items, especially food rations, were given to local 
executive chiefs to distribute to gol leaders who would in turn re-distribute to 
households. 
The executive chief has jurisdiction over a given geographical territory while the gol 
leader has jurisdiction over a social territory (chiefs and gol leaders generally 
appeared to be only men). The latter is some kind of a clan head who knows all the 
families under his leadership and is therefore best placed to identify the vulnerable. 
The executive chief being in charge of a geographical area may distribute food to 
areas (within his territory) that have not necessarily been targeted for distribution. 
This may result in the targeted area getting inadequate food or other assistance, 
thereby leaving out some 'genuine beneficiaries'. Nevertheless, the traditional social 
structure appeared to offer the best opportunities for participation where these were 
appropriate and required. 
In a rather authoritarian fashion, some agencies used their own judgement to define 
beneficiaries. This was mostly the case with regard to the distribution of non-food 
items such as seeds, tools, fishing equipment and household utensils, and water and 
sanitation programmes. Apparently, these agencies felt that it was possible to come 
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up with a reasonable judgement regarding people in need of items such as seeds, 
tools, household utensils, etc. While this might have been true in some cases, it 
certainly could not have been true in all cases. More importantly, as will be shown 
later, while agencies might have fairly accurately determined who should receive 
assistance, the specific aspects of the type of assistance given posed more problems 
than was anticipated. So, for example, while agency judgement could be used to 
determine the need for seed or tools, it could not easily be used to determine what 
type of seeds and what kind of tools. In some cases, agencies provided assistance to 
prevent populations from leaving their areas, thereby creating the problem of a huge 
displaced population elsewhere. The definition of beneficiaries in this case was also 
agency-driven. 
Identification of beneficiaries. 
Beneficiary identification took many forms, not all of which were participatory. 
Firstly, there were beneficiaries who effectively identified themselves through self- 
presentation at places where assistance was being given, for example, at mission sites 
in the case of one church-affiliated agency. It was also not uncommon to find people 
who defined themselves as needing assistance camping, lingering and loitering 
around the compounds of some aid agencies. Free rations were not the only reason 
why these people were found in these places. Some were motivated by the possibility 
of opportunities for paid casual work made available by the labour requirements of 
agencies in, for example, the fetching of materials and the construction of their living 
compounds. Secondly, people presented themselves at feeding centres if they felt that 
their children needed assistance. 
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Identification through self-presentation had several problems. In the first instance, 
only those who were physically strong enough to walk could make it to the places 
where assistance was found. Some people were also by-passed simply because of a 
lack of information regarding where to find assistance. Additionally, there were a 
number of cases where agency staff turned self-presented individuals away as the 
former determined that the latter did not qualify for assistance. This was particularly 
true in the case of the therapeutic feeding programme. Based as it was on set indices 
of what constituted severe malnutrition, agency staff had to refuse to admit children 
who, in spite of their obvious physical wasting, had not met the required criteria. The 
difficulties faced by agency staff in dealing with this situation were reflected in a 
number of reports that several of them began to relax the standards in order to 
incorporate increased numbers of malnourished children. This practice posed 
problems for field staff who were at the same time under pressure from their head 
offices to distribute a finite amount of resources. The worst case was one in which, 
even using the agreed standard for identifying malnourished children, agency staff 
found themselves ending up with too many children to admit into the programme 
relative to available resources. Attempting to solve this dilemma resulted in a 
situation in which officially severely malnourished children were not classified as 
such and denied admission into the programme. Such children were returned to their 
homes and only admitted into the supplementary feeding programme. The fact that 
the latter programme is, by definition, meant to supplement therapeutic feeding, in 
addition to the fact that the general ration at times was not timely delivered, agency 
staff found themselves in the contradictory situation in which they were giving food 
rations supplementary to nothing. 
Clearly, the problems faced with regard to self-presented beneficiaries also had much 
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to do with the method that was used to screen them, in this case, nutrition indices. 
The experience in south Sudan appears to raise a question that needs careful 
attention: How appropriate are standard nutritional surveys in identifying 
beneficiaries in situations of extreme food shortages? The significance of this 
question is highlighted even further when the issue of adolescent and adult 
malnutrition is brought into play. The focus on under-five children and pregnant and 
lactating women often overlooks the vulnerability of children over five years as well 
as adolescents and adults. Yet, as argued by Salama and Collins (1999), based on 
experiences in Somalia, Angola, the Great Lakes and Liberia, adolescent and adult 
malnutrition deserve serious consideration during emergencies. In the case of south 
Sudan they observe: 'this focus on child malnutrition did not always correspond with 
the mortality patterns in a given location. In a number of areas these were typical of a 
late stage in a severe famine, with adult and adolescent deaths out-numbering those 
of children under the age of five' (p. 19). Saving children who are likely to become 
orphans because their parents have been neglected is an issue that not only raises 
ethical considerations but also puts question marks on the effectiveness of the whole 
relief process. 
Perhaps recognising the pitfalls of self-presentation as a form of beneficiary 
identification, some agencies employed the strategy of house-to-house visits. This 
strategy had the obvious advantage of reaching out to those who could not make it to 
the feeding and distribution centres during the particular period for a variety of 
reasons including poor physical/health status, long distance and lack of information. 
An additional advantage was the possibility of learning more about the community 
set-up as well as individual household characteristics that could be harnessed to 
improve the planning and execution of the programmes. The obvious difficulty lay in 
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the need to mobilise enough resources in terms of manpower and transportation to 
cover substantially large areas. 
Vulnerability workshops were an alternative or an additional strategy for identifying 
beneficiaries for some agencies. These one-day workshops brought together agency 
staff, community representatives (principally the executive chiefs and the gol 
leaders) and the representatives of the SRRA. This forum presented opportunities for 
community representatives to influence the process of identifying beneficiaries and 
helped to generate information that was key to the effectiveness of the humanitarian 
programme. 
Distribution. 
The mode of the distribution of relief items appeared to follow along the lines 
through which beneficiaries were identified. Agencies that relied on self-presentation 
of beneficiaries distributed their items through fixed stations such as the mission site 
and the feeding centres. Beneficiary participation in the process of distribution varied 
from agency to agency. Some agencies made efforts to involve the local population 
with varying degrees of extensiveness. Others preferred to rely on large numbers of 
expatriate staff. In the former case, there were those who undertook, for example, to 
train the local population in nutritional measurements, feeding and the distribution of 
food items. In some instances committees were formed composed of local people 
that administered the day-to-day activities of feeding and distribution centres, 
including the settling of disputes. However, participation in this case was mostly 
limited to women whose children had been admitted into the feeding centres. In the 
latter case, particularly for some medical agencies, expatriate staffs were imported en 
masse to carry out distribution activities. At one point, one agency reportedly 
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imported a staggering eighty members of expatriate staff, causing considerable 
anxiety and feelings of chaos not only among some local aid administrators, but also 
fellow international NGOs. (Some agency staffs reported that the arrival of this 
contingent at the UN inter-agency compound where all operations were based did 
cause some problems with regard to accommodation and the general management of 
the camp). 
One agency attempted to overcome the shortcomings of distributing relief items at a 
fixed centre by designing a mobile feeding programme. 'Ibus, contrary to usual 
practice in the distribution process, the agency went to the community as opposed to 
the community going to the agency. This programme involved agency staff travelling 
to designated outposts in the villages where local people were mobilised and 
supplied all the labour requirements and only received material and technical 
assistance from the aid agency. Incidentally, the particular agency involved in 
running this programme was relatively small without much resource back up. in 
addition it was the first time it had ever directly operated in the field, having 
previously only worked through funding local partners. Being a church-affiliated 
agency, however, it was able to forge quick links in the community through its 
church partners. But given the limited resource-base of the agency, the programme 
itself was of a very limited nature, with only one vehicle employed in the feeding 
rounds. 
Nevertheless, the mobile feeding programme demonstrated a number of advantages. 
Firstly, it offered increased opportunities for participation by the local population as 
the programme was taking place within their normal social environment. Secondly, 
opportunities for social learning on the part of the agency were also increased, as 
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agency staffs were able to hold discussions with members of the community before 
and after the feeding activity. Thirdly, the programme helped to prevent large 
concentrations of the population that would have necessitated the introduction of 
water and sanitation programmes. Fourthly, the programme also contributed to the 
strengthening of household coping mechanisms by allowing women to use the time 
they would have spent travelling the long distances and queuing for rations to look 
for extra food and other supplies. In this sense the burden of a heavy workload for 
women was also considerably reduced. 
I 
Agencies involved in the distribution of the general ration mainly did so through 
executive chiefs and gol leaders. The distribution itself usually took place at the 
airstrip where the food had been dropped by planes and stored. A day would then be 
announced when the goods would actually be distributed. On the designated day, 
agency staff and porters selected from within the local communities would distribute 
food to the executive chiefs. The executive chiefs would in turn, under no 
interference from agency staff, distribute the proportion given to them to the gol 
leaders. At the end of the chain, the gol leaders would then distribute rations to 
individuals. Thus, distribution was quite indirect and agencies found it very difficult 
to know what happened beyond the level of the executive chief, let alone that of the 
gol leader. This lack of knowledge raised some concern among some agency staffs 
that, because of their lack of knowledge regarding mechanisms for guaranteeing 
fairness in the community, they were unsure whether the food was reaching what 
they (the agencies) had defined as vulnerable individuals. On a more serious note, 
there were fears that the food would find its way to SRRA officials and eventually to 
the SPLM, thus rendering the agencies a party to the continuation of the conflict 
through sustenance of the soldiers. 
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Beneficiary participation. 
The participation of beneficiaries varied in extent and type across different agencies 
and programmes. This section will give examples of agencies and the ways in which 
they attempted to get their beneficiaries to participate in the various programmes. 
Given the large number of agencies involved only short summaries will be given. It 
should also be mentioned that these summaries are by no means exhaustive. Some 
programmes have deliberately been left out due to lack of adequate information 
available to me at the time of writing on the role of beneficiaries in these 
programmes. The account itself is also limited by the amount of available 
information. 
Oxf, am carried out several emergency programmes in both the south and northern 
sectors of Sudan: 
Emergency Water Supply and Hygiene Promotion. 
This programme involved the provision of clean water at a total of 31 sites in 6 
months, mostly feeding centres and food distribution points. Tle choice of the 
programme was clearly agency-driven but programme delivery involved some level 
of beneficiary participation. The main types of participation were: 
" Involvement of communifies in rehabilitation of water points. 
" Female community hygiene motivators (members of the community) who 
carried hygiene messages into the community. 
Emergency Food and Nutrition. 
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The programme was carried out in Rumbek and Agangrial towns in Rumbek County. 
The following types of participation were employed: Focus group discussions, a 
vulnerability workshop and key informant interviews. The vulnerability workshop 
was particularly important. Planned in consultation with the SRRA, it involved 
participants from across the county who represented different sectors of the 
population including women, traditional and community leaders, civil authorities, 
village councils, farmers, health workers and agricultural extension workers. 
Through the vulnerability workshop, a call was made by participants to improve 
representation on the relief committees and their involvement in distribution. 
Awareness on groups who were not receiving food was also raised and one practical 
resolution was made to target, directly and separately, families of children in feeding 
centres, which was done in subsequent distributions. 
OLS Livestock Support Progranune. 
The programme's objectives were, among others, to support vulnerable livestock 
owners through the provision of additional medicines, vaccines, cold chain 
equipment, and veterinary equipment for increased disease treatment. The main types 
of participation utilised were: 
Dialogue workshops in all payanis (districts) with community leaders and 
livestock owners; 
The formation of a Veterinary Co-ordination Committee (VCQ in each 
Payam; and 
Employment of local supervisors. 
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Both programme reviews as well as agency staffs hailed the livestock support 
programme as one of the most successful programmes during the emergency. 
Livestock Epidendc Control (Bahrel Jebel, Northern Sector). 
The main objective of the programme was to improve animal health for stronger 
livestock resources. Beneficiary participation was sought through community 
sessions with livestock herders and community based animal health workers. The 
programme was done in conjunction with two local partner organisations. 
TEAR FUND (Church afflliated ai! encv). 
The south Sudan emergency programme was the first for Tear Fund to be directly 
operational at the field implementation level. Previously, the agency had only 
operated through funding local partners. Tear Fund specialised in feeding 
programmes, particularly dry supplementary feeding. They operated three 
programmes in three different areas in Bahr el Ghazal namely, Rumbek and Billing 
in Rumbek County and Malual Kon, north east of Aweil. In Rumbek, Tear Fund 
inherited beneficiaries from an Oxfam therapeutic feeding programme. Part of the 
reason for this was that being new in the area, and operating for the first time, the 
agency lacked adequate information regarding how and where to start what kind of 
programmes. A community education programme was run concurrently with the 
feeding programmes. During the initial stages of the programme there was almost no 
beneficiary participation at all. Beneficiaries were selected using the pre-set criteria 
of OLS for feeding programmes. The agency found that pressure to start programme 
activities to win support from local authorities made beneficiary participation 
difficult. With the programme underway, the agency was able to utilise the following 
forms of participation: - 
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& Informal discussions with various groups and community members; 
* Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (KAP) survey with women groups; 
* Discussions with women's groups and church groups; and 
9 Child to child classes. 
Tear Fund's programme had two unique features as far as beneficiary participation 
issues are concerned. Firstly, it was the only agency running a mobile supplementary 
feeding programme. The programme allowed increased beneficiary participation by 
making it easy for volunteers to work in the feeding centres. Because the centres 
were also small, contacts between agency staffs and beneficiaries were close. 
Secondly, Tear Fund was also the only agency running a child-to-child lessons 
programme. This programme enabled children over five years of age, often a 
neglected group during emergencies, to participate in the humanitarian programme. 
MERLIN (a medical relief a2encv). 
Merlin carried out five activities in their overall programme, namely therapeutic 
feeding, supplementary feeding, clinic activities, nutritional and health surveillance, 
and water and sanitation programme. 
Beneficiary involvement during the initial stages of the programme was difficult 
apparently because of a shortage of local staffs that could communicate with the 
beneficiaries. This problem alone resulted in several weeks' delay to programme 
commencement. After the programme got off the ground, beneficiary participation 
was achieved through: 
* Extensive employment of local staffs (up to 70 women); and 
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9 Discussions with community leaders. 
Merlin believed that language differences and the sheer number of staffs required 
would have made the programme impossible without major local staff recruitment. 
In addition, extensive local staff recruitment, many of whom had their own children 
in the programme, helped the programme's acceptance and its publicity throughout 
the community. Community involvement also helped to identify other needs. For 
example, the establishment of a clinic and a health surveillance programme was a 
direct response to community demand. 
The main problems of relying heavily on recruitment within the same community 
included the following: 
* Favouritism by staffs, who were in a position to allocate food, evidenced by the 
admission of children who did not meet the criteria, and the admission of the 
same children several times under different names. This obviously reflected 
social pressures, which these workers were under. 
On the medical side, there was a propensity for Health Workers to administer 
unnecessarily large amounts of medication. 
Save the Children Fund UK (a Development and Relief agency). 
The SCIF mounted several projects, all of which were not necessarily funded by the 
DEC. Only those that had direct relevance for beneficiary participation are 
mentioned here. These included: 
Community kitchens for unaccompanied minors; 
Community survival kits; 
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o Emergency relief items; 
* Emergency supplementary food delivery; 
9 Delivery of seeds and tools; 
* Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in South Darfur; and 
9 Assistance to unaccompanied children in South Darfur. 
The targeting and beneficiary selection mechanisms that were used are well 
documented in SCFs final programme report to the DEC. The local authorities and 
the representatives of SRRA and another local authority were given the responsibility 
to work with the communities to decide who would receive assistance and draw up 
lists of vulnerable individuals. The SCF retained the primary role of analysing the 
details of the identified beneficiaries and verification by their field staff before 
delivery of relief items. Field staffs were also used in conducting post-distribution 
assessments. In some areas distribution was done via Village Identification 
Committees (VICs) who, in collaboration with SCF, determined criteria for 
vulnerability in their community. In other areas food distribution was done through 
the Relief Committees established by WFP and a local authority. Chiefs were an 
integral part of the whole process. 
According to SCF, their experiences in working with beneficiaries revealed several 
lessons. Firstly, in their opinion, the traditional system of distribution (through 
chiefs) worked well in a stable community where vulnerability was related to asset 
losses from raids, floods or drought. The system did not work equitably when there 
was a large displaced community and another structure, such as the VIC, became 
necessary. Secondly, SCF had to modify its approach to targeting and delivery to 
reach out to the most vulnerable who, according to the agency, were people displaced 
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from their communities and traditional social networks of kinship support. Actions 
taken included intensifying discussions on selection criteria and follow up on 
distributions, and the withholding from the general distribution of a proportion of the 
relief available to the community (about 25%) to be distributed to households which 
were identified as having been previously neglected during the follow up visits. 
Thirdly, SCF learned that timely delivery of adequate essential relief items could 
increase the chances for people to remain stable, reducing the need for the 
establishment of feeding centres. They argued that one adverse effect of the feeding 
centres was that it distracted the attention of some agencies to the point where they 
had to scale down or even close their other ongoing primary health care programmes 
and outreach capacity, negatively affecting the health status of the communities. 
However, it may also be true that this reflected poor management and lack of 
adequate resources on the part of such agencies. Fourthly, working with beneficiaries 
resulted in the need to develop a fuller understanding of the concept of vulnerability, 
culminating in a research project (separately funded), which was later published as 
The south Sudan vulnerability study (Harragin, 1998). 
CAFOD (a Church afflliated Development and Relief agency). 
For CAFOD, beneficiary involvement in the programme was dictated by the nature 
of the delivery structure. In terms of the management framework, Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) as opposed to INGOs tended to operate in a structure of 
governance, sometimes negotiated locally because of knowledge of an area, 
sometimes imposing a structure from a regional framework. The diocesan structure is 
an example of the latter allowing quick reaction to a growing emergency situation 
where there was local knowledge of need. Beneficiary selection was based on local 
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knowledge, and beneficiary participation was mainly constituted by discussions 
between people who requested food at the mission, community elders, diocesan 
staffs and parishioners. Beneficiaries were defined as: 
* The poor of the parish, particularly those without work opportunity or the 
sick; frail and disabled; 
Clinic patients; 
Children in school; and 
* Others included at the discretion of the mission. 
Given the poor health and physical status of these categories of people, it was 
sometimes felt that participation was inappropriate at presentation. The agency 
claimed that some evidence in the south sector programme appeared to suggest that 
beneficiary recovery was greatly accelerated by an approach that emphasised family 
delivery of supplementary feeding and other medical inputs rather than isolating the 
individual patient. 
The experiences of the agency were important for learning. For example, the diocese 
of Rumbek felt that the 1998 disaster produced three critical lessons namely, the 
need for their own logistics, the need for professional input for therapeutic and 
supplementary feeding (to use Catholic Relief Services) and to deliver assistance to 
families and not individuals. 
CONCERN (a Development and Relief aj! enc 
Concern's emergency programme involved three major activities namely, adolescent 
and adult nutrition, support to sanitation programme and the improvement of 
capacity for humanitarian management by the SRRA. The latter project also aimed at 
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improving the relationship between NGOs and the SRRA. During the emergency, 
Concern operated more like a CBO, forging very close links and social contracts 
with the community. The programme was carried out in Aweil West and Yirol 
Counties. 
The pre-distribution planning phase of the programme involved, among other 
activities, consultations with the community leaders and the SSRA to determine the 
best strategy for targeting, determination of location and coverage of distribution 
sites, making agreements with local representation regarding target procedures, 
identification of staffs and community capacity for assistance with distribution, and 
outlining the process for the dissemination of the distribution plan to the 
communities. The targeting strategy adopted during the implementation phase was 
essentially to use traditional chiefs and gol leaders to distribute to the most 
vulnerable in their communities. The local leaders had record cards on which they 
recorded the names of the households that received items from them. 
Monitoring and Evaluation of the programme involved the following activities: 
fo Three- month progress reports; 
*A survey in Yirol county; 
* SRRA-Concem joint evaluation workshops in each county. The 
workshops had a broad range of participants including local civil 
authorities, women's association representative, SPLM representatives, 
chiefs, gol leaders and other NGO representatives; 
* Interviews conducted by community agents attached to decentralised 
supplementary feeding programmes in Aweil West. These agents would 
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also be used to collect information to inform policy on 1999 distributions 
and other food security related issues. 
The programme produced several key lessons, among which were: 
* Limited literacy levels among gol leaders led to their inability to fill in the record 
cards, limiting the effectiveness of using them in monitoring the targeted 
individuals; 
* Households in villages remote from the distribution point tended to receive less, 
especially if unaccompanied by their leaders to the distribution points. In some 
villages, households were not aware that distributions had taken place; 
e Gol leaders tended to distribute on an equal basis rather than targeting to one 
group called 'the most vulnerable'. Despite this issue the system was identified as 
a largely effective way of ensuring that assistance was delivered to the targeted 
populations; 
& Decentralised feeding programmes allowed for a closer relationship between the 
agency and the community. It was also realised that there was potential for 
improving and modifying the traditional targeting system. Improvements could 
be achieved through the identification of literate persons from each gol to assist 
the less literate gol leaders. The modification of the system would basically draw 
from the available knowledge and would involve, for example, the employment 
of community agents partly in a monitoring and training role. 
The capacity building programme implemented by Concern in south Sudan deserves 
a special note. Traditional practice in emergency relief is to see as emergency 
activities only the provision of immediate relief needs such as food, other non-food 
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livelihood materials and health and sanitation needs. Rarely do agencies see capacity 
building as an emergency activity. Yet, in a complex emergency like south Sudan, 
Concern's capacity building programme demonstrated that this programme can be 
valuable in terms of improving relations between the local authorities and aid 
agencies, enabling the latter to get better access to beneficiary populations. Thus, 
rather than complain that SRRA were exercising favouritism, or were proving 
difficult to work with, the capacity building programme enabled Concern to discover 
that part of the problem related only to a limited capacity in certain areas. Improving 
such capacities in those areas enabled the SRRA to participate more effectively. 
Individuals or Communities? 
The key issue addressed in this study related to the extent to which the views of the 
affected population can be taken into account by agencies involved in humanitarian 
programmes. The ways in which beneficiaries are defined, identified and reached 
have implications for the levels and types of participation that can be expected. In the 
case of south Sudan it seems fair to say that the traditional way of considering as 
beneficiaries only those who directly received assistance predominated. Yet it could 
be argued that bene)7ciary conununities might sometimes be a more appropriate term, 
particularly when considering participation. 
It is important to understand what may be implied by the terms beneficiary 
participation and beneficiary involvement. In Chapter One, I made a distinction 
between beneficiary involvement, which is primarily related to the supply of physical 
energies by the affected population to the programme, and involvement or 
participation that allows for the engagement of the community mind (i. e. social 
involvement). For example, most of the construction of feeding centres in the south 
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Sudan programme was done by the affected communities who mobilised their own 
labour and resources with very little input from the agencies. Women also supplied 
most of the labour for programme activities, including cooking in therapeutic feeding 
centres, pounding, drawing water, washing etc. However, the women did not always 
form part of the consultation process during the planning, monitoring and evaluation 
phases of the programmes. A number of reports on the programmes in south Sudan 
expressed concern over the limited involvement of women in these areas and made 
various recommendations for their inclusion. 
Clearly, it is possible on the one hand for much physical involvement or participation 
to occur without much social learning taking place, that is, without the beneficiaries 
being able to influence the decisions taken on their behalf by the agencies, and 
without the agencies learning the vital social infori-nation that can improve the 
effectiveness of their programmes. On the other hand, much social learning could 
occur without high levels of physical involvement. Thus, the argument that some 
agency staffs raised, that beneficiary participation was inappropriate in some cases 
because of poor nutritional status of the beneficiaries, would not hold water at this 
level. According to this argument, beneficiaries could not have been involved in 
programme activities because their nutritional status left them physically too weak to 
work, and involvement in decision-making was inappropriate because of the urgency 
of food need. However, this argument is largely irrelevant if a broader definition of 
beneficiaries is allowed that includes the wider community into which a programme 
is being delivered rather than one which considers as beneficiaries only those 
individuals who receive assistance directly. 
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In principle, only women and children are beneficiaries of feeding programmes, for 
example. But for a feeding programme to run well even men need to participate, 
even if in different ways. Two examples can illustrate this point. Firstly, the 
SPLM/SRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and Vulnerabilities Task Force noted that a lack 
of proper information regarding the purpose of feeding centres resulted, during the 
early stages of the programme, in households who were receiving rations from the 
centres, not being given the general food ration. The local distribution structure, 
dominated by men, failed to realise that feeding centre rations were meant for 
malnourished under-five children only and not for the whole household. 
Secondly, one agency reported from their experiences in feeding centres in Rumbek 
and Agangrial that a lack of initial engagement with men resulted in family 
misunderstandings between women attending the feeding centres and their husbands. 
This experience was also reported by another agency working in Mapel. Women 
reported that they experienced some resentment from their husbands for staying too 
long away from home, which sometimes resulted in marital disputes and violence. 
To address this problem feeding centre staff held discussions with community 
leaders and made plans to raise awareness among men in the community on this 
issue. In Agangrial Oxfam. also utilised the existing health committee to address the 
issue. Noteworthy here is the fact that the participation of men was brought on board 
to deal with a specific problem rather than being conceived, at the outset, as part and 
parcel of the programme. 
The point about beneficiary communities can further be illustrated by one project, 
which was established with the aim of assisting unaccompanied minors (see 
Discussion Point 2). The beneficiaries of this programme, using the narrow definition 
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of individuals, were the children who were admitted into the camps. The children 
participated in the information-gathering activities to establish their identities and 
family links. However, they did not participate in the decision-making process 
leading to the construction of the camps. Neither did they participate in the 
construction of the camps themselves. It was adults who participated in making 
decisions leading to the construction of the camps. In addition, women participated 
in supplying most of the labour for the day to day running of the camp, the activities 
of which included pounding flour, cooking, drawing water, bathing the children, 
washing and cleaning the dormitories. Adults also dominated the process of 
repatriation, who, together with agency staffs, determined that this was in the best 
interests of the children. 
The OLS Review (Karim, et. al, 1996: 170-180) also noted the problems of using 
narrow definitions of beneficiaries. The Review criticised the focus by many 
agencies on the female-headed household as a specifically vulnerable group. It was 
argued that there was a total lack of understanding of this concept by many agencies 
and that this focus was but one example of the tendency of aid agencies to focus on 
vulnerable individuals or groups, rather than societies. Theoretically, it was noted 
that the definition of a female-headed household is a source of on-going controversy. 
In the case of the social realities of south Sudan it was argued that using current 
acceptable definitions, marriage customary practices render all south Sudanese 
households female-headed regardless of the war. Externally influenced views are 
likely to be problematic, as evidenced by the following recommendation made by a 
headquarters-based staff of one agency to field-based staffs: 
'Another problem with the distribution lists was that during 
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compilation, some women who were second/third/fourth wives 
were mistakenly included as female heads of households 
(usually widows), which led to confusion during distribution... 
the lists should be altered to reflect the real status of each 
beneficiary' (Field reports). 
During the 1998 emergency, the general focus on women as heads of households led 
to specific problems in the distribution of general rations by WFP. Food, after being 
distributed to women, was subsequently taken to a secondary distribution point 
where it was redistributed by the traditional leadership structure based on its own 
definitions of vulnerability. Clearly, the community felt that the people receiving the 
food were not the only ones vulnerable. The imposition of this distribution strategy 
stands out as but one example of imported assumptions and models that bear little 
relevance to the particular situation under consideration. It is important to note that 
the problems created by this strategy, as well as other problems highlighted above, 
primarily resulted from emphasising the individual or particular individual social 
units as beneficiaries without considering these in relation to the wider social context 
within which they existed. 
Analytical Issues. 
Socio-cultural set-up of south Sudan. 
With regard to participation the most important social aspect of south Sudan appears 
to be the concept of sharing and the way in which vulnerability is regarded in the 
pre-dominant Dinka culture. Harragin's anthropological work (1998) goes into some 
detail in describing and analysing these concepts. Its usefulness lies in the fact that 
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the concepts are discussed in the context of a humanitarian intervention. There are a 
few aspects of Dinka culture that appear particularly relevant with regard to 
participation. These deserve some attention. 
To begin with, it is clear that in their local politics, the Dinka adhere to the basic 
democratic principles not incongruent with those of other democratic societies. 
Harragin (1998: 6) writes: 
'In local politics it is usually the majority decision that holds sway. Chiefship 
will normally be in the hand of the most populous group... a chief has 
authority as the leader of a group of people, not an area, and is more 
considered for his (sic) personal merits rather than for the authority of his 
(sic) office. It is a highly consensual society, and the decisions of the court 
seem to reflect more the desire to keep peace for the majority than to pursue 
the rights of the individual. ' 
As regards the concepts of welfare and inequality, the author dares assert that Dinka 
society is more egalitarian than western society, although he makes it clear that this 
does not mean that everything will be shared amongst everyone. Various 
mechanisms exist that ensure that people in need are not left completely without 
support. A high value is placed on the sharing of individual resources, a trait that aid 
agencies have had to grapple with, as relief aid distributed to the perceived 
vulnerable individuals was subsequently redistributed to a wider social grouping. 
Vulnerability itself is understood in ways that are different from those that aid 
agency staffs are used to: 'the kinds of people who are seen as vulnerable in Dinka 
society... are very difficult for someone not from that society to identify without 
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detailed insider knowledge available only to members of the local community, 
(Harragin, 1998: v). As a result their targeting of food aid was not accurate: 
'Targeting aid to the vulnerable reflects more the logistical and financial 
constraints of the relief operation... than the belief that 'targeted' aid ensures 
that it reaches those in need. The very fact that it has been outsiders defining 
who the needy are has meant that targeting has been a sham in most cases 
where locals accept the conditions outsiders put on the relief but subsequently 
redistribute it to all sections of the population, who then redistribute it within 
their lineages to those who are most in need' (p. iv). 
Harragin's conclusion is that, while neutral outsiders can do prioritisation by area on 
the basis of need, internal targeting should be left to the groups that define 
themselves as communities. 
Vulnerability. 
Many agencies operating in south Sudan appeared to have realised that it was 
difficult to understand the concept of vulnerability as it applied to the local 
communities without their participation. This realisation accounted for the central 
role played by the chiefs and the gol leaders in the targeting and distribution 
mechanisms of many agencies. The importance of understanding this concept was 
highlighted by at least three ma or undertakings: i 
The establishment of the SPLM/SRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and Vulnerabilities 
Task Force; 
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Oxfam's vulnerability workshop involving all sectors of the community and local 
counterparts; and 
9 The SCF's South Sudan Vulnerability Study. 
The main theme that runs through all these attempts to understand vulnerability is 
that vulnerability in south Sudan is inextricably connected to kinship structures and 
social processes. An important cultural orientation of the local people, particularly 
the Dinka, is the sharing of resources to militate against any severe inequalities 
within specific sections of the social system. 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of sharing posed major challenges for aid workers. 
Assistance targeted to individuals deemed vulnerable by the agencies subsequently 
underwent a secondary community re-distribution to reflect the communities' own 
views of vulnerability and fairness. Understanding the concepts of sharing and 
vulnerability helped some agencies to fine-tune their delivery mechanisms. For 
example, it helped to put the controversial taxation of relief food into proper 
perspective. Soldiers from the SPLM, being an integral part of the community are 
supported through community contributions called tayeen. Rations are contributed by 
households through the chief and community leaders in collaboration with the 
SPLM. In normal circumstances, the vulnerable households are exempted, and 
tayeen is a one-off payment. However, during an emergency period, tayeen is 
subtracted from the amount to be distributed prior to distribution. This results in 
burdening the people who are traditionally excluded from the payment. This 
understanding enabled agencies to take a stand and condemn the practice. 
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The issue of vulnerability is closely related to the issue of saving not only lives but 
also livelihoods during emergency programmes. As demonstrated above, a person's 
vulnerability is very much dependent on social connections and it is those social 
connections that constitute livelihoods. Therefore, it is important to understand 
community perceptions on vulnerability for an effective rehabilitation programme, 
which mainly involves the re-establishment of livelihoods that were destroyed by the 
disaster. 
Humanitarian space versus participatory space. 
Humanitarian space for the OLS NGOs was negotiated, in principle, by OLS. In 
practice however, the agencies had to do their own negotiations with the local 
authorities/local counterparts, i. e. the SRRA/SPLA(M). The SRRA held considerable 
leverage in terms of deciding where the agencies could establish their programmes 
and in some cases what could be provided. The NON-OLS agencies had to negotiate 
humanitarian space directly with the local counterparts. CAFOD appears to be the 
only organisation that created humanitarian space without the SRRA and other local 
authorities playing a critical role. The authority of the church through the parish 
structures created humanitarian space for them. 
In practice, therefore, the degree of humanitarian space that could be created for both 
OLS and NON-OLS agencies depended to a significant extent on the relationship 
between the agency and the local authorities, in this case the SRRA. This relationship 
depended in turn on a number of factors, including the agency's view of neutrality, 
level of trust in the counterpart organisation and attitudes towards other agencies and 
the recipient community. The relationship between the agency and the local 
counterpart organisation defined access to humanitarian space. For instance, some 
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agencies interpreted neutrality to mean disengagement with local counterparts. This 
led to strained relations and suspicion. World Vision, for example, reported that they 
had to evacuate from one area due to strained relations with the local authorities. In 
another instance, it was reported that one of the reasons why MSF-Belgium faced 
difficulties in Ajiep was a poor working relationship with the local counterparts, 
which resulted in the latter withholding security information. Disengagement with 
the local counterparts and unfavourable attitudes towards other agencies may not 
only result from neutrality concerns but also from a certain measure of 'professional 
arrogance' where an agency sees itself as a technically and professionally 
accomplished 'godfather' that has nothing to learn about humanitarian programme 
practice. 
Clearly, an agency's approach to the acquisition of humanitarian space will determine 
the degree of participatory space. A good working relationship with local counterpart 
organisations leads to trust and thus, also, access to the community. Such a 
relationship will be created not by disengaging from the local counterparts but by 
engagement with them as closely as is possible. Recognising that they are operating 
in conditions of war, where attitudes are more likely to be shaped by suspicion and 
lack of capacity, agencies have to make concerted efforts to create a suitable level of 
understanding between themselves and the local counterparts. This may involve 
closer co-operation in the planning and execution of activities and actions aimed at 
improving the technical capacity of the local counterparts. This was the way 
Concern, for example, chose to operate, and it was clear that the agency was able to 
foster participation because of this approach. If this approach is considered to 
constitute a compromise on neutrality, then the choice is between the acquisition of 
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humanitarian space without much participatory space and the type of humanitarian 
space that guarantees wide participatory space. 
The experiences of OLS have shown that failure to approach the humanitarian issue 
from the position described above may adversely affect participatory space. For 
example, Karim et al (1996: 116), reviewing the programme, noted that 'in the early 
years of OLS, access to civilian population was limited by the respective authorities 
in both sectors'. They further noted that the inclusion of the affected population as an 
explicit factor in assessment methodologies did not take place until 1993 when a 
household questionnaire was developed by OLS. The questionnaire itself generated 
controversy between the UN and the GoS in the northern sector, for implying that the 
quality of access was a contentious issue. Similarly, the introduction of RRA 
methodologies in 1994 caused further friction in both the northern and southern 
sectors. It is significant to note that problems of access in the south sector were 
addressed by the inclusion of the SRRA in the training sessions. In the northern 
sector, attempts to use qualitative methods in the assessment processes were 
generally resisted by government. 
Commenting on similar issues, Murphy and Salama (1999: 5-6) sum up the situation 
in south Sudan aptly: 
'The position of individual agencies, vis-A-vis the SRRA for example, 
differed greatly. Some within OLS distanced themselves, reluctant to 
acknowledge their role as partners in the humanitarian response: wary of 
compromising their professed neutrality. Others argued differently that 
although the SRRA has its own problems, particularly in terms of resources 
and capacity, it is only through constructive engagement that such an 
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organisation can build its capacity to assist in co-ordination, improve its 
accountability and represent the community more effectively. Similar 
variances exist among agencies operating outside of the OLS framework. 
Some agencies choose to be outside the OLS umbrella because it allows 
greater flexibility, especially in reaching geographic areas that lie outside the 
UN agreement and consequently receive far less resources and services from 
the international community (e. g. the Nuba Mountains)'. 
Problems of insecurity and access also affected humanitarian space. Insecurity is 
largely created by attacks and counter attacks between the SPLA and GoS troops, the 
raiding of civilian populations by govemment-aided militia groups and fighting 
between SPLA factions. Specifically, the Baggara militias broke off their temporary 
reconciliation with the SPLA and resumed raids on the Dinka in 1997. In January 
1998 fighting broke out between government forces and the SPLA, triggering 
massive displacements. GoS reaction was to ban all flights to different airstrips. It 
has been argued that regular flight bans by GoS aim at furthering its own military 
and political interests rather than to address strictly security concerns (Keen, 1998: 
7). The SPLA factions have also been fighting among themselves and attacking 
civilian populations affiliated with their opponents. 
The effect of fighting as regards humanitarian space has been reduced access as 
agencies have failed to expand the scale of their operations and sometimes have had 
to undergo evacuations. For example Tear Fund, Oxfam, World Vision and MSF- 
Holland all experienced evacuation at some point in their emergency programmes. In 
addition, the banning of flights or their restriction to specific, limited areas has meant 
that in effect, humanitarian space is created not by OLS, but by GoS. 
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Thus areas which are insecure, as well as those without access to air food drops, were 
not receiving adequate humanitarian assistance. There was also a tendency for 
agencies to 'bunch' together in the 'safer' places. This meant that in some places 
beneficiaries received a range of services/assistance while in others the assistance 
was very limited. For example, there were several agencies operating in Rumbek 
including Oxfam, Tear Fund and CAFOD, while only Christian Aid was operating in 
the Nuba Mountains. Also, within areas where agencies had theoretically acquired 
humanitarian space, agency capacity, logistical ability and programme focus tended 
to determine the extent to which that space was utilised. For example, field 
interviews indicated that both Oxfam and SCF were initially less enthusiastic to start 
feeding programmes due to limited existing capacity (in terms of qualified 
personnel). This may have resulted from a programme focus not originally geared to 
address famine relief 
Emergencies and participation. 
Broadly, it seems useful to make a distinction between complex emergencies and 
natural disasters. Generally, because local government structures may still be intact 
and issues of neutrality seldom arise during natural disasters, participation may not 
present the same challenges as in complex emergencies. In natural disasters, the 
disruption in general is primarily of a physical nature, although it is true that 
sometimes significant social disruptions can occur. In complex emergencies social 
disruptions and suspicions brought about by war may present a different set of 
challenges. In the case of south Sudan near-chronic massive displacements of 
populations have led to some degree of disruption, although not to total 
disintegration in the social structure. A long history of war has also prevented formal 
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education from flourishing, resulting in a widespread lack of technical capacities and 
general manpower abilities. The local government structure that normally offers 
potential for broad-based community participation does not exist. Instead, there is a 
structure that represents a rebel movement whose internal cohesion is not assured 
and whose representation of the interest of the population is therefore not guaranteed. 
This situation may present practical limitations to broad-based participation, as 
agencies are not sure how well affected populations are represented. 
However, this does not mean that meaningful levels of beneficiary participation 
cannot be achieved, only that greater efforts will be required to achieve it and that 
some limitations will be encountered. For example, this study found that in the 
emergency many agencies found it difficult to utilise participatory approaches during 
the planning stage of their programmes. The planning was usually agency-dominated 
either because of the agencies' perception of the needs of the population or because 
of their technical and logistical ability. Indeed, in many cases it was felt that 
beneficiary participation was not required at this stage. For example, agencies such 
as Oxfam, SCF, Tear Fund and MSF felt that the existence of high malnutrition rates 
necessitated the establishment of therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres. 
Lack of food-stocks necessitated the provision of seeds and tools, and health and 
sanitation problems necessitated provision of clean water and sanitary facilities. 
Examined closely, however, this view may be a dangerous excuse for, as the 
experiences of the agencies have shown, there may still be aspects of these 
'necessary' programmes that can be appreciated only through the involvement of the 
affected populations. 
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Specifically, a certain amount of participation was still required for achieving 
effectiveness. For example, the establishment of therapeutic and supplementary 
feeding centres without any information flows between the affected communities and 
the agencies resulted in unintended consequences. The Joint SPLWSRRA-OLS 
Targeting and Vulnerabilities Task Force noted that households with a member in a 
feeding centre were being excluded from the general rations due to a lack of 
understanding on the part of some community decision-makers that feeding centre 
rations were only supplementary to the general rations, and due to the movement 
(unknowingly) of people from the areas where they were entitled to a general ration. 
In the second instance lack of information transfer resulted in the supply by some 
agencies of inappropriate imported tools which were melted down and re-fashioned 
by beneficiaries to suit local preferences. Tear Fund reported this experience in 
Malual Kon but information from field reports indicated that this was not the only 
instance. Related to this case was the initial rejection of foreign seed varieties 
reported by Oxfarn in Rumbek but also said to be fairly common. Thirdly, while the 
provision of latrines was chosen as an intervention to address the sanitation problem, 
it was valuable to know that the targeted community did not have a 'latrine-culture' 
and therefore it was necessary to devise strategies that would facilitate adoption. In 
the first place, some form of an educational campaign was necessary and secondly, 
the location of the latrines was crucial given that, according to the local culture, a 
person should not be seen going to the toilet. Some field staffs in fact reported that as 
a result of the poor location of the latrines they were only used at night in some 
cases. 
These instances seem to suggest that while beneficiary participation may not be 
critical to the type of intervention (assuming the agencies got it right), beneficiary 
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participation is necessary with respect to the quality of intervention at the 
implementation level. Thus, even if a programme has been designed in an agency- 
dominated fashion, beneficiary participation is required to fine-tune that programme 
to ensure that it has no unintended adverse consequences that could affect its 
effectiveness. 
The second broad distinction that can be made is between relief intervention and a 
rehabilitation intervention. There is a lively debate on how to reconcile the concepts 
of relief, rehabilitation and development but it is not intended in this chapter to dwell 
on that debate. However, as regards the concept of participation, the experience is 
generally that it is limited, whether one considers development or relief situations, 
although the situation might be worse for the latter. 
It can be argued, however, that even in emergency programmes, only in very special 
circumstances can the absence of participation be excused. This is particularly true in 
view of the fact that many agencies believed that it was inappropriate to operate a 
purely relief programme without planting some seeds of recovery which would 
ensure that the community does not collapse again once the relief intervention comes 
to an end. This is why many agencies found it necessary to distribute such things as 
seeds, farming tools, fishing equipment and even make attempts at establishing 
Income-Generating Activities (IGAs). A discussion was rife on 'exit strategies' 
among the agencies that appeared to present formidable challenges. (Perhaps 
reflecting the difficulties involved, one agency's field staff suggested the provision of 
a chicken to each household, which apparently would in time become a flock, as an 
exit strategy from the emergency programme! ). Indeed, Karim et al (1996: 111), 
found that the purely relief intervention objectives spelt out in the initial agreement 
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between GoS and the SPLA were later modified in the south sector 'to include 
enhancing the lives and livelihoods of the people of south Sudan, and protecting and 
promoting the rights of war-affected civilians, particularly women and children'. 
This shift in objectives resulted in the reduction in the quantity of food per person or 
per household, the restriction of food to specific geographical areas or to specific 
groups and an increased emphasis on the provision of agricultural inputs for food 
production. 
Benefits of participation: some propositions. 
The advocacy for mainstreaming participatory approaches in humanitarian 
programmes is not a rhetorical exercise. As discussed in Chapter One, it has come 
out of development studies, where numerous experiences have been documented of 
programme failures resulting directly from the exclusion of the intended 
beneficiaries in programme planning, implementation and monitoring. Such 
experiences have led to the well-known buzzwords of top-down approaches and 
bottom-up approaches. It is now accepted in development studies that bottom-up 
approaches that begin from the perspective of the population and build on local 
knowledge, values and sometimes even resources are the ones most likely to 
succeed. 
Development and relief are qualitatively different, as many commentators continue 
to point out. Roughly, development has much to do with long-term objectives 
involving the improvement of people's general standard of living. Relief is 
essentially short-term and involves the immediate objective of saving lives. Yet, as 
some have argued in the preceding sections, relief must also include the objective of 
saving livelihoods so that relief itself does not become a permanent undertaking. On 
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this point it is important to note that at the time of writing this chapter, Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, a humanitarian programme, had clocked more than ten years since it 
was first created in 1989, a period sufficiently long for the completion of some 
development programmes. 
As regards participation, the key point to bear in mind is that while relief and 
development vary in their objectives, they both involve the idea of outside 
intervention to save some aspect of a given population. In development the 
programme endeavours to save the local population from a less desirable standard of 
life. In relief, the programme attempts to save the population from losing their lives 
and the means for supporting them. In short, both relief and development involve a 
clash between insiders and outsiders. This clash is essentially a clash between 
perceptions, values and priorities. Using this line of understanding it should be 
possible to draw an analogy between development and relief as regards the 
buzzwords referred to above. Top-down in development corresponds to supply- 
driven in relief whereas bottom-up in the former corresponds to demand-driven in the 
latter. 
In principle, many agencies place a high value on the participation of their 
beneficiaries. For example, Concern Worldwide believes that greater participation 
leads to greater commitment. One of Oxfam's principles of emergency programmes 
is to be consultative, aware of the concern and capacities of women and, whenever 
possible, participatory and empowering. In practice, moreover, it has also been 
shown that many agencies attempted to utilise participatory approaches of some 
kind, although some may have been more 'successful' that others for a variety of 
reasons. 
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However, in examining participation it is important to be aware of the possibility that 
agencies can manipulate participation to suit their own pre-conceived strategies. 
Participation frequently involves facilitation by the agencies delivering the 
programme. (An acquaintancelacademic mentor, during personal communication, 
told me that in the Philippines, some people say that rather than 'facilitation', the 
word 'facipulation', i. e., a mixture of facilitation and manipulation, is more 
appropriate). What then were the benefits of participation? 
This question should be approached from two angles. From one angle, it should be 
answered in terms of what the agencies achieved that could not have been possible in 
the absence of participation. From another angle, it should be answered in terms of 
the 'mistakes' or the unintended consequences that resulted from limited levels of 
participation but which could have been avoided had there been more participation. 
The following propositions can be made based on the experiences of the various 
NGOs covered by the study. 
Participation enabled agencies, especially those that utilised the traditional social 
structure to arrive at a wider, more comprehensive and more accurate 
understanding of vulnerability and beneficiaries. 
A better understanding of vulnerability and beneficiaries resulted in a practical move 
narnely, the inclusion of some categories of people who had been left out of the 
programme at the initial agency-dominated stage such as: 
* The displaced without the representation of a chief, a gol leader or some 
other authority figure; 
* Families or households with a member in a feeding centre; 
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* Widows; and 
* People with very low social status in the society. 
The SPLM/SRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and Vulnerabilities Task Force, as well as 
the NGOs were able to obtain this information by using a range of participatory 
methodologies that included semi-structured key-informant interviews, household 
visits and interviews, focus group discussions and vulnerability workshops. The 
community members involved included chiefs, Relief Committee members, resident 
women and men, displaced women and men and households with children in the 
feeding centre. Based on these exercises the task force made numerous practical 
recommendations such as the one captured under 'Discussion Point F below. 
Discussion Point 1 
A review of community perceptions of targeting and distribution systems must 
take place as soon as possible. 77ds should include 
SRRAAVFPIUNICEFIrelevant NGO: r and should befacilitated by an external 
consultant who has a broad background in distribution methodologies and no 
vested interest in any one particular methodology. To ensure a successful 
methodology, it is crucial that the community participates and distributes 
their ideas at every stage of the process. nile the Team is not in a position 
to recommend any specific steps, it was very clear that a new methodology 
must be established that would include the SRRA, WFP, civil authorities, 
community representation (particularly by women) and a direct 
representation of the targeted beneficiaries. In addition to including all 
relevant parties, a system of checks and balances between the parties must 
also be built in. Finally, as it was clear to the Team that no targeting and 
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distribution system will ever be totally immune to abuse and leakage, there 
should also be a mechanism built into the system by which any parly, 
particularly targeted beneficiaries, can safely appeal to higher authorities. 
(Field reports). 
Participation Contributed to the protection and efficient use of resources. 
During the initial stages of the general ration distribution, looting of the food was 
frequently reported after the food was dropped at the drop zones by the C- 130 planes. 
Several days (up to a week) could pass before the beneficiaries could be informed 
and a distribution organised. It was during this period that looting took place. The 
Task Force, for example, reported that looting of relief items took place in many 
areas. In some cases, for example Rumbek, unidentified men looted women coming 
from distribution points. This problem was addressed by putting the security issue in 
the hands of the beneficiaries, in this case the local civil administration, the SRRA 
and the community at large. 'Ibis action was important in two ways. Firstly, it 
prevented the loss of resources that would have needed replacement and secondly, it 
prevented the deployment of external security that would have increased expenditure 
for agencies. By transferring the security issue to the beneficiaries, some sense of 
ownership was created and this led to the protection of resources. 
At another level a sense of ownership can encourage the spirit of voluntarism. 7[llis 
can improve the cost effectiveness of the programme, in the sense that money is 
saved in the procurement of both human and material resources. An example of a 
spirit of voluntarism is captured under Discussion Point 2 below. 
Discussion Point 2: Community Participation and Voluntarism 
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The Save the Children Fund (SCF-UK) established two camps in Mapel an 
Achong Chong to address the problem of unaccompanied minors. I 
consultation with the community (through women leaders, chiefs an, 
community leaders) SCF opened the two camps in July 1998. Th, 
communities themselves, who also provided their own building materials 
built the camps. SCF provided the food and health facilities. Oxfam assism 
in the provision of clean water. Labour for the running of the camp's 
activities that includedpounding, cooking and monitoring the health status oj 
the children, was provided by the community on a voluntary basis. 77ze 
community made contributions to support the workers. A locally based 
Sudanese was employed as a psychosocial supervisor who facilitated 
activities such as story telling, local dances, riddles and games. The children 
who were admitted into these camps were identified through a committee 
made up of representatives from different payams. Between July and 
December 1998 up to 1225 unaccompanied children had been admitted and 
repatriated in the two camps. The repatriation was done through a committee 
of community workers composed of chiefs, women's association 
representatives and other community representatives, assisted by the SRRA. 
Children whose parents were notfound were fostered within the community. 
At the end of the programme the community suggested that the centres be 
converted into schools. At the time when I visited one of these camps in 
Mapel, community members were rebuilding the campsfor this purpose. 
This project did, however, encounter some problena. The separation of 
children from community in the local culture is something not normally 
acceptable. Children belong to a very broad social grouping to the extent that 
I 
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in practice the issue of orphanhood does not arise. Consequently, because of 
limited levels of understanding between the community and the agency as to 
the purpose of these camps, some community members began to secretly 
"move children and to re-integrate them into the community. Members who 
did not resort to this practice were only those who had understood and 
agreed that the camps were only a temporary measure to assist the children 
who had no care as a result of displacement and general lack of livelihood 
resources in the community. However, the important point is that attempts to 
involve the community in the initial stages of the project led to a spirit of 
voluntarism. 
Volunteers were also used in most of the feeding programmes run by Oxfam, Tear 
Fund and other agencies. Christian Aid reported that in Twic the community 
continued with the feeding centre with their own personnel and resources after the 
agency had closed it down. In Rumbek, I met a Sudanese woman who had opened a 
feeding centre on her own initiative. She mobilised community support and whatever 
resources could be found to respond to an acute famine situation that was resulting in 
many under-five deaths. (She stated for, example, that cooking pots were made by 
cutting used oil barrels). Oxfam later incorporated this woman in their feeding 
programmes. 
Apart from demonstrating the spirit of voluntarism that can result from participation, 
the two examples cited above also serve as an indication of how communities can 
demonstrate resourcefulness and initiative in an emergency, providing some 
justification for the need to blend agency plans with community social and material 
resources. 
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Efficient use of resources may also be seen from the point of view of the ability by 
agencies to provide relevant materials to communities. If materials provided are not 
effectively used by the recipients, this constitutes both time and resource wastage. 
On the south Sudan programme, Grunewald eLal, (1998: 7) noted that: 'it has been 
frequently reported that the tools provided are not fully meeting local needs'. I 
confirmed this observation during field visits. In Malual Kon, for example, Tear 
Fund reported that the tools imported from Kenya were subsequently being melted 
down after distribution and refashioned to suit local tastes. Included in the package 
were also Kenyan tilling implements (called Jembes) which were not used to a 
significant extent in this area. One key informant stated that it was a mistake to 
distribute such implements ahead of any educational programme regarding usage. 
While thejembe was technically a superior tool the local population simply did not 
know how to use it. 
The experience of Tear Fund in Malual Kon is an interesting one. To address the 
problem of unacceptability of the Kenyan tools, the agency initiated another project 
that involved provision of raw materials to local blacksmiths for the production of 
the traditionally acceptable tools. Tear Fund would then buy back the tools for 
distribution to the targeted beneficiaries. As it turned out, the local production was 
more expensive than the imported tools. However, there was no evidence that there 
was any consultation on how to make the imported tools acceptable. Lack of 
consultation at this level seemed to be common among the agencies. A similar 
problem was faced in the distribution of seeds. The distribution of foreign varieties 
of seeds in the absence of prior consultation frequently resulted in rejection. 
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It is true that local production of seeds and tools frequently fails to meet the demand 
but the imposition of materials that will not be effectively used does not solve the 
problem very well. Increased consultation with communities may reveal the causes 
for dislike as well as channels that can facilitate adoption. A key informant stated, for 
example, that communities in south Sudan are characterised by rigid social 
hierarchies with great respect accorded to people in positions of authority. He 
believed that the ordinary people would easily follow or copy new behaviours if 
people in authority had first adopted them. Ibis suggests that working with authofity 
figures could provide an important breakthrough. 
Participation helped to prevent the creation of community tensions or conflicts 
among different social groups within the affected communities. In addition, it helped 
to strengthen existing capacities, making the employment of large numbers of agency 
staff unnecessary. 
One of the problems agencies faced with the feeding centre programme was the 
development of tension between women who were attending the centres and their 
husbands. Before opening a feeding programme in Rumbek town, for example, 
Oxfam used focus group discussions with communities, with traditional leaders 
representing them, with extension workers and civil authorities as part of the initial 
assessment. In Agangrial, Village Health Committees were also involved. 
Continuous discussions were held with the women regarding the progress of the 
programme. Through these discussions some women raised the issue that their 
husbands resented their daily absence from the home since it required men to 
undertake work regarded as women's work. This resentment sometimes resulted in 
marital disputes and violence. This problem was addressed through discussions 
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between feeding centre staff and community leaders as well as with the Village 
Health Committee. MSF-Belgium reported a similar problem in Mapel. 
As regards strengthening community structures and building up of capacities, many 
agencies involved in feeding programmes, including Oxfam, SCF, World Vision and 
Tear Fund, indicated that as the programme progressed the need for a large agency- 
personnel input decreased as local people began to master the performance of the 
various activities carried out at the feeding centres. In Agangrial, Oxfam reported 
that the beneficiaries of the feeding programme even formed their own disciplinary 
committee to address issues of misbehaviour connected with the programme. I have 
also already shown how the building up of capacities was important in fostering 
understanding between agencies and local authorities/counterpart organisations. 
Participation also enabled agency staff to understand important social distinctions 
among different ethnic groups. This prevented the formulation of standardised 
programmes that could have led to conflicts among the groups. For example, two 
different social groupings can be identified among the Dinkas. Although they speak 
the same language, the Agar and the Gok have substantially different cultural 
orientations with respect to gender. One group has no problem with strangers talking 
to their women while the other will not allow it. 
Pareicipation provided some added value beyond immediate relief. 
It would be a mistake to assume that complex emergencies and humanitarian 
programmes are one-off events. The case of south Sudan, where a humanitarian 
programme has been going on for over ten years makes this point very clear. Because 
of this fact several agencies felt that a six-month intervention, dictated by their 
operational and funding procedures, did not make much sense. The presence of 
193 
NGOs in the affected areas changes both the physical and social environments. By 
their very nature, some interventions begin to rebuild livelihoods and the NGOs 
place upon themselves a responsibility to ensure that the community does not 
collapse because of sudden withdrawal. The importance of exit strategies has already 
been commented upon. In this respect, several important issues were raised by 
various agencies. 
Firstly, beneficiary participation helps the agency to build up experience in terms of 
the kinds of questions that need to be asked and the type of involvement that will 
help the organisation to establish the nature of social relations within the affected 
communities. This is important in minimising the unintended negative consequences 
of particular action. Secondly, the building up of this experience gives participatory 
delivery a wide base as agencies share their experiences through inter-agency co- 
operation. As Harrugin (1998) observes, a profound lack of communication with the 
local population leads to unavailability of information for many aid agencies. 
Therefore, most tend towards twisting any available information to suit their 
preconceived solutions. Thirdly, participation can act as a medium for the 
augmentation of local management systems as a prelude to future stability (IDS, 
1999). A participatory training workshop in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan, facilitated 
by the Institute of Development Studies (University of Sussex), brought together 
local people from all sections of the community, including soldiers. This work claims 
to have provided a very useful example of the potential of using participatory 
principles in a war setting: 'people became able to see things from the others' 
perspectives... found ways of the powerful working with the disenfranchised to 
develop solutions to all sorts of problems' (p. 1). Fourthly, participation may enable 
the agency to become an influential partner in rehabilitation and future development. 
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People develop trust in the agency and are able to open themselves up to a process of 
continued dialogue and negotiations. Fifthly, Concern Worldwide found that 
participation led to an improvement of the relationship with its counterparts in the 
management of the humanitarian programme through sharing of information and 
joint evaluation. 
Where participation of the affected communities has been deemed appropriate, this 
study only managed to get some hints of 'disbenefits' that might result from such 
participation. Some of these hints also related more to limitations rather than 
'disbenefits' as such. Some agencies indicated that a participatory approach might be 
time-consuming, resulting in delays in commencing the programme. But a closer 
examination reveals that this problem had more to do with the type of participatory 
methodology used as well as the capacity and experience of the agency involved than 
just the amount of time available. For example, the study found that some of the most 
important information to programme delivery was generated through one-day 
workshops that involved the widest possible representation of the community. The 
involvement of the local authorities also proved useful in terms of bridging the gap 
between the agency and the community as well as playing a key role in security 
matters. 7bere seems to be an in-built assumption that only the 'formal' research tools 
can generate reliable information. Yet some agencies found that a simple meeting 
under a tree, as long as it was representative, went a long way in generating valuable 
information as well as providing an indication of local perceptions, expectations and 
values. On the other hand, it is well known that a very elaborate research 
methodology that lacks representation of the population can be highly misleading. 
This suggests that agencies must start small and then build up progressively in the 
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course of the programme. In addition, they should refrain from restricting themselves 
to only formalised participatory tools. 
One clear limitation of the participatory delivery of relief identified in the study was 
that in a war situation, where many people have been displaced, true representation is 
difficult to guarantee. In the south Sudan case, there are always groups who fail to 
find representation in the social structure. This problem led some agencies, notably 
SCF, to retain a certain proportion of the total amount of items to be distributed. 
After the distribution by the community structure, SCIF would then carry out 
independent assessments and distribute the remaining proportion to those that had 
been bypassed by the community distribution. 'Ibis, however, seems to be a value- 
loaded practice. It would need to demonstrate that the communities approved it and 
that it did not generate any negative views of the agency. Furthermore, it would need 
to prove that the social relations within the community were not undermined. 
Interestingly, whereas SCF sought the solution to the problem of marginalized 
individuals in decreased levels of participation, Oxfam approached this problem from 
the opposite direction, i. e. through increased levels of participation. This increase in 
the level of participation succeeded in bringing out the various groups that were 
being bypassed because of a lack of representation. Ways were then devised, in 
collaboration with the communities concerned, to have them registered and included 
in the delivery mechanisms. 
Conclusions. 
Ethics. 
The issue of participation of affected population or beneficiaries in humanitarian 
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programmes is not just a matter to do with the practical or operational aspects of a 
particular programme. It is also a moral and ethical one. The way agencies look at 
humanitarian aid has important implications in terms of how they will look at their 
beneficiaries. Do the resources belong to the agency or the beneficiaries? Has the 
agency the authority to decide how the resources should be used and who should 
benefit from them, or is this power vested in the beneficiaries? Answers to these 
questions might help to put participation into a proper perspective. Essentially, the 
call to seek answers to these questions is a call for agencies to confront the set of 
ethical issues that pertain to humanitarian assistance and state their stand. Since 
views of good practice in humanitarian programmes clearly depend on the stand so 
taken, a neutral position is not an alternative. These questions, however, were not 
adequately addressed in the south Sudan study and pointed to the need for further 
work. 
Structure. 
A strictly top-down or supply-driven approach to humanitarian programmes 
implicitly makes the assumption that the affected population has no capacities for 
decision-making or understanding the needs of the various groups of people in that 
population. Yet, as many agencies working in South Sudan would agree, war and 
displacement may have broken social ties for many people but this has not resulted in 
total disintegration of society. If society has not disintegrated and still retains 
capacity for making decisions, is it a waste of energy to strive for participation? And 
if every agency were to conduct relief in their own way and on their own terms what 
shape would relief take? Yet the experiences in south Sudan only provided one case 
of participation in a particular state of a particular social structure. A more thorough 
understanding of the issues involved requires an examination of different social 
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contexts in order to highlight what might be the general features and salient features. 
In this regard, results from ALNAP's Global Study will be important in terms of 
providing some indications of how participation may be approached in different 
social contexts as well as pointing to areas needing further invesfigation. 
Operations. 
On the operational level, it has been shown how limited levels of participation of 
beneficiaries can introduce inefficiencies into the programme. Adding the ethical and 
operational aspects together, the conclusion that can be made is that unless the social 
structure has been completely disrupted, it is always desirable and appropriate in 
principle to utilise participatory approaches. But even where the social structure has 
disintegrated, the objective will be to try and re-establish some social framework, 
and this would require participation of the affected individuals. In other words, 
beneficiary participation in programmes intended to assist them simply makes sense. 
Targeting. 
Unless an agency has unlimited resources and feels no need to target specific groups 
within a community, beneficiary participation is critical. In practice, the experiences 
of the British NGOs in this study show that they all started from a situation of limited 
resources that had to be targeted to the most vulnerable. The south Sudan case 
provided an excellent example regarding the complex nature of the concept of 
vulnerability. Agencies came to realise that it was almost impossible to understand 
this concept without making concerted efforts to involve the affected communities in 
the defining process. It was only after some understanding of what vulnerability 
meant and what caused it that better targeting and better delivery of the programme 
was achieved. 
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'Smart Relief. 
Even if targeting is not necessary, participation offers a channel for understanding 
and addressing issues such as gender relations and understanding the impact of relief 
on the livelihood system and the social structure in general. Participation also offers 
the agency the opportunity to disseminate its own messages, for example, health 
education and sanitation, which may increase the effectiveness of the relief 
intervention. 
The arguments against doing development alongside relief are well appreciated and 
support is not being advocated in favour of those arguments. Rather, I wish merely to 
concur with the idea that it possible to do 'smart relief, where relief is not given 
without asking questions regarding the way in which it is delivered. There is need to 
understand the different levels of social interaction and power relations that exist 
among different groups of people in the so-called beneficiary communities. This is 
particularly true in the case of south Sudan where relief is certainly not a one-off 
intervention, and where the social structure is far from homogeneous. Moreover, 
historical and political processes sometimes make it possible to talk in terms of 
relief-prone areas. Because of these considerations many agencies have found it 
appropriate to engage in both famine-relief and famine-prevention programmes. A 
study of one such area would help to clarify some of the issues about beneficiary 
participation in emergency relid So, for example, does prior knowledge of the 
possibility of disaster improve participation? 
Famine-prevention programmes have to do with saving livelihoods, which is very 
much a social activity. Most agencies in fact double as both relief and development 
agencies (e. g. Oxfam, SCF, World Vision, CARE and the CBOs). This means that 
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participation in the relief programme will pave the way for more effective 
rehabilitation and development programmes. 
It is important, however, to establish the extent to which participation and social 
learning can be used as a tool for addressing more general issues relating to social 
change. In their paper on Shared Social Leaming, Apthorpe and Atkinson (1999a) 
question whether a policy of social change (e. g. of gender relations) ought to be 
mixed up with service provision, the extent to which this can be done and what risks 
could be confronted. Thus, it is interesting to note the following recommendation 
made by an Oxfarn headquarters-based staff to field officers after visiting some 
feeding programmes in south Sudan: 
'Women are naturally subservient and do not speak out; they 
are marginalized and their opinions are considered 
unimportant. Oxfam should therefore take the opportunity to 
challenge these traditional inequalities in the implementation 
of this programme, and indeed make this one of the core 
objectives of the programme' (Field reports). 
Such views are also frequently coupled with the idea that participation leads to 
empowerment. To what extent is this the case in emergencies? Who would get 
empowered and with what consequences? Again, there was no opportunity to address 
these questions in this study. However, the case of SEWA's involvement in disaster 
relief programmes in India, as will be shown in Chapter Six, provided an opportunity 
to address this question and appeared to suggest that empowerment leads to 
participation rather than the other way round. 
Information. 
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Agencies moving into new areas of operation frequently find that there is very 
limited, if not total lack of social and geographical information available. Even 
where other agencies have been operating for some time, a new agency may find that 
the critical information as regards their intended programme is not available. One of 
the problems involved seems to relate to lack of institutional memory within 
agencies because of very short contract periods of staff. Thus, Grunewald et. al 
(1998: 38), noted that: 
'Staff in the field have contracts which are too short for them to plan coherent 
and lasting programmes, and consultation with local communities and 
implementing partners. All field monitors should have the maximum 
contracts available, i. e. one year, given the one-year funding horizon of OLS. 
This would allow them to develop better working relationships with 
community leaders and with staff of counterpart agencies and individual 
farmers'. 
Merlin in fact found that efforts to ask questions to already established agencies in 
one area were not welcomed with much enthusiasm. Moreover, even if information 
from other agencies were made available it would be difficult to know the extent to 
which such information might have been influenced by the priorities of the agencies 
involved. In such a situation, engagement with the local people offers a way out of 
the problem. At any rate, the community is arguably the best source of information 
about itself I 
Accountability. 
In principle, it is desirable to involve beneficiaries in monitoring and evaluation of 
the programme but sometimes difficult to achieve in practice. The major difficulty in 
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the south Sudan case related to the identification of individuals within the 
community who could take on monitoring and evaluation responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the experiences of some agencies demonstrated that increased 
participation of beneficiaries in the programme in fact constituted an in-built 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism. An atmosphere of openness, trust and 
responsibility resulting from greater involvement created information channels where 
beneficiaries were able to communicate to agencies as regards what happened 
beyond what they were able to follow. The SPLWSRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and 
Vulnerabilities Task Force noted that there was a gap in almost all areas by all 
agencies and institutions involved in food distributions in monitoring the impact of 
interventions. However, the task force also noted that in some cases this resulted 
from the fact that the different levels of the community were not aware of the total 
amount of food being brought in, and what their entitlement was, making it almost 
impossible for beneficiaries to monitor food movements. 
Need to act? 
The general belief is that there are some special circumstances in which participation 
may be deemed inappropriate or undesirable. Some agencies indicated that this 
would be the case where there are unusually high rates of morbidity and mortality. 
Agencies may find it appropriate to provide food, medical assistance and other 
survival kits without much consultation. Participation becomes appropriate when the 
situation improves and people are in a state in which they can participate effectively. 
In other cases participation may be deemed undesirable because agencies feel that 
they can make reasonable judgements of what should be done based on their 
observations, technical knowledge, previous experience, or even common sense. For 
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example, SCF and Merlin argued that nutritional assessments were not required 
during the acute stages of the emergency. Observations alone were adequate to 
justify the establishment of feeding programmes. Most of the survival kits were also 
pre-decided based on common knowledge, for example, that a displaced person 
would need household utilities. However, even if the decision of what to provide was 
not made in a participatory manner, the effective distribution of the materials 
required some level of beneficiary participation. 
Moreover, the basis upon which agencies can make unilateral judgements regarding 
intervention is yet to be developed in a systematic way. Another issue that also 
deserves consideration is the extent to which particular types of investigation and 
participation might result in loss of time and introduce inefficiencies into the 
programme. Could it also be the case that agencies are reluctant to use participatory 
approaches for fear of generating unrealisable expectations? In south Sudan, for 
example, beneficiaries of tools and seeds programmes requested some agencies to 
give them the tools ahead of the seeds so that they had enough time to work in their 
fields. Invariably, the agencies stated that they were not prepared to do the double 
distribution this request would involve. At another level, are some forms of 
participation disruptive to community relations in terms of say, gender and the local 
political economy? 
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Chapter Five. Local capacity and the international 
system: participation in a flood disaster in Malawi. 
Introduction. 
On the global level, Malawi will not be immediately recognisable as a country that is 
frequented by large-scale disasters, natural or man-made. One of the major disasters 
in living memory was a countrywide famine in the 1940s. This famine did not 
involve a large international humanitarian relief operation. The largest humanitarian 
programme ever mounted in Malawi was with regard to an influx of refugees from 
neighbouring Mozambique following civil fighting during the early 1990s. However, 
there have been other disasters of smaller magnitude over the years, mostly in the 
form of floods or drought affecting particular areas within the country. In 1997 one 
such flood affected two districts in the southern part of Malawi, namely Nsanje and 
Chikwawa. The area covered by these two districts is commonly known as the Lower 
Shire valley. This area is subjected to frequent flooding because of its low-lying 
nature but it was widely believed that the 1997 floods were amongst the worst in 
recent history. 
Background to the study. 
The study was commissioned by the UNDP, Malawi who provided administrative 
support to the relief programme. The main aim was to analyse the various aspects of 
the programme with a view to identifying efficient and inefficient elements and 
provide some lessons for the future. 
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Perhaps because of the absence of a history of large-scale disasters, the main issues 
brought out by the study centred on levels of preparedness and the extent to which 
co-operation was effected among the various parties involved in the relief 
programme that followed. The different parties involved included the Malawi 
government, the international donor community, particularly WFP and the 
Department of Human Affairs (DHA) of the UN, NGOs, and local 
structures/communities. The study covered a wide range of issues regarding the 
implementation of the entire relief programme but only those issues that are directly 
related to participation will be discussed in this chapter. In particular, the discussion 
in this chapter is intended to provide an empirical illustration of some of the, 
theoretical issues raised in previous chapters, for example, with regard to the nature 
of the relationships between the international donor community, NGOs, government 
and affected communities, and how these relationships affect the issue of 
participation. Specifically, this chapter demonstrates how suspicion and lack of trust 
as well as the absence of meaningful engagement with affected communities created 
inefficiency in the overall delivery of the programme. To this extent, this study is 
also an illustration of what can be expected in cases where there are only minimum 
or token levels of participation by the affected population, especially at the grassroots 
level. 
Method of study. 
Information for the study was collected through interviews with representatives of 
various parties concerned: government (mostly officials from the Ministry of Relief 
and Rehabilitation Affairs), donors and NGOs. Interviews were also held with 
relevant field staff. I also spent about a month in the affected communities talking to 
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traditional leaders, local planning agents, affected households, attending actual 
distribution activities at various centres as well as making observations. Prior to, and 
after all these activities I spent some time reading background materials, which 
included minutes of meetings on the management of relief operations. I also actually 
attended one such meeting after fieldwork. 
Disaster management in Malawi: a brief present and historical overview. 
In recent years, a few efforts have been made to gather information and to put a 
system in place that is capable not only of responding swiftly to a disaster but also of 
providing advance warning. By far the most important work is perhaps the 'National 
Disaster Management Plan for Malawi' (Chiotha et al, 1996) compiled in 1996 by a 
team of University of Malawi personnel for the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation 
Affairs (MRRA). This report divided the causes of disasters into five categories viz.: 
weather and climatic hazards; hydrological hazards; pest hazards; geological hazards 
and social hazards. Floods fall under 'hydrological hazards'. Within each category 
detailed descriptions and analyses of strategies for reducing the effects of disasters 
are presented. Each strategy has at least five essential elements namely: Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. 
The report emphasises that in flood disasters preparedness is of paramount 
importance since flood hazards cannot be prevented. The elements of preparedness 
should include: prediction of flood stage, identification of threatened areas, 
assistance required, quick dissemination of information to concerned persons, 
evacuation of affected persons, assessment of flood damage, repair and rehabilitation 
and public awareness and training. The report also outlines various activities that 
constitute a National Disaster Preparedness Plan for Floods to be followed in the 
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event of a flood disaster. Preparedness refers to the minimisation of the adverse 
effects of a hazard through effective precautionary actions to ensure timely, 
appropriate, efficient and safe organisation and delivery. Its principal element is good 
Early Warning Systems (EWS). The operation of the Early Warning Systems for the 
Lower Shire Valley is well described in the Disaster Management Plan for Malawi. 
For example, the plan suggests that at some point in the system 'the flood officers 
enquire from the Department of Meteorology about any cyclone, storms and other 
heavy rainfall conditions predicted or observed... establish and identify areas to be 
flooded, immediately report the deteriorating situation to the Controller of Water 
Services and eventually get the flood warning issued on (Malawi Broadcasting Co- 
operation) MBC' (Chiotha et. al, 1986: 40). 
However, clearly missing in the Disaster Management Plan is the role of 
communities in both disaster mitigation and response. It is noted for example that: 
'The institutional framework for disaster management in Malawi as created by Act 
No. 28, the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act, 1991, has not been fully 
implemented, notably, the functioning of the Civil Protection Committees aimed at 
involving the community at grass-root level, as well as poor intra-governmental 
linkages which lead to poor information flow' (Chiotha et. al, 1986: v). 
Other documents that attempt to provide inforination that can be used in disaster 
management are equally deficient in terms of defining the role of communities. Most 
such documents centre on technical assessment of vulnerability of particular areas to 
different types of hazards and also provide baseline information that could be useful 
in planning an emergency response. The Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping 
(VAM) done by Famine and Early Warning Systems (FEWS) (1996) is one such 
207 
report. This report includes an assessment of the vulnerability of the Lower Shire 
Valley in terms of poverty, food deficiency, malnutrition and other food security 
elements. However, the report suffers from the all too familiar problem of analysing 
vulnerability from a 'technical' point of view. Vulnerability is not analysed in terms 
of how it is viewed by the various communities. 
With respect to the 1997 floods, FEWS did an assessment for flood mitigation, which 
included elements such as length of season, drought-resistant planting, average daily 
per capita kilocalories produced, access to adequate sanitation and livestock 
holdings. Another was the Risk MAP Report by the Save the Children Fund (UK) 
(1996) which analyses food economy zones for various parts of Malawi, including 
the Lower Shire Valley. The report identifies this area as an area of grain and cereal 
deficit for most households and discusses a number of survival mechanisms 
employed by people in affected communities. The Socio-economic and Production 
System Study of Wetland Use (of which I was part) by the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) (1996) analyses prevailing production systems for various 
regions in Malawi, including the Lower Shire Valley. In the Lower Shire Valley, the 
report describes production aspects which include: Cropping patterns for both dry 
land and wetland, rainy season and dry season cropping patterns, as well as the role 
of livestock. 
The District Development Office for Nsanje (1996) carried out a report on the socio- 
economic profile and situation analysis for the district. This is a useful document that 
describes physical features of the district, political and administrative structures, 
demographic characteristics, settlement patterns and the land-use system. Also 
described is the economy of Nsanje district in terms of agriculture, livestock, forestry 
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and natural resources, fisheries, commerce and industry, and employment and 
income. Other sections of the report look at social services. It concludes by 
discussing the major problems of the district and strategies for development. 
However, it is Mandala's work (1990) that is probably the most detailed and 
comprehensive historical account of the economy of the Lower Shire Valley. 
Covering the period between 1859 and 1960, this work analyses aspects of the Lower 
Shire Valley peasant economy such as the ecological conditions of production, 
gender and generational conflicts and the division of labour between and within 
households. 
Mandala's account shows that the people of the Lower Shire Valley have grappled 
with the problems of uncertain weather conditions for a long time. He cites the 
Bomani floods of 1939 as being one of the events that caused an ecological crisis in 
the past century. One result of those floods was a demographic change. Many people 
left the marsh areas of Nsanje (then Port Herald) to the drier areas, especially those 
of southern Chikwawa. Yet there were also some people who would return to the 
marshes as soon as they were dry. Another result of the ecological changes was the 
diversification of the productive base. Labour migration, cattle raising and fishing 
replaced cotton as the main source of money. Flooding is reported to have occurred 
also in 1943,1957 and some years thereafter. Chiotha et. al (1986) in fact suggest 
that the Lower Shire valley has an average floods return period of five years. 
The 1948-9 famine, probably the worst in recent history, also affected the Lower 
Shire Valley in a severe way. Peasant responses to this famine provided an 
opportunity for understanding their ability to cope with recurrent crises in the food 
economy. In addition to adapting to climatic changes in the form of changes in 
209 
cropping patterns, 'villagers survived the famine without much assistance from the 
state or migrant workers. Their only insurance was their resourcefulness. Some 
bartered property such as goats, fowls, and earthenware. Some worked in the fields 
of friends and relatives within and outside the valley. But the majority lived on fruits 
of nature' (Mandala, 1990: 247). 
Being an area of uncertain weather conditions (frequent floods/droughts) the Lower 
Shire Valley has been subjected to relief concerns at certain times in history. 
However, not much is available by way of documentation of these past relief 
processes. Most of the relief appears to have been ad hoc rather than organised. 
Moreover, it would appear from the foregoing section that there continues to be a 
predominance of technocratic aspects to current efforts to establish a systematic 
disaster management plan. Some of the problems faced in the 1997 relief programme 
could be related to the lack of the 'human element' i. e. grassroots participation in the 
response procedures. 
The 1997 Emergency Relief Programme. 
Onset offloods and immediate coping strategies. 
Many parts of the country had experienced increased rainfall during the months of 
January, February and March. However, the rains seemed to have been particularly 
heavy towards the end of January and the beginning of February. The Lower Shire 
Valley floods appear to have been caused by these rains coming in both the 
highlands (such as Blantyre, Zomba, Mwanza etc. ) and in the Shire Valley itself. 
Flooding in the Lower Shire Valley was first noticed around the 7th of February 
1997. By the 9th many areas in both Chikwawa and Nsanje districts had been 
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affected. In Chikwawa, seriously affected areas included the Economic Planning 
Areas (EPAs) of Kalambo, Mbewe, Mikalango, Dolo, in the West Bank and 
Livunzu, (East Bank), and Mitole (both Banks). In Nsanje, most seriously affected 
areas included the EPAs of Makhanga on the East Bank and Magoti, Mpatsa, Nsanje 
and Nyachilenda in the West Bank. The floods affected almost every aspect of 
livelihood. A number of houses in several communities fell. Many households also 
lost food stocks from water sweeping through the houses. 
A distinct characteristic during the onset of the floods was a total lack of 
preparedness on the part of both communities and the government. A newspaper 
reporter who visited the area described the situation aptly: 
'On Sunday afternoon, two rivers conspired with the forces of nature to send 
torrents of water down the Lower Shire Valley with singular ferocity and 
wreaked untold havoc... In the floods, said to be the worst in living memory... 
houses have collapsed, leaving hundreds of people homeless. Cattle, goats 
and other livestock which form the principal wealth of the Valley's people, 
have been washed away and crops... have been uprooted. Food that was kept 
in the houses was either swept away or soaked in swirls of muddy water. 
Today, the villages stand desolate and the people destitute. Hours after the 
tragedy... government officials were nowhere in sight... Officials from the 
Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation were conspicuously absent from the 
scene. No one [was] providing any emergency aid to the desperate children 
and mothers. The plight of the people of Chikwawa from Sunday through 
Tuesday is a sad commentary on the office of the Commissioner of Relief and 
Disaster Preparedness... Perhaps it is time the role of the office of the 
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Commissioner of Relief and Disaster Preparedness and how it works were 
revisited in earnest. ' (The Nation, Feb. 12: 8). 
Although a newspaper report, and notwithstanding its journalistic tone, the 
description presented is not in contradiction with what was found during the field 
study. Some officials from the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation Affairs did in 
fact admit that they were ill prepared to handle disasters in so far as an effective, 
consolidated response system is concerned. Although heavy rains had started towards 
the end of January 1997, serious flooding was reported on the morning of the 9th 
February. It was not until 13th February that government officials visited the area 
(the Minister of Relief and Rehabilitation Affairs, Minister of Lands and Valuation 
and Deputy Minister of Education). The Cabinet Committee on Disaster 
Management met on 14th and directed the declaration of the Nsanje and Chikwawa 
as disaster districts. The President visited the flood areas on the 16th of February and 
made a public appeal for relief assistance. 
This degree of lack of preparedness was somewhat paradoxical given that there had 
been considerable effort in terms of training personnel and investment in equipment 
to develop an Early Warning System. This study identified several factors that 
contributed to the problem. 
To begin with, it appeared that the procedures for responding to a flood disaster as 
outlined above were not strictly followed. The Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Development indicated that information leading to the flood warning was collected 
manually (i. e. it relied on reports on rising water levels). Difficulties in 
communication and transport for field staffs meant very long time lags in updating 
information. The Early Warning Systems referred to earlier were not utilised, 
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reportedly due to malfunctioning of field equipment. The revitalisation of the system 
was reported to be in process. 
Meteorological reports on the radio indicated continuing heavy rains but there was 
nothing specific in terms of flood warning. Rising water levels were not a cause for 
alarm in some cases as people thought the water would soon recede, as was normally 
the case in previous years. This view was backed by a popular saying in the 
vernacular, which states that: 'Madzi ndi mulendo, sachedwa kupita' (flowing water 
is like a visitor, it soon goes away). Clearly then, there were no concerted efforts 
made to provide clear information about the impending floods nor to gain an 
understanding of how the communities were viewing the continuing rains and the 
possible preparations they might have been making. At this stage, opportunities for 
involving communities in disaster preparedness were missed. 
The absence of a clear message about possible flooding was difficult to understand in 
the light of the fact that, according to the Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Development, the probability of floods had been established some hours before the 
onset. In actual fact, the information had reached the Malawi Broadcasting Co- 
operation radio (the only national radio station) some fourteen hours before any 
warning was issued. When the warning was issued it came through the 6.00 PM 
news bulletin (in English) rather than being fitted into the broadcasting schedule as 
an urgent emergency message. Apparently, the MBC management did not want any 
unscheduled flood warnings to interfere with their scheduled programmes, or it may 
be that because of bureaucracy, simply no one was available to make the decision. 
In any event, the idea of issuing a flood warning during an English news bulletin did 
not reflect reality. For one thing, illiteracy levels in the Lower Shire Valley are 
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amongst the highest in the country resulting in a very low proportion of the 
population that can speak and understand English. For another, radio listening 
surveys have shown that the proportion owning working radios countrywide is very 
small. Even smaller is the proportion of people that actually listen to radios. In the 
Lower Shire Valley, the situation is complicated by the fact that the Mozambican 
radio is quite close and quite a few people tune in to that radio, given language 
similarities. It was little surprising therefore when interviews with the affected 
communities revealed that they were unaware that any flood warnings had been 
issued. Some people indicated that the message they got was simply that the heavy 
rains would continue (which was consistent with the meteorological reports on the 
radio). Given that this is an area where people also frequently experience drought, 
this was welcome news to them as it implied a good crop. In the light of these facts it 
would have perhaps been useful to work with the local government machinery and 
the communities to try and establish the most effective ways of quickly getting flood 
warnings across to as large a population as possible. When I was in the area I 
discovered that the villagers had very good ways of spreading news, using local 
messengers, forms of transport, even methods such as drumming or hooting with 
traditional tools such as a bull's horns. This is also true of other areas in rural 
Malawi. 
The absence of any organised system of response resulted in a considerable degree of 
haphazardness as regards, immediate coping strategies. Because there was no flood 
warning heard, there were apparently no preliminary arrangements made in terms of 
evacuation plans. The flooding reached its peak in the middle of the night (around 
11.00 pm) while people were sleeping. Most people initially had to take refuge on 
roof-tops and in trees. In most cases, fishermen who owned canoes did the 
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evacuation. These fishermen were free to charge any fee they wished, although there 
ware some who also voluntarily assisted others. The canoes were of a very limited 
capacity and could only rescue people. Mostly, property was left behind. Very few 
people managed to escape with some food stocks. In one case, the Malawi Police (at 
Nsanje Boma) helped in the rescue operations using one motorboat. In another case 
in Chikwawa the District Commissioners (DCs) office hired a motorboat for 
rescuing some stranded families. After being rescued from the flooding areas, most 
people sought refuge in school buildings, community halls, old refugee shelters, etc. 
There, they survived on whatever food items had been salvaged as they fled. There 
were no immediate provisions for sanitary or water services. There were no special 
arrangements for people in vulnerable conditions such as pregnant women and cases 
of babies being born in these temporary shelters were reported. 
First contact from the outside world with affected communities appears to have come 
from the offices of the District Commissioners in the form of registering flood 
victims who took refuge at various centres. In Nsanje NGOs followed this response, 
notably the Church Action in Relief and Development (CARD) and Mddecins Sans 
Fronti6res (MSF). About two weeks after the flooding incident CARD responded by 
mounting tents at Bangula, Lalanje, Phokera, Tengani, Nsanje Boma, Mankhokwe 
and Mpisamanja. MSF visited the area at about the same time and pledged medical 
assistance 
Determination of extent of destruction and identification of affectedpopulation. 
Determining the extent of destruction and identification of affected population 
appeared to be the most problematic area in the whole process of relief delivery. 
There was much less contention on what was destroyed than on who was affected. It 
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was clear that the flood had touched almost every aspect of the people's livelihoods. 
Most households lost livestock, be they cattle, goats, pigs, ducks or chickens, even 
though the actual extent of loss was not well known. The inter-agency verification 
report indicated, however, that livestock losses in Chikwawa appeared not to be 
significant, although there were official reports that at least 3 cows, 220 goats and 
1063 chickens got lost in the floods. These numbers may not have been significant 
for the district as a whole but could have been quite significant for specific 
communities. In Nsanje district the interviews suggested that the situation was likely 
to have been worse, especially in the marsh areas where most people were rescued by 
canoes. The possibilities of rescuing livestock in such conditions were extremely 
limited. 
Families whose houses collapsed also lost whatever property was in them. This 
included everything from cooking utensils, clothes, bedding, and furniture to radios 
and in some cases bicycles. Those whose houses did not collapse had most of their 
property damaged by water getting into the houses. An undetermined number of 
households had their food stocks damaged because of water that got into the houses 
in one way or another. Crops still growing in the field were also destroyed. 
Interviews indicated that in the case of maize, the main food crop, maturity had been 
expected within two weeks when the flood came. Other types of crops destroyed in 
the fields included beans, sweet potatoes, rice and other minor crops. Figures from 
the Ministry of Agriculture suggested that about 17,153.2 hectares of land in the 
Chikwawa Rural Development Project (RDP) and 7,052 in Nsanje were damaged. 
There were no reports of large numbers of human casualties either by the MRRA, the 
DCs' offices or from the affected communities. Only isolated incidences of 
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suspected casualties were reported. It would appear that the major reason for this was 
the relatively low tide, and perhaps velocity of the floodwaters; otherwise the 
unexpectedness of the flood would have resulted in a large number of casualties. 
The identification of who was affected was not so straightforward. The original 
beneficiaries (i. e. those who benefited from immediate government assistance) were 
identified through the offices of the District Commissioners in the two affected 
districts. The registration exercise was done at the centres where people fleeing from 
the floods had sheltered (schools, community halls, camps etc. ). In theory, without 
the interference of politics and other sources of bias, this exercise should achieve a 
considerable level of accuracy regarding people needing immediate assistance. In 
practice, however, the figures obtained were doubted on the basis of the fact that the 
international community did not regard the local government agency (office of the 
DC) involved in registration as an objective force. A preliminary assessment by the 
government estimated that the floods had affected 80,000 Malawian families 
(approximately 400,000 individuals) and had displaced into Malawi 20,000 
Mozambicans. An appeal for international assistance was made based on these 
figures. While awaiting this assistance, the government, through MRRA, began 
distributing some food (maize flour and beans) to some of the affected people 
already registered. Some NGOs (e. g. Red Cross and CARD) also began to distribute 
non-food items such as blankets, tents and plastic sheets. 
In responding to the government's international appeal, the United Nations 
Department of Human Affairs (UN-DHA) sent in a team of experts from Geneva to 
assess the flood damage. Based on their assessment, the government figures of 
80,000 families (400,000 Malawians) and 20,000 Mozambicans were heavily 
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contested. The DHA team argued that government figures did not distinguish 
between losses of food stores, crops and homes. The DHA team reported that 
according to their assessment, only 102,500 persons i. e. 20,500 families (11,000 
persons in Chikwawa and 91,000 persons in Nsanje) were identified to be in 
immediate need of food assistance and in some cases poles and plastic sheets. About 
50,000 Mozambicans were reported in Nsanje by the District Commissioner's office, 
a figure which the DHA team recommended for verification, together with the other 
government figures. Ile distribution of this 'immediate' assistance through WFP 
started on 27th February in Chikwawa and on 4th March in Nsanje. The food 
distributed was meant to cater for two weeks. 
Targeting and Distfibution. 
The whole distribution programme had four phases: 
i) Pre-phase one. This involved the distribution of maize flour and beans to flood 
victims assembled in various places in the affected areas. The government using its 
own resources, including Army helicopters and vehicles from other government 
departments, supplied the relief materials in this phase. Some 843 Metric Tonnes 
(MT) of flour were distributed during this phase. However, the European Community 
was committed to reimbursing 360 MT of the amount supplied by the government. 
The amount distributed was a two-week ration. The distribution began on 10th 
February in Chikwawa District and on 17th February in Nsanje District, although 
some centres were not to receive any relief items until three weeks later due to a 
combination of factors, including poor roads, lack of adequate personnel and lack of 
adequate transportation. 
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ii) Phase one. During this phase the World Food Programme (WFP) distributed 700.6 
MT of maize and 84-07 MT of beans to 28,026 families, including 7,506 
Mozambican families, based on the initial assessment conducted by the UNDHA. 
The amount distributed was also a two-week ration. 
iii) Phase two (a). WFP distributed two-month rations to Malawians and two-week 
take-home rations to displaced Mozambicans. 
iv) Phase two (b) this would involve a food-for-work programme targeting some 
1,500 individuals over a period of 4 months. 
Included in the distribution programme was the distribution of various non-food 
items such as blankets, soap, seeds, clothes etc. by NGOs at various times. 
The relief programme was co-ordinated by a committee of government, NGOs and 
UN agencies under the chairmanship of the Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness 
Relief and Rehabilitation of the MRRA. This committee held regular meetings to 
review the progress of activities of various agencies in the relief programme. It was 
agreed that all donations would go through MRRA. WFP was responsible for the 
delivery of all food items in phase one and phase two. WFP ensured the 
transportation of items to distribution centres. Red Cross carried out the distribution 
exercise. Government, through MRRA, delivered pre-phase-one food items and was 
also responsible for the delivery of all non-food items. Similarly, government 
ensured transportation of materials and the Red Cross distributed them. However, a 
few NGOs, for example, CARD and Concern Universal, delivered their own food 
and non-food items, but efforts were made to have these donations registered within 
the relief programme. Such NGOs resorted to distributing items themselves when the 
Red Cross suspended its operations to wait for the verification exercise to be 
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completed. A special commodity-tracking unit known as the Transport and Logistics 
Unit (TLU) in the MRRA kept records on quantities of commodities delivered to 
beneficiaries. The tracking system appears to have worked well although the data 
was usually about five days behind the actual, because of delays in the 
communication process. The installation of fax machines, especially at Bangula 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) Depot, was 
suggested in order to improve the system. 
Beyond phase one, the timetable of the relief programme was dictated by the 
verification exercise commissioned by donors to authenticate figures generated by 
the government. This exercise, which was carried out by a team of staffs from 
different NGOs and co-ordinated by Concern Universal, commenced on the 12th of 
March and ended towards the end of that month. This exercise identified 66,074 
families (40,613 in Chikwawa and 25,461 in Nsanje) or 330,370 Malawians in total, 
(as opposed to the original figure of 400,000) to have been affected by the floods. 
The issuing of ration cards and then distribution of relief materials followed the 
verification exercise. The following calendar of events is useful in terms of 
understanding the sequence of significant events and the time lags between them. 
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A Calendar of some significant events in the 1997flood reliefprocess. 
7th-9th February On-set of floods. 
9th February Government aware of serious flooding in the lower Shire Valley through reports 
from the District Commissioners' offices. 
9th February Registration of flood victims by offices of District Commissioners commences. 
I Oth February Pre-phase one distribution commences in Chikwawa District. 
13th February Three cabinet ministers visit the area affected by floods. 
l6th February The country's President visits the flood area and declares it a disaster area, 
appeals for international assistance. 
17th February Pre-phase one distribution commences in Nsanje District. 
19th February MSF, a French medical NGO, visits the area, pledges medical Assistance 
21 st February UNDHA team carries out rapid aerial assessment of damage in the flood area. 
28th February Phase one distribution begins in Chikwawa district. 
4th March Phase one distribution begins in Nsanje District 
5th March Phase one distribution ends in Chikwawa District. 
12th March Inter-agency verification exercise begins. 
22nd March Phase one distribution ends in Nsanje district. 
3rd April Ration card distribution begins in Nsanje District 
7th April Ration card distribution begins in Chikwawa District. 
13th April Ration card distribution ends in Nsanje District. 
17th April Phase two (April) distribution begins in Nsanje District. 
21 st April Ration card distribution ends in Chikwawa District. 
3rd May Phase two (April) distribution begins in Chikwawa District. 
13th May Phase two (April) distribution ends in Nsanje District. 
17th May Phase two (May) distribution begins in Nsanje District. 
Note: The calendar is incomplete because the period of the relief programme extended beyond the 
period of study. 
In an apparent attempt to match resources that donors were prepared to commit to the 
relief process in the second phase of the distribution process, the government and 
NGOs were forced to agree with donors that assistance be given only to those whose 
houses and property had been damaged, leaving out those who lost only crops in 
their gardens. This arrangement meant that for Chikwawa only 12,000 out of about 
40,000 families would be assisted, and for Nsanje the figure would be 23,000 out of 
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about 25,000. This meant that only half (175,000) of the people identified by the very 
verification exercise ordered by donors would be targeted for assistance. 
Here was a clear example of the classic case in emergency relief where policy drives 
numbers rather than numbers driving policy. Apparently, the donors were under the 
(possibly deliberately erroneous) assumption that people had food stores in their 
houses and thus, it was only those whose houses had collapsed who were left without 
food. The government was of the view that this assumption and its resultant form of 
targeting beneficiaries did not correspond to reality: 
'The scenario shows that all people who either lost their houses and properties, or 
those who lost their gardens only should all be considered as having been 
affected by the floods and therefore, legible (sic) for relief assistance until such 
time when both groups are able to get food from other sources' (MRRA Progress 
Report, 1997). 
The Government's view made sense when considering that crops were within two 
weeks of maturity when the floods destroyed them. This meant that many households 
had already exhausted their food stores. Many studies in Malawi have shown that 
many households in most rural areas run out of food several months before the next 
harvest and have to rely on a range of coping mechanisms. 
The top-down nature of this decision also implied a lack of recognition of the fact 
that communities have their own ideas and views regarding fairness that could have 
been harnessed to address the problem of limited resources. Thus, perhaps it was not 
totally surprising that one traditional chief rejected the verification exercise 
altogether and no food was distributed in his area of jurisdiction during the second 
phase. Another village headman branded the whole relief programme as 
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'segregationist'. Some people I interviewed suggested that assistance should have 
targeted whole communities even if it meant a reduction in individual entitlements. 
They argued that the amount of food given to the targeted individuals was already 
inadequate and such individuals had to supplement it with other coping strategies, 
notably, casual work which could be paid in cash or kind. That the quantities of relief 
food delivered sometimes made no difference may have been evidenced by the fact 
that there were no reports of mass starvation in the area of the traditional chief who 
rejected the distribution. In such cases, relief materials may have only succeeded in 
creating resentment and tension not only between targeted and non-targeted 
individuals within communities but also of the relief process itself by the 
communities in general. 
The difficulties experienced in targeting beneficiaries had at least two further 
profound effects on the process of relief delivery. First, the verification exercise and 
the issuing of ration cards were identified as the major element in the delays that 
were experienced in delivering relief items. It was noted that for some communities a 
period of at least two months elapsed after phase-one food distributions, which were 
meant for only two weeks. It can be noted, for example, from the calendar of events 
that phase-one distribution in Chikwawa commenced on 28th February while phase- 
two distribution commenced on 3rd of May. Thus, it can be assumed that people ran 
out of food six weeks before the next distribution. In some cases food meant for the 
month of April was delivered in May and food meant for the month of May was 
delivered in June. 
Secondly, difficulties in targeting beneficiaries interfered with the working 
relationship between government and donors. It was clear that the government was 
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not in favour of the verification exercise, even though officials came short of 
admitting this fact during interviews. Thus, in spite of donor insistence that the 
exercise was only meant to complement government efforts, disagreement over the 
number of affected population nevertheless disappointed the government. 
Government felt that donors did not trust it. For example, government questioned the 
point of the verification exercise in Nsanje where eventually, due to some problems 
in the exercise, donors had to revert back to government figures. The only 
importance attached to the verification exercise by the government was with regard 
to its inclusion of eligible beneficiaries, rather than its exclusion of them. Thus: 
Me verification exercise has been very important in that those areas and 
villages which were left out during the registration exercise have now been 
covered and included... However, it is not clear on the number of displaced 
Mozambicans who are in Nsanje district... From the report, one hopes that 
those verified numbers of the flood victims will now be given necessary 
assistance in terms of food, agricultural inputs, and other non-food items such 
as blankets, pots, plates etc. One would want to believe that since [the] 
verification exercise was done by an independent body of NGOs, more 
donors would now be forthcoming. One also hopes that with these figures in 
our hands, we have now come to the end of the road regarding questions of 
which figures should be used to target relief assistance to relief flood victims' 
(MRRA Progress Report, 1997). 
But, as shown above, the end of the road did not seem to have been reached since 
donors had to slash their own verified figures to target assistance to only those who 
had lost their houses and property, and exclude those who had lost their crops in the 
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field. Government argued that people who lost their gardens would by then be 
harvesting crops such as green maize, pumpkins, cucumbers, sweet potatoes etc. 
which would have enabled them to survive the period. 
In general, government was of the view that the initial response of donors to the 
international appeal for assistance was very quick and impressive, in spite of the 
mistrust placed in government figures. This response was in the form of assessment 
of damage and production of numbers of people to be given relief assistance. 
However, this process was slowed down during the implementation phase. It would 
appear that part of the reason for donor retreat lay in the fact that figures generated 
by the verification exercise they had themselves commissioned did not come down 
low enough to match their plans. As shown above, the government figure of 400,000 
Malawians came down to 330,370 after the verification exercise. From this figure, 
donors targeted only 175,000 for assistance, a figure which was only moderately 
above the 102,500 people identified through their preliminary assessment. Donor 
enthusiasm further waned when issues of rehabilitation were raised. For example it 
was difficult to source funds for rehabilitation of roads, especially the West bank 
road in Chikwawa. 
The verification exercise and the slashing of beneficiary numbers together with a 
lack of proper information dissemination and consultation with the communities 
further gave rise to a situation in which some people began to relate the relief 
programme to politics. To begin with interviews indicated that most people were not 
aware that, although the government had contributed a small proportion, the bulk of 
assistance had come from external donors and government was merely an instrument 
for the management of the distribution process. During field interviews, the answer 
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to the question 'where is the assistance coming from? ' was almost invariably 
'government'. Indeed, it was found that in the few cases where people were aware 
that the assistance did not come from the government, people were less critical of the 
targeting process and did not tic relief to politics. 
For those who lacked this knowledge (but perhaps also justifiably in their own right) 
the situation was different. Many failed to see the purpose of the verification exercise 
asking: 'If I do not need assistance, why did they give it to me during the first 
phase? ' Such sentiments were reinforced by messages from some politicians who, in 
order to win votes for impending by-elections, were telling people that everyone 
would receive relief assistance. The fact that it was politicians in the ruling 
government who were making such pronouncements only helped to convince the 
people that indeed it was the government that was providing the assistance. One 
village headman expressed the view that if only the government could give just one 
bag of flour to every family in the area where the by-election was to take place, then 
the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) would definitely win. Such sentiments 
revealed a total lack of understanding of the relief process in general and the need for 
targeting in particular, in this case brought about by a lack of meaningful levels of 
participation of the affected communities. 
The conduct of the political opposition only served to further fuel such sentiments 
and views. Through the media, they expressed the view that: 'The Lower Shire area 
is known to be pro . Malawi Congress Party. The UDF will want to make it known to 
people that they will be given assistance only if the people will support it' (The Daily 
Times, 26th February, 1997: 8). Such views may have given people the impression 
that targeting was being done on the basis of political inclinations rather than priority 
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of need, or more accurately, on the basis of a limited amount of resources available 
to donors. Had the communities participated fully in the relief process, and had the 
government wanted to be sincere, the people would have been told that resources 
were provided by external donors and they were cutting beneficiary numbers simply 
because the resources were inadequate. Silence on the part of the government 
officials on this matter could easily have been taken to mean that they wanted to take 
advantage of the people's ignorance regarding the source of assistance in order to 
achieve political goals. 
Government also lost an opportunity to clear misunderstandings on the part of the 
people regarding quantities of relief materials received at various points during the 
relief programme. Radio reports, which only mentioned that a particular organisation 
had donated some items to help flood victims in the 'Lower Shire Valley', were 
interpreted as suggesting that everyone would benefit from such donations. When the 
materials were not forthcoming (either because the government was trying to find 
suitable distribution plans, or because the materials had already been distributed 
elsewhere) people in other affected areas began to accuse the government of 
freceiving materials andjust storing them away'. Some even began to suspect foul 
play, creating suspicion of government intentions. Such suspicions did not encourage 
people to view the relief process positively, an aspect that was necessary to release 
people's energies for meaningful participation. 
Relief materials versus relief needs. 
In general, relief needs were accurately identified, with food assistance being 
considered a priority. Many people who needed shelter were also given plastic 
sheeting for the construction of temporary dwellings. However, the necessary poles 
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were not provided, which prompted complaints from the beneficiaries that it was 
difficult to get poles in this area of near desertification. Blankets were provided to 
individuals in some communities, although some of these came two months after the 
flood disaster because of the need to wait for the verification exercise to be 
completed. Also, only one blanket per family was given regardless of the number of 
people in the family. Much as this was understandable from the point-view of limited 
resources at the disposal of the aid agencies, no attempt was made to consult the 
communities to see if they could come up with alternative ways of distributing these 
items fairly. Tbus, it was not surprising to find the blankets on sale at the local 
market soon after leaving a distribution centre. Interviews indicated that people 
preferred the blankets to be given to children rather than adults who could find 
alternative coping mechanisms such as staying up late drinking or around a fire in the 
open. Indeed, when asked how they were going to use their one blanket, most 
families who had a child said that they would let the child use it or that they would 
divide the blanket into pieces according to the number of children needing it. 
Strangely though some adults stated unashamedly that, although they had children, 
they would use the blanket themselvesl Such behaviour could only have been 
addressed through village mechanisms for social control if the relief process had 
been so participatory as to allow communities to utilise mechanisms for protecting 
vulnerable individuals such as children. 
The MSF provided some medicines and medical personnel to Nsanje District 
hospital, which boosted the hospital's capacity to deal with increased patient 
numbers resulting from the disaster, even though there were no reports of serious 
outbreaks of diseases. Other NGOs, notably CARD, provided two-week Likuni 
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Phala rations (nutritionally fortified baby porridge) to under-five children to boost 
their nutritional status. The coverage of this project was very limited. 
However, in spite of the general effectiveness of relief delivered in meeting relief 
needs, a few problems remained. First, some people questioned the usefulness of 
uniform food rations. They argued that giving uniform rations regardless of family 
size did not make sense since some families had more members than others. In 
reality, a one-month ration based on a family of five meant only half that period for a 
family of ten. Yet there was no arrangement to compensate for this discrepancy. 
The government also faced a dilemma on how to distribute foodstuffs that had 
remained from pre-phase one distributions. MRRA simply made no decision as to 
how these foodstuffs were to be distributed. Up to the time of the fieldwork for this 
study 685 bags of cream of maize (13.7 M'I), which was by then damaged and unfit 
for human consumption, were still lying in the ADMARC warehouses at Bangula. 
The paradox was that just outside these warehouses there were camps of starving 
flood victims who scavenged on grains of maize dropping from truckloads. 
Furthermore, government was being charged for storage space for this consignment. 
Again, there was no attempt to consult any section of the community to see if they 
could come up with alternative ways of distributing these foodstuffs. 
A related dilemma concerned the distribution of various food and non-food items in 
small quantities donated by various organisations. These included 50 cartons of 
spaghetti, 50 cartons of canned tomatoes, 15 bales of mixed clothes, 9 bags of mixed 
shoes, 2 cartons of ladies' high-heeled shoes, 20 cartons of soap bars, 600 KGs maize 
flour, 600 KGs salt, 1/2 packet dried fish; 99 cartons of biscuits and other such items. 
It was also difficult to account for these items since exact numbers were not known 
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or some cartons got burst during loading. Government was also being charged 
storage space for these materials. Problems in distributing these materials reflected 
the need for government to devise ways of turning 'unusable' donations into usable 
ones. Organisations and individuals often donate what they have at their disposal. 
Some of what they donate might not be useful for affected communities in an 
emergency. For example, I would have been surprised if anyone had even heard of 
spaghetti, donated by the State House, in rural Malawi, given the possibility that 
even the majority of the urban population have no knowledge of this imported food. 
Similarly, the usefulness of high-heeled shoes (also donated by the State House) for 
rural people in Nsanje, could be questioned. 
There were also other materials available in larger quantities such as 7 MT of cream 
of maize flour and bars of soap. A programme for distributing these materials had not 
yet been drawn. Worse still, there were some needs that were entirely unmet. 
Minutes of meetings of NGOs and donors indicated that the need for non-food items 
such as pots, pails and hoes was identified, but the procurement of these materials 
never took place. 
There were also some instances where the relief items delivered did not match 
people's expectations. A case in point occurred at Bangula where an aid agency's 
unilateral decision to reduce the size of plastic sheeting led to people's refusal to 
accept them. The people argued that the size of sheeting provided would not serve 
any useful purpose. Consequently, the distribution of these materials had to be 
abandoned. 
An example of inefficiency and ineffectiveness resulting from failure to consult the 
affected communities was the action taken by Action Aid in their seeds distribution 
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programme. Maize seed was to be distributed to communities to enable them to re- 
plant their gardens. Action Aid decided that people in communities that suffered 
100% crop loss would receive 10 KGs of maize seed each. Where crop loss was 50% 
everybody would receive 5 KGs of seed. And if a community suffered 25 % crop 
losses then everybody would receive 2.5 KGs seed. This of course, meant that in the 
latter cases some seed went to people who did not suffer any crop loss while others 
who suffered a total crop loss got an inadequate amount of seed. Action Aid argued 
that even 5 KGs of seed was assumed to be adequate, given landholding sizes in 
these areas. If that was the case, then it could also be argued that it would have been 
possible to distribute 5 KGs of seed to all communities regardless of the degree of 
crop loss. This arrangement would have had the advantage of allowing distributions 
to go ahead of donor-verified beneficiary figures, thus providing seeds to affected 
people when they needed them most. Additionally, this would have reduced the total 
tonnage of seed distributed. For example, total district tonnage in Nsanje District 
would have reduced from 215.284 MT to 107.64 MT. In Chikwawa District it would 
have reduced from 346.723MT to 173.36 MT. Overall tonnages for both districts 
would have gone down from 562.007 MT to just 281 MT, thus, avoiding bringing a 
'seed flood' to the area. The provision of too much seed was not only inefficient for 
the relief programme, but also dangerous. There was no shortage of reports that some 
people were eating seed, which had been dusted with poisonous preservation 
chemicals. 
It would also appear that much premium was placed on the provision of food and 
clothing materials to the neglect of sanitary facilities, which people felt were also 
important. According to health personnel in both districts, there was a considerable 
increase in the cases of water and sanitation-related diseases, for example, diarrhoea. 
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They attributed these to lack of provision for sanitary and hygiene facilities, most of 
which had been washed away by the floods. It was observed that in most camping 
places there were long time-lags between settlement and the provision of communal 
water and toilet facilities. In addition, in some places the number of toilet facilities 
did not correspond to the number of people. Overcrowding compounded the health 
risks. In some cases a tent meant for ten people could accommodate up to 30-50 
people. 
Apart from the unhealthy conditions stated above, malnutrition could have also 
contributed to infectious diseases among the flood victims, especially children. 
Infectious diseases and parasitic diseases are linked with malnutrition. It is especially 
common for people suffering from malnutrition to contract another illness. Infections 
in turn worsen malnutrition. It has been found that the frequent episodes of diarrhoea 
and other infections decrease nutrient absorption and increase nutrient loss. 
Therefore, it may be the case that lack of food put the affected communities more 
vulnerable to infectious diseases. 
In response to health, water and sanitation problems faced by the victims in Nsanje, 
the Water and Sanitation Project (WATSAN) did an assessment and found that the 
floods destroyed 10% of the sanitary facilities. As a result, a task force was formed to 
help in the provision of safe water and communal toilets to some of the camps. 
However, WATSAN project would not visit some of the affected areas due to 
transport problems and the impassable roads. In addition, according to the WATSAN 
Co-ordinator, it took them several days to implement the relief help due to lack of 
co-ordination among the NGOs involved. MSF teamed up with Save the Children 
and the government Department of Health to provide water and sanitary structures to 
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the people at all the assembled points. The Save the Children and Water 
Development repaired broken pumps and installed pumps where there were none. 
The MSF set up a water tank together with a drainage system at Nsanje Community 
Centre Hall and a deep pit latrine and refuse pit. The same was done at 
Ndamera/Mankhokwe, Tengani, Mpisamanja, Bangula and Nkotamu. 
In an interview with Chief Kasambwe of Chikwawa district, whose area was flooded, 
he revealed that they were not given good water or access to protected wells. They 
had to dig shallow unprotected wells themselves. In addition, communal toilets were 
not provided to Chikwawa flood disaster victims. As a result, almost all the 
assembling places experienced diarrhoea cases and measles because of overcrowding 
in their temporary shelters. Coughs and eye infections were among the diseases 
common in the assembling places as well. 
Volume of Relief Materials Supplied. 
Procedurally, all relief donations were to be made through the MRRA. NGOs could 
do their own distributions but were supposed to report to the MRRA the nature, 
quantities and value of materials distributed. The MRRA produced tabulated 
information that showed requirements, pledges, receipts and shortfalls. One 
drawback, however, was that no dates were included on the information sheets to 
allow one to know the period to which the information referred. In total, government 
relief requirements, including rehabilitation, were valued at MK195,366,000. By 6th 
May, 1997, only K14,311,000 had been received from various donors, suggesting a 
shortfall of K173,083,000. The donations received at this point represented only 7.6 
% of the total requirements. 
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Other survival mechanisms. 
The study concluded, on the basis of the quantity of relief materials supplied and the 
time lags between distribution phases, that people did not cope primarily on the basis 
of the relief programme itself. Not only were the quantities of the relief materials too 
small to satisfy the subsistence needs of the affected people but also long periods of 
time elapsed without any food assistance being given to the people. A significant 
contribution came from the people's own resourcefulness in employing other 
survival mechanisms. A number of coping mechanisms were identified, similar to 
those contained in the Inter-Agency Verification Exercise report. These included 
ganyu labour (paid casual work), by far the most common coping mechanism, selling 
firewood and fishing. In terms of fishing, the study showed that, as a coping 
mechanism and not a regular activity, even women were involved. This is in contrast 
to the Inter-Agency report, which stated that only men fished. Another coping 
mechanism was the reduction of meal frequency from three to only one per day. 
Consumption and selling of livestock and use of green maize, usual coping 
mechanisms in previous times, were not possible in the flood disaster since most 
people had lost most of their livestock and crops. While not possible to quantify, it 
was apparent that social and kinship networks also played an important role as a 
coping mechanism. To many, relatives and friends living in upland areas provided 
temporary shelter and initial food assistance. Many also reported receiving assistance 
in terms of clothing from friends and relatives. The whole issue of copping strategies 
is an area that needs consideration in terms of how people's participation can be used 
to incorporate it into any disaster mitigation, emergency and rehabilitation plans. 
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Survival mechanisms employed by the communities also revealed that greater 
participation of the affected population could help to find ways in which community 
efforts could complement government and donor efforts in relief programmes. For 
example, in order to facilitate access to ganyu one traditional leader declared that all 
boat trips for ganyu seekers should be free during the flood disaster. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, local initiatives were important during evacuation. 
Scope for participation. 
What emerges from this study is that there were many problems that the relief 
programme faced, despite the fact that there was a lot of scope for incorporating the 
affected population into the relief programme. Attempts to address many of the 
problems faced could perhaps have benefited from forging closer links and 
establishing channels of communication and participation with grassroots structures. 
The most problematic area in the relief process was the determination of beneficiary 
numbers and their registration. It was clear that there was a need to develop a system 
that could ensure quick and accurate registration of affected persons immediately 
after a flood had occurred. Government felt that donors have usually been reluctant 
to accept its initial beneficiary figures and that this reluctance is likely to continue. 
Donors' mistrust and suspicion of the government appears to be inherent in all relief 
endeavours. 
To remedy this problem, government proposed joint assessment and registration 
exercises with donors when floods (or other kinds of disasters) occur. However, it is 
unlikely that donors would find such a proposal attractive given that they have very 
few staff at their disposal and are always operating within pressured time contexts. 
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Also, the assessment of damage and determination of disaster victims is a messy 
business and, as shown in Chapter Two, donors are keen to avoid this messy swamp. 
What could possibly be attractive for donors is the streamlining of a ministry such as 
MRRA into a small unit capable of marshalling NGO systems. NGOs like Red Cross 
already have manpower and infrastructure that they could quickly deploy for such 
exercises. In addition, many NGOs are already working with community structures 
and these could be utilised. The MRRA would then merely provide any needed back- 
up support to these NGO systems. For example, once declared a disaster area, the 
DC's office in that area could be mandated to mobilise transport and logistical 
support to any NGOs conducting assessment and registration exercises. This 
arrangement may reduce the controversy that usually surrounds beneficiary numbers, 
since NGOs are regarded as objective forces. This will also avoid the politicisation of 
the issue. However, the NGOs also need to demonstrate that they see the 
participation of affected communities in their planning and implementation processes 
as a priority. Without incorporating affected people's views regarding vulnerability, 
need and fairness, government and NGOs may find that they have become popular 
with donors but unpopular with affected communities. In such a case, government, 
NGOs and donors may be seen to have conspired against the very people they seek to 
assist. 
Decentralisation, with the aim of giving the local planning agencies more resources 
and room for manoeuvre in terms of decision-making, needs serious consideration. 
The DCs' offices in both districts, for example, lamented the situation in which 
duties were delegated to their offices without or with little resource back-up. 
Decentralisation needs to provide machinery that can bring together the formal local 
planning agencies and the various grassroots structures for the purposes of planning 
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and executing both development and relief work. Community structures are usually 
very well informed in terms of particular areas of families in need of particular forms 
of assistance and their involvement could improve the targeting process. For 
example, community structures could have been used for the distribution of 
'miscellaneous' donations which government failed to distribute on the basis of 
failure to find a suitable distribution mechanism. Community structures, e. g. the 
village leadership, formal and informal village committees, could have been involved 
in determining which families had been affected and in what ways. 
The non-involvement of the affected people in determining vulnerable individuals, in 
addition to failure to recognise the vulnerability of those who had lost only their 
crops and not their dwelling, led to their exclusion from the relief process. In 
addition, it led to the exclusion of other vulnerable people such as the elderly and the 
handicapped. A visit to some distribution centres revealed that most of these were 
being left unattended. Perhaps as a result of the problems experienced during 
targeting, it was quite apparent that less deserving individuals were receiving relief 
items. For example, it was not unheard of to find relief blankets being sold on a 
nearby market immediately following a distribution exercise. (Of course, it may also 
be the case that in some cases this was done in order to buy food from the cash 
realised). Red Cross field staff could only lament this situation but could not exercise 
any discretion since their mandate was to distribute only to registered individuals. 
It was also clear that NGOs that failed to utilise people's participation in determining 
the vulnerable had problems distributing their relief materials in time. Action Aid, 
for example, could not distribute seed in time because they were awaiting figures 
from the verification exercise demanded by the donors. Yet since seeds were in 
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smaller quantities, it would have been easier, based on initial assessment reports, to 
target whole communities for distribution, or at least work out a formula for 
distribution in consultation with the affected communities. Some NGOs, in co- 
operation with community leaders, went ahead and distributed non-food items 
regardless of the verification exercise and ration cards. In this way they were able to 
distribute materials quickly in periods when they were needed most. For most 
agencies the village leadership was only used to inform villagers of distribution dates 
and venues as well as for maintaining order at the distribution sites. Their 
involvement in the planning process was missing. 
In any event, even the limited ways in which communities were involved were 
problematic. In several communities, people complained that there was poor 
communication from the NGOs as to the exact dates for distribution either of ration 
cards or other relief materials. People were not informed in time and sometimes it 
was not very clear which villages particular messages were meant for. In one 
example, that I witnessed, poor communication had resulted in two villages 
responding to a message meant for one village to go for ration-card distribution. The 
result was severe difficulties in the distribution of materials, which necessitated a 
considerable level of security provision. Some community leaders felt that the NGOs 
could have made more use of the traditional systems of communication to dispatch 
messages rather than relying on their own staff, who were not only few in number 
but also under-equipped in terms of transportation. 
The whole issue of security was itself problematic. Unlike south Sudan, where 
efforts were made to use community structures for the security of relief materials and 
helping with orderly distributions, the Malawi case involved the use of the military 
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for these purposes. At some of the distribution sites that I visited, Malawi Army 
soldiers, clad in camouflage attire and brandishing fully-fledged machine guns, were 
in attendance, creating the contradictory situation of helping victims at gunpoint. 
This situation gave the impression that beneficiaries were villainous, to be closely 
watched, rather than actors to collaborate with. 
Where large numbers of people were involved at distribution points, beneficiaries 
also complained of long waiting times on queues. In some cases, NGO personnel 
would fail to turn up altogether due to logistical problems such as lack of transport. 
Thus people could wait all day to register or receive ration cards. This meant loss of 
valuable time during which they could go out to do ganyu or to look for food in other 
ways. People felt that if the community communication channels had been used 
properly, more effectiveness and efficiency would have been achieved not only in 
terms of informing different villages of distribution dates, but also to inform them of 
any difficulties encountered by the NGOs. 
Activities pertaining to preparedness could also have benefited from people's 
participation. For example, mitigating plans for monitoring the conditions of 
infrastructure such as bridges and roads could be developed with community 
involvement. It should be known beforehand, for instance, if a bridge is in danger of 
being washed away or if certain important roads are becoming impassable. These are 
issues that could be handled at community level and with community involvement. 
Once such information is available, preliminary mitigation and rehabilitation plans 
where possible could already be set in motion (for example, mobilising community's 
labour for this purpose). In addition, plans for sheltering victims could be put in 
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place (for example, positioning containers on safer ground, as was done in the 
1960s), and mobilising the communities for the up-keep of these. 
The Disaster Management Plan for Malawi advises that once a flood is imminent 
(assuming the Early Warning System is effective) evacuation of people in potential 
flood areas should be mandatory rather than by choice. The advantages of a 
mandatory evacuation include the preservation of food stocks, livestock and even 
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property, which would reduce the need for relief assistance. Human casualties would 
also be avoided. However, a mandatory evacuation cannot be achieved without some 
degree of co-operation from the affected communities, given that it is difficult and 
unethical, for example, to move people under gunpoint. This is the area where there 
is a strong need for participation and dialogue between government and 
communities. I have already noted the important role played by local people in 
evacuation during the 1997 flood disaster. 
Related to the idea of mandatory evacuation is a long-standing feeling of the 
government that certain communities need to be re-settled altogether. Some 
communities are located in areas that are in constant danger of flooding (at the time 
of writing this chapter in 2001, there were reports that some of the same areas that 
had been affected by floods in 1997 had been hit by floods again). However, 
government views as regards re-settlement have not been translated into active 
engagement with communities to determine why such communities are reluctant to 
re-locate and develop alternative plans that can militate against the frequent floods. 
The participation of the affected communities could hold the key to striking a 
compromise as regards the peoples' unwillingness to move out of the flood-prone 
areas. This study brought to light some reasons why many people were unwilling to 
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re-locate to safer areas. It was clear, however, that there was no serious attempt on 
the part of the government to discuss with the communities the issues raised by them. 
Firstly, many people from the affected areas stated that Chikwawa, and especially 
Nsanje, being areas of frequent drought, the wet areas in the marshes and along the 
main rivers offer excellent farming opportunities. Not only are these areas well 
watered but very fertile as well. Crops are usually grown twice a year and no 
fertiliser is used. Secondly, fishing appears to be a very lucrative economic activity. 
Informal inquiries indicated that annual income from fishing for many fishermen 
could be quite substantial, especially in the Ndindi and Elephant marshes. It was 
noted that fish from these areas is exported to far away major cities such as Blantyre 
and Lilongwe. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the traditional chiefs are 
reluctant to move. While the above factors may be important, another consideration 
relates to the sovereignty of their chieftainship once they move out of their areas of 
jurisdiction. It appears that fears exist among traditional leaders that relocation will 
signal the end of their authority if they have to be subsumed under other traditional 
leaders. The following caption from a newspaper report expresses very well the 
sentiments of one of these traditional leaders: 
'Village headman Nyachikadza whose village was one of the worst hit by 
floods in Nsanje, says he will go back to the river banks as soon as the place 
dries up. "We will all go back to our village soon after these floods and when 
the place has dried up. We are not worried with these floods since they come 
once in a while, " said the village headman in an interview. He said it is along 
the riverbanks only where one can find fertile soil and this is why most of the 
people who stay along the riverbanks grow a lot of crops. "We grow almost 
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all the crops in my village, that's why we are not all that poor compared to 
our friends who stay in the upper areas, " he said. Village Headman 
Nyachikadza said he would not tolerate the government's move to evacuate 
his people from the riverbanks. "I can't accept it. Where does the government 
want us to go? We will continue living where we came from, " he said. He, 
however, admitted that this year's floods are the worst in living memory. "In 
1989, we had floods but these are the worst since I became chief 19 years 
ago, " he said, adding that in his village over 20 houses were completely 
destroyed displacing over 200 people. ' (Malawi News, March 22-28,1997: 
8). 
The government on the other hand appears to be more concerned with the ecological 
viability of mass movement of people into new areas. If not properly planned and 
implemented, the government fears that this move could result in destabilisation of 
the catchments and other environmental systems existing in the receiving areas, 
which would create other problems. 
In general then, permanent mass movement of people from flood-prone areas to safer 
ground appears to attract less enthusiasm from the concerned communities as well as 
government. What could possibly find wider acceptance would be the idea of dual 
homes. Government of Malawi (GoM) and communities could discuss this 
arrangement in which people would have permanent homes upland and only 
temporary homes close to the water. Such an arrangement could mean that any 
available food stocks not immediately needed as well as some livestock could be 
kept upland as a form of security in times of disaster. If this idea succeeded the need 
for relief assistance during such times could be significantly reduced. Since upland 
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relatives proved to be important in coping with the immediate effects of the disaster, 
full community participation could reveal ways in which this kind of cooperation 
could be incorporated into the relief programme. 
There was also scope for the local planning agencies to work more closely with 
communities in order to build up capacity for responding to disasters. One of the 
components of the UNDP 5th Country Programme "Management for Development" 
is directed at assisting communities to develop institutional capacity at the local 
level. This programme covers Nsanje district. As part of developing institutional 
capacity, development committees are supposed to be revitalised and trained so that 
they can be active agents of development. Although these committees existed in 
Nsanje it was noted during the study that they did not play a specific role in the 
management of the flood disaster. According to the DCs office the major problem 
had been the lack of training on the specific issues dealing with disaster 
management. This lack of training on the part of the local committees may, however, 
have resulted from limited contact with the responsible offices to the extent that the 
training needs were not identified. Thus, in terms of flood management, there were 
no significant differences between Nsanje (covered by the programme) and 
Chikwawa (not covered) that could be attributed to the District Focus Programme. 
Even some of the problems faced by NGOs resulted from a limited involvement of 
the affected people in the relief programme, for example, as regards the process of 
distributing relief materials vis-A-vis other existing programmes within the affected 
communities. Two examples can be cited to illustrate this point. Firstly, there were 
cases in which two different NGOs were carrying out two different activities in the 
same community. In one community in Nsanje, Red Cross were issuing blankets in 
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one place at the same time as CARD were distributing Likuni Phala in another place. 
In another community in Chikwawa, Concern Universal were distributing blankets in 
one place at the same time as Red Cross were distributing ration cards in another 
place. This resulted in people missing out on one item in some cases as they could 
only attend one distribution at a time. 
Related to this problem was a case in which there was need to fit relief assistance 
into existing programmes by other NGOs. A good example was a seed credit 
programme being run by CARD in Nsanje as part of the drought rehabilitation 
programme. The coming in of free seed distributions from Action Aid in the same 
areas meant the disruption of the on-going credit programme. Perhaps the two 
NGOs, together with the communities concerned, could have co-operated to work 
out the best possible ways of assisting those families that needed free seed. In any 
event, as shown earlier, Action Aid were in fact guilty of distributing more seed than 
was actually needed in the communities. 
For both government and NGOs, absence of meaningful participation from affected 
communities resulted in difficulties in providing relief assistance to flood victims 
who had been displaced from Mozambique into Malawi. Assessing the number of 
Mozambicans who crossed into Malawi because of the floods was also surrounded 
by the controversies affecting the numbers of Malawian flood victims. Initially, a 
figure of 50,000 Mozambicans was reported by the DCs office in Nsanje. The 
verification exercise report in Nsanje was not very clear on the exact number of 
Mozambicans, but WFPs records showed that 7,506 Mozambican families (37,530 
individuals) received food assistance during phase one. A similar number was 
targeted for phase-two distributions. During phase one Mozambicans got the same 
244 
rations as Malawians but in phase two Mozambicans received a two week 25 kg per 
family as a take-home package, contrary to a one month 50 kg package originally 
planned for them. 
A visit to Mozambican refugee camps revealed that the Mozambicans felt more 
comfortable to live in Malawi than return home. It appeared, however, that the 
government, the donors and many NGOs were unaware of this fact and the reasons 
behind it. No effort was made to initiate a dialogue with the Mozambicans to find out 
how they viewed the relief process and how their views could be incorporated into 
the planning process. 
This study found that the Mozambicans lacked proper information regarding the 
relief programme. It seemed clear that it was not initially made known to them that 
the flood relief was only a temporary exercise. In some camps, the refugees spoke of 
their anticipation of receiving assistance for at least six months. This view could 
have been influenced by the experience during the previous refugee crisis and the 
resultant relief programme in the district, which took several years. The lack of 
proper information was compounded by needs assessment exercises by agencies, 
which were interpreted to mean that assistance would follow automatically. 
Additionally, the refugees were never told that the tents were only temporary and 
they would be expected to move out once the situation had improved. The attitude of 
CARD (the NGO which mounted most of these tents) was that the refugees would 
leave the tents whenever they felt they no longer needed them. This led to a practice 
whereby, instead of constructing temporary shelter across the border where most had 
returned to work in the fields, most opted to commute from the tents, hoping to 
receive assistance. Also, Mozambicans preferred to stay because of opportunities for 
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ganyu and access to services such as grocery shops, maize mills, clinics and produce 
markets absent on the Mozambican side. However, there were many difficulties in 
obtaining ganyu, given that they were foreigners, and they also did not have relatives 
to fall back on for assistance. As a result Mozambican camps appeared to have been 
in greater need of food assistance than other areas targeted for distribution. Acute 
hunger was apparent in the camps and children were acutely malnourished. Rather 
than view them with hostility, getting them to participate more meaningfully in the 
programme might have not only allowed for the dissemination of proper information 
to them but could also have opened up possibilities of incorporating them, in 
collaboration with recipient communities, within local survival strategies. 
If the quality of the relief programme was adversely affected by failure on the part of 
the government and many of the NGOs to foster participation of affected people in 
their activities, the case was more so with respect to the conduct of WFP and other 
international donors. It was obvious that the assistance that the affected people 
received was not enough (quantity) and not timely. Both facets of the problem could, 
in large measure, be attributable to the unilateral decision-making behaviour of WFP 
and the other donors. WFP argued that the objective of the relief food was simply to 
regenerate the nutritional status of people to normal levels. It is doubtful if this 
objective was achieved. It appears that lack of enough resources led to discrimination 
against some individuals who were clearly in need. In Chikwawa for instance, the 
DC's office observed (supported by the study) that the figure of 12,000 families 
targeted for assistance was far below reality. 
If greater levels of participation could not have influenced the quantity of the volume 
of relief materials provided (assuming, as it appeared in this case, that the donors 
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were prepared to make available a pre-decided amount to the relief process), it could 
at least have helped in timely delivery, especially in the case of food assistance and 
seed distribution. One way of ensuring timely delivery of food assistance would have 
been to start distribution to areas where targeting and ration card distribution had 
been accomplished, rather than to do distribution on a district basis. This would, of 
course, require additional resources but it could be a possible alternative. But more 
importantly, the donors needed to find ways of effectively incorporating the 
participation of affected communities. Rather than unilaterally making decisions 
regarding who needed assistance most, targeting scarce resources should take into 
account community views about vulnerability and fairness. Such participation could 
have helped to ensure not only appropriate, but also timely delivery of relief 
assistance. 
Timely delivery of relief materials is crucial. In the present case, provision of 
assistance to people long after a disaster had occurred made relief make less sense 
and increased potentials for politicisation. Additionally, people failed to appreciate 
the need for targeting. Increased participation could also be a way of identifying a 
targeting mechanism that does not disrupt social relations existing within and 
between communities. Village leaders, for example, raised concerns that it would be 
difficult to get people who did not receive relief food but were clearly in need to 
work on existing community projects. In cases where two adjacent villages were co- 
operating on a community project such as the building of a school block or the 
construction and rehabilitation of village roads, distributing food to only one village 
threatened such co-operation. 
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As indicated above, some village leaders suggested that perhaps a better way would 
have been to target whole communities that were affected, even if that meant 
reducing the food rations. The food rations that the actual victims received were 
regarded as grossly inadequate. And given that many people survived because of 
ganyu, it is possible that food given to those "not so much in need" would still have 
found its way to the intended beneficiaries through this mechanism. 
As in many other emergencies, WFP attempted to use the relief programme as a 
mechanism for fostering changes in gender relations within the affected communities 
by giving special roles to women. In order to ensure that the food reaches the 
household, GoM and WFP agreed to target the senior female in the targeted 
households during the distribution exercise. Apparently, this strategy was also 
devised to avoid cases in which men could sell the food or give it to other wives in 
the case of polygamously married men. According to WFP reports, this strategy 
appeared to have been successful as 60% of the food was distributed through this 
process. This study also revealed that women welcomed this strategy and it did not 
seem to pose any serious problems with men. In any case, men were still supposed to 
carry the items home if they were bulky (e. g. 50 kg maize bags). However, WFP felt 
that it could do more than just targeting the senior female of the household. Women's 
involvement in the actual distribution exercise, for example, would be one way of 
increasing their participation at the community level. The Distribution Point 
Supervisors and the Tippers all came from the affected communities and more 
women could have been appointed for these positions. While the intentions of such a 
practice were noble, the decision was again made without consultation with the 
affected population and thus not much appears to have been achieved. In addition, as 
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I have maintained throughout this thesis, the very idea of attempting to mix social 
change objectives with relief objectives needs to be considered carefully. 
Conclusion. 
This study showed that although people and communities in the affected area 
demonstrated great capacity to cope with the flood disaster, they were not 
incorporated into the relief programme as actors who could make valuable 
contributions through their participation in the planning, implementation, 
management, monitoring and evaluation of the relief process. Participation was 
limited to the formal involvement of official local leaders. Much energy was devoted 
to an antagonistic relationship between the government and the donor community. In 
Malawi, a local proverb says that when two elephantsfight it is the grass underneath 
that suffers. In the case of the flood relief programme, when the two elephants fought 
(government and donors), it was the grassroots that suffered. 
The chapter constitutes an empirical demonstration of some of the theoretical issues 
that surround the participation of affected populations in emergency relief. 
Specifically, the problems of mistrust and suspicion between government and 
international aid organisations and their implications for participation have been 
highlighted. In addition, the chapter has provided concrete examples of government, 
NGOs and international aid donors failing to incorporate participation, even though 
there was considerable scope for doing so. Ile whole relief programme was 
managed without much input from grassroots; structures and processes. Even the 
management meetings that called together all the stakeholders in the programme 
failed to include significant representation from affected communities. Such 
meetings took place in the main city, away from the literal messy swamp of the 
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floods. A suggestion by one of the District Commissioners whose district was 
affected to hold one of such meetings in the affected districts to enable the traditional 
leaders to attend, for example, did not go beyond being welcomed as a good idea. It 
appears clear that, in addition to limited knowledge on how to incorporate 
communities in the relief programme, failure of grassroots participation to take place 
resulted also from a limited enthusiasm and effort to incorporate it. Partly this could 
be explained by a spirit of superiority that leads to undermining the importance of 
local knowledge. Partly, especially on the part of donors, lack of participation was 
related to their need to support distribution policies that were in line with the quantity 
of their resources. In both cases therefore, grassroots participation was not seen as 
part and parcel of the emergency relief programme. 
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Chapter Six. Grassroots organisation and 
participation in disaster relief: The case of the Self 
Employed Women's Association (SEWA) Gujarat, 
India. 
Introduction 
The response of the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) to the 2001 
earthquake in Gujarat, India appears to offer an alternative model of disaster relief 
when compared with the two case studies presented in the previous chapters. The 
salient feature of this model is the absence of external organisations, international or 
national, in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the relief 
programme. This in contrast to the case of south Sudan, where international aid 
agencies dominated the scene, and Malawi, where the wrangle between the dominant 
players, WFP and the government, completely sidelined affected communities in 
programme implementation. SEWA's operations involve participation through 
grassroots structures. In addition, SEWA's experience offers a new dimension to 
disaster relief in that women, traditionally ignored, underrepresented or 
disadvantaged in many relief programmes, take centre stage. This chapter details the 
ways in which SEWA was able to use its existing structures to bring the affected 
population to participate fully in the relief programme. 
Background and Method 
Fieldwork for the study was undertaken from mid October to beginning of November 
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2001. The earthquake-affected state of Gujarat was selected for two main reasons. 
Firstly, through personal meetings with its director, I had previous links with the 
Disaster Mitigation Institute, based in the area. Through these meetings I became 
aware of the work that had already been going on in terms of cyclone and drought 
relief. Secondly, I felt that having done two case studies on the relief process in 
Africa, a study in Asia would provide a good comparative base given some general 
differences in terms of political and cultural organisation between the two. 
Additionally, working with SEWA, a women's organisation, would bring in a new 
dimension in the whole relief process since the current norm is one in which women 
are generally underrepresented. 
Several methodological tools were employed in the study: I conducted semi- 
structured interviews with key SEWA personnel at the headquarters, including the 
executive secretary and district-based coordinators. I also conducted similar 
interviews with district-based coordinators, team leaders, spearhead team members 
as well as village-based members belonging to various SEWA activity groups such 
as Savings, Childcare, Health, Insurance, Craft etc. Focus group discussions were 
conducted with spearhead teams and activity groups; village meetings; village 
transect walks; and observation. In addition, I made use of various reports produced 
by the SEWA Academy covering the various stages of the relief process. Because I 
have had to 'pick and mix' information from these reports to achieve coherence I 
have chosen not to put specific references in the text, except where I have made 
direct quotations. However, all reports used appear in the bibliography. In addition, 
the information I collected through field visits was quite similar to that contained in 
the reports. Tberefore it would be difficult (and perhaps not necessary) to distinguish 
between the documented information and information collected through field visits. 
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Even though the reports were produced by SEWA itself, I was quite confident of the 
accuracy of the information they contained particularly because in many cases I 
became aware of the reports after I had already collected my own information. 
Some important features of Gujarat. 
Gujarat state is located in north west India. Relative to other states, Gujarat appears 
to experience frequent disasters. A chronic drought has become a dominant feature of 
the state but other forms of disasters such as cyclones, malaria epidemics and 
earthquakes affect it from time to time. The northern part of the state is generally 
semi-arid. The majority of the population depend on rain-fed agriculture, although a 
few irrigation schemes exist. 
Gujarat has several economic activities. The majority of the population is engaged in 
agriculture, growing both food and cash crops. Farmers are divided into a minority of 
relatively well-to-do land holders, and the majority who are landless. The latter are 
forced to become labourers. Animal husbandry among some involves the rearing of 
animals such as cattle, goats, sheep, buffalo, and fowl. The state of Gujarat produces 
70% of India's salt, so many people are also employed in salt fanning. Gum 
collection is also an important economic activity for a considerable number of the 
population. In certain districts, such as Banaskantha and Kutch, there are traditions of 
world-famous craft production spanning centuries and this provides a source of 
income for many households. 
The failure of rains has a chain effect on many of these production activities. For 
example, salt production suffers due to low water tables, fodder production suffers 
severely affecting livestock production and gum collection also becomes difficult. 
Craft production appears to be the only activity that is not affected by rainfall. As a 
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result, it has become an increasingly important weapon in fighting disasters such as 
drought and others that lead to water shortages. 
Socially, the caste system operates in Gujarat that puts certain classes of people in 
positions of permanent relative disadvantage. These classes have little voice as 
regards the operation of the state machinery in activities that affect their lives. This is 
where SEWA becomes important as it attempts to mobilise such classes and 
incorporate them into decision-making structures where they can have a voice. 
Much like all other States in India, people's participation in government 
development programmes is institutionalised through the panchayat, which is an 
elected body of village leaders. Communities always retain the power to elect new 
panchayat members, which, in theory, should make it important for them to behave 
in the interests of the community. 
There is a lot of literature analysing the panchayat and its related forms of 
government at village level. While various authors applaud or criticise with varying 
degrees the extent to which village government in India accords the rural masses 
with an opportunity for participation both in the political and development process, it 
is true to say that the panchayat system is quite unique when compared with many 
countries within the developing world. Recognising its central role in the village 
setting, SEWA attempts to seek the approval of the panchayat in its own 
programmes through its inclusion in village-level planning meetings. So, for 
example, SEWA village committees deliberate on issues and make decisions that the 
village panchayat is supposed to endorse. To facilitate acceptance of their plans, 
SEWA committees often invite members of the village panchayat to their meetings 
so that they become part and parcel of the deliberations. 
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Historical background and organisation of SEWA 
History 
Registered as a trade union in 1972, SEWA is a member-based organisation of 
women who work in the informal economic sector. Its members are women with no 
employer or fixed employer-employee relationships. They may be daily wage earners 
or self-employed. Through a demand-based operational framework, the organisation 
attracts women who are at the base of society in terms of economic resources as well 
as having limited ability to find a voice in the wider political and social processes. 
Many of the women who become members of SEWA often have low or no working 
capital and poor work tools. Thus, despite having various skills and knowledge, their 
work is characterised by low productivity and very low incomes. 
Based on the 'Gandhian' philosophy which embodies the principles of truth, non- 
violence, simplicity and self-reliance, SEWA'S main goals are two fold: first, to 
organise women for full employment at the household level that provides them with 
work, income, food and social security. Social security is defined in terms of access 
to health and childcare, insurance and shelter. Second, to accord women with 
economic self-reliance in order to increase their bargaining power as well as their 
control over the decision-making process and thus, ultimately, better control over 
their lives. 
If SEWA offers both economic and social advantages to its members, why do some 
people choose not to join? In answer to this question I was told that those who 
choose not to join SEWA are generally the relatively affluent who probably have 
already a measure of influence socially and politically as well. SEWA also offers 
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people the flexibility of joining only the activities that will benefit them given their 
specific circumstances. For example, some may chose to be members of childcare 
activities only while others may become members of several activities. In all cases 
poor people are provided with the opportunity to become involved in the decision- 
making process and their various capacities are enhanced. 
Rose's (1992) account of the history, development and organisation of SEWA is 
probably the most comprehensive on the organisation to date. Her book traces the 
development of the organisation over a period of twenty years from its embryonic 
stages. In this account, the author documents SEWA's struggles to help poor women 
improve their lives through influencing policy at the local, regional and even 
international levels. She refers to many instances that demonstrate how SEWA has 
consistently put into operation the principles embodied in the Ghandhian philosophy 
to become a powerful force through which women's voices are not only heard but 
also through which they find dignity through the realisation of their dreams, goals 
and aspirations. 
A detailed look at its history reveals that SEWA owes its birth and growth in great 
measure to the personal dedication and charismatic leadership of its founder, Ela 
Bhatt, a lawyer who had headed the women's wing of the Textile Labour Association 
(TLA). The TLA is India's oldest and largest union of textile workers. Ela Bhatt had 
become acquainted with and sympathetic to the problems of women textile cart- 
pullers and head-loaders. Presented with the appeals of these women for assistance, 
she responded by providing them with the necessary organisational help to establish 
what has now become one of the most well-known women's trade unions in the 
world. 
256 
Funding information was not easy to obtain but Rose's account mentions briefly that 
international aid organisations have played a role in the development of SEWA 
through provision of financial grants, supporting SEWA's policy intervention 
initiative as well as providing training support. Other sources of funding have 
included private donations, government and membership fees. However, SEWA 
leaders, who always provide the members with management support, capacity 
building needs, generation of alternative employment activities and favourable policy 
initiatives, internally generate much of the development process. 
SEWA's growth has been quite steady, starting out with 320 members in 1973 to 
318,527 in 2000 in all India. With 205,985 members (about 65%), Gujarat has by far 
the greatest membership. The members are both rural and urban-based. In the state of 
Gujarat, 38.36% of the membership is rural against 61.64% urban. SEWA's model 
has since begun to be adopted internationally in some countries, for example, Sri 
Lanka and South Africa. 
Structure 
A two-tier level of elected representation governs SEWA. The members of each 
trade elect their representatives in the ratio of one representative per one hundred 
members. These representatives comprise the Trade Council (Pratinidhi Manal). 
Parallel to the Trade Council are Trade Committees (Dhandha Samit) in each trade 
whose membership is not fixed but varies between 25 and 50. The Trade Committees 
meet every month. Every three years the Trade Council elects an Executive 
Committee of 25 members, reflecting the proportions of the membership. The office 
bearers of the trade union are elected from among the executive members. 
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Operationally, the general secretary at the headquarters heads SEWA. Each of the 
eleven districts in which SEWA operates have two-levels of coordination: 
headquarters-based and district-based. Depending on the needs of the membership 
each district then has various activity groups that may include Savings, Craft, 
Insurance, Childcare, Salt Production, Health, etc. In turn, each activity group has a 
team leader, an organiser and a spearhead team. This organisational structure offers 
many pathways of communication to ensure that people at the grassroots have the 
opportunity to articulate their real needs as well as getting involved in the planning 
and implementation processes. SEWA's organisers, being village-based, are always 
in close touch with the members. There are many fora of elected union 
representatives that cut across occupations, districts, sectors (urban and rural) and 
levels of the organisation, bringing together women from all contexts and focussing 
programmes according to their needs. Monthly Pratindhi Milan meetings of union 
organisers and members serve as pathways of communication through which 
information on disasters and relief-programme implementation can be disseminated 
quickly and effectively. In addition, at village level, women grassroots leaders 
known as aagewans are always in constant communication with organisers as part of 
carrying out their routine work on existing projects. 
The spearhead teams 
One of the core objectives of SEWA is to adopt the kind of planning, development 
and implementation of enterprises in a manner that facilitates its members to become 
not only producers and users but also controllers and managers of their work and 
products. The spearhead team plays a pivotal role in translating these objectives into 
reality. The spearhead team comprises the aagewans, who develop their knowledge 
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and skill in a particular activity, and SEWA organisers in the ratio of 80-20. The 
abilities of these aagewans as well as their management skills are enhanced through 
SEWA's planned capacity-building schemes. For example, the spearhead team for 
managerial, accounting and marketing activities needs to have corresponding skills. 
Such skills are provided by the SEWA Academy and other affiliated federations 
through various training programmes. Each spearhead team has a leader whose task 
is to convene village-level meetings and conduct training as well as undertake 
periodic visits in the districts. She conducts weekly meetings with her team to 
identify issues needing attention and to draw out plans for tackling such issues. In 
addition, she also conducts monthly meetings at the district level in liaison with the 
district co-ordinators. All SEWA teams are made up of women. In 1999 there were 
500 spearhead teams for the various activities including, Embroidery, Healthcare, 
Childcare, Savings etc. 
Relations with government 
The state government of Gujarat has the ultimate responsibility for fostering 
development as well as providing disaster relief and rehabilitation. Therefore, SEWA 
has always worked complementarily, rather than parallel to government in 
development and relief efforts. SEWA is itself at pains to point out that its role is not 
merely to agitate and protest but to provide a forum through which members can 
strengthen themselves through the solidarity of the union and express their collective 
needs to Policy makers. This role becomes critical during periods of scarcity: 
"As a strong community-based organisation. SEWA's... organisers can 
present the needs of members to government officials, who may not be aware 
of the particular situations of women and children. Likewise the government 
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benefits from this communication as they can formulate more appropriate 
response measures... Community based organisations that involve the key 
participation of the local people should also be involved in disaster 
intervention and prevention measures... a partnership between grassroots 
organisations like SEWA and the government is the most effective approach 
to ensuring sustainable intervention measures that meet the needs of rural 
communities" (SEWA, no datea: 34). 
Traditionally, SEWA's links with government were established through the former's 
efforts to lobby the latter on policy and legislation affecting poor women. In time, the 
government began to hand over the management of some of its development projects 
to SEWA. And although SEWA's suggestion that it be made the official distribution 
agent of government relief failed to materialise during the cyclone disaster relief of 
1998, there have been many channels through which SEWA has linked up with the 
government in disaster relief. Such links have included communication and 
cooperation with the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary, the Relief Commissioner, 
the Rural Development Ministry and other departments concerned with relief and 
rehabilitation. During the earthquake disaster relief operation of 2001, a government 
liaison team was set up at state level to foster cooperation with SEWA and other 
organisations involved. The Relief Commissioner and Secretary were contact points 
for SEWA, especially as regards the transportation of relief materials and 
coordination with other NGO's. At district level, SEWAIS coordinators are always in 
touch with government district authorities through the collector's office. 
SEWA's paid organisers act as a link between govemment officials and SEWA 
members. They try to bridge the gap in communication between high-level state 
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officials and members in remote villages. They are very familiar with the resources 
at the disposal of the communities as well as the needs of members and they try to 
maintain a constant awareness among the membership of government schemes that 
could benefit them. The organisers also try to awaken policy makers to the realities 
of members so that actual needs are reflected in planning. 
Several issues come out of SEWA's experience in working with the government in 
disaster relief. One observation has been a divergence of relief philosophy between 
the two. Whereas SEWA's philosophy embodies the principles of participation, 
capacity building and creation of alternative sources of employment to enable 
communities to respond effectively to disasters, government adheres to the orthodox 
relief mentality characterised by scarcity recognition, assessment, declaration, and 
response. The latter essentially involves the provision of material goods at the height 
of distress and does not foster participation. As a result it leaves much room for 
inconsistency and inefficiency. 
Several examples can be drawn to demonstrate the sort of inefficiencies that can 
attend the orthodox relief mentality. With regard to drought relief, the conventional 
procedure in Gujarat is to wait until the official withdrawal of the South West 
Monsoon winds before calling on district collectors to appraise the situation in their 
jurisdiction. In 1999 the fact that the rains didn't come led some commentators to 
assert that: 'It seems a ridiculous and unnecessary formality to await the end of a 
rainy season that in fact never was before taking concrete action' (SEWA, no datea: 
23). Thus, although it was the case that rural people had began to feel the effects of 
the drought in July and August, drought was only officially declared in December, at 
which time the mobilisation of relief had to start. SEWA is engaged in continuing 
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efforts to use the existing channels of communication and cooperation to influence a 
change in the government's approach to disaster relief. For example, in April 2000 
the government accepted SEWA's proposal to include craftwork as an alternative to 
the then manual labour of pit digging. SEWA petitioned the state government to 
widen the scope of relief work to include skilled labour or provide training to those 
in need, for example in masonry and plantation work. Government have since started 
funding craftwork. These changes enable people at grassroots level to participate in 
government activities since demand for them is generated at community level via 
SEWA's structures. 
Similar examples can be drawn from the 1998 cyclone relief programme (Polzer, 
1998). In that programme, assessing the extent of damage and determining the 
number of beneficiaries faced problems typical of situations where either 
government or external aid agencies play a leading role. In some areas figures of 
affected people produced by SEWA and other NGOs, on the one hand, and 
government, on the other, varied widely. Government reports suggested only 
approximately 1000 dead and 1500 missing whereas eyewitness accounts obtained 
by SEWA suggested between 10,000 and 20,000. This variation in figures had a 
direct impact on the number of people eligible for compensation. In addition, it 
contributed to fund-raising problems for SEWA, since international aid agencies did 
not consider the original death figures produced by the government as constituting a 
major disaster. 
Yet SEWA demonstrated that the government figures, based as they were on the 
number of dead bodies that were actually recovered and the number of registered 
workers in the affected areas, were grossly inaccurate. Eyewitness reports covering 
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the number of houses washed out to sea by the tidal wave gave a much more accurate 
picture. In addition, through contact with eyewitnesses, SEWA was able to recognise 
that there were many working families who were not registered and could therefore 
not be accounted for in the government official registers. 
In similar vein, SEWA challenged the government's approach to the issue of missing 
persons. SEWA and other NGO's argued that the government's definition of missing 
people, which referred to people whose bodies could not be found, did not reflect 
people's experiences. In many cases people had their relatives swept by the tide 
before their very eyes, and sometimes even from their very arms. In some cases 
people had to leave bodies behind fleeing from rumours about a major gas leak. As a 
result many bodies were never found. Yet the government's policy was to regard 
missing persons as dead only if the person has not been traced for seven years. This 
would have meant that many people who lost their relatives would never have 
received compensation in good time. SEWA, working through its community-based 
members, was able to identify such people and succeeded in lobbying the 
government to start paying compensation to affected people as part of the disaster 
relief programme. Such efforts included lobbying the government to use the 
community social structure in attempts to find alternative ways of identifying 
deceased persons who did not have the kind of documentation that the government 
required. 
As a result of SEWA's interaction with government and through its own activities, 
several disaster mitigation programmes managed at the grassrootS level were already 
in place when the earthquake disaster occurred. Thus, part of the relief process for 
the earthquake disaster consisted of merely strengthening the existing programmes 
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rather than starting new ones from scratch. For example, as part of drought-proofing 
activities, SEWA members from 9 districts presented a memorandum to the Chief 
Minister of Gujarat in which they requested the implementation of many 
programmes in the areas of fodder security, employment generation, water 
harvesting and conservation, development of rural infrastructure, aforestation, skills 
training, craft activities and health and child care activities. The state government did 
not respond favourably to all of these requests. However, SEWA implemented some 
of them through their district associations, in some cases taking up partnership with 
government, in others working independently. At district level SEWA set up several 
operational teams for the implementation of certain activities such as craftwork. 
These included: procurement teams, production teams, distribution teams and 
marketing teams. The picture presented is thus one of an integrated programme 
implemented and managed at the grassroots level. Such a programme went a long 
way to building the capacities of the people and communities involved and were thus 
better prepared to handle the earthquake disaster. For example, with regard to a 
SEWA-managed government fodder scheme, it was reported that: 
'SEWA organisers quickly learned the technicalities of management, and 
were able to smooth out controversies instigated by aggressive farmers. The 
responsibility of running a smooth distribution system for 12,000 farmers and 
their 40,000 cattle has been gargantuan. In fact, their management has been 
so impressive that the Santalpur fodder depot became a focal point. 
Whenever visitors come to witness government relief efforts in this district 
they are taken here' (SEWA, no datea: 55). 
It was these same people who were involved in the management of the drought- 
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proofing schemes that were able to use their acquired management skills to expand 
some of the activities and to initiate and participate in new ones during the 2001 
earthquake disaster. 
SEWA Is involvement in disasters 
Though created primarily to foster socio-economic development among the rural and 
urban poor, SEWA is increasingly becoming involved in disaster relief as well. This 
trend is particularly true for Gujarat, which has witnessed an increased number and 
frequency of natural disasters. The history of involvement in disasters since the 
creation of the organisation dates back to 1986 when there was a severe drought in 
the state of Gujarat. That drought lasted for three years. In 1996 floods devastated 
some parts of the state. A devastating cyclone hit the state in 1998 leaving more than 
10,000 people dead and many homes and crops destroyed. A combination of a 
cyclone and a drought hit the area again in 1999. In 2000, there was drought in the 
districts of Kutch, Banaskantha and Surendranagar. In previous years people had 
responded to drought by migrating to the southern districts of Gujarat to find work. 
This option was not available in 2000, as the drought had also affected the southern 
areas. Migrants had to return to their home areas empty handed and destitute. 
However, it appears that the principle of self-reliance had become so internalised 
among many community members that their greatest demand was not for relief. 'At 
every monthly meeting, the members' demands became louder and more strident: 
"Give us work, not relief', they said' (SEWA, 2000: 9) In response to these 
demands, alongside the relief programme of distributing nutritious food to more than 
23,000 labourers at the relief work sites, SEWA also commenced the provision of 
craft-related employment, mainly embroidery and the provision of fodder at 
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subsidised rates and in adequate quantities to at least 35,125 animals. In addition, 
water conservation activities were begun as a long-term strategy for countering water 
shortages. These activities constituted what came to be known as the 'Campaign 
Against Drought', which was run and managed by SEWA members. 
With the 'Campaign Against Drought' barely underway, the organisation was again 
called upon to respond to floods in some parts of the state. In conjunction with the 
local municipal corporation, SEWA worked to pump out water from streets and 
houses, distributing chlorine tablets and Oral Dehydration Salts (ORS) packets to 
people in affected areas and in cleaning up and related activities. 
However, although natural disasters have been part of the recent history of Gujarat, 
SEWA claimed that the earthquake disaster of January 26 2001 was unprecedented 
in nature. Drought left people without food, floods brought health risks and cyclones 
damaged crops and rooftops but never before had they dealt with an extensive 
collapse of houses and physical injury to the affected. 
The 2001 earthquake disaster. 
Extent of destruction. 
The earthquake, measuring 7.9 on the Richter Scale, occurred on the morning of 26 
January 2001 in the state of Gujarat. The most severely affected areas were the 
districts of Kutch, Patan, Surendranagar and Ahmedabad. Kutch experienced the 
heaviest losses. By the afternoon of that day SEWA's teams were already on the 
scene talking to people and gathering preliminary information. On the 27 th a team of 
about 50 SEWA organisers conducted a house-to-house survey of the villages in the 
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affected districts. The survey centred on assessing: the extent of damage to the 
houses; extent of loss of household goods, including food stocks, tools and 
equipment; extent of injuries; and extent of damage to child-care centres and 
community centres. 
The survey revealed that at least 60,000 SEWA members had been affected. Many 
houses either collapsed completely or suffered at least 80% damage, leaving them 
uninhabitable. Heavy losses in household tools and utensils meant that many lacked 
both food and accommodation. In the meanwhile, affected families were camping in 
the open in makeshift shelters. In an effort to help, some town dwellers began to send 
cooked food to the villages, transporting it over a distance of up to 5 hours. In many 
cases the food was damaged and not fit for consumption when it arrived. To counter 
this problem, community kitchens were set up. One such kitchen had been set up by 
a religious-based organisation through which individual donations of food were 
made. 
Many of those involved in salt production had their salt pans damaged and needed 
rebuilding. The salt already produced got mixed up with sand. The brine wells also 
caved in and the pump sets for pumping out the brine also got damaged. There was a 
need to re-dig the wells and replace the diesel pump sets immediately to resume 
production and restore the livelihood base of these salt producers. In agriculture 
many small and marginal farmers suffered losses in terms of cracked fields, damaged 
wells and motor pumps as well as damaged boreholes. Several cattle also suffered 
injuries from collapsed cattle sheds. Damage to water resources included caved-in or 
cracked wells, cracked rainwater harvesting tanks and cracked check dams. All the 
30 child-care centres in the villages sustained heavy damage. In two child-care 
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centres in the district of Surendranagar at least three children were buried under 
collapsed buildings. 
Response to the disaster. 
The response to the disaster took place in three phases namely, the immediate 
response, the mid-phase relief and rehabilitation response and the rehabilitation 
phase. The latter involved the rebuilding of livelihoods and a housing reconstruction 
plan. 
Immediate response. 
SEWA's immediate response action was geared at addressing the immediate needs 
identified in the assessment exercise. This response comprised the following actions: 
Provision of shelter material, including tents and tarpaulin sheets; family kits; food 
supplies; blankets; medical aid; and water. Functioning round the clock, SEWA field 
teams, supported by their district centres and field offices, carried out these activities. 
SEWA field teams also worked out the distribution systems to ensure that assistance 
from the government reached the affected villages and individuals in the various 
districts. For this phase, the Government of Gujarat provided relief materials in the 
form of food packets, medical aid and cash doles. UNICEF provided 25,000 
blankets, 12,000 family kits and 48,000 tarpaulin sheets. Peace Winds Japan 
provided 6000 tents. In providing such materials, these organisations sometimes 
responded to appeals for assistance from SEWA but sometimes gave of their own 
accord based on their own previous experience and knowledge of what people might 
need in a disaster of this nature. In both cases the distribution of all materials 
received was conducted by SEWA's village-based teams. In cases where there were 
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limited relief materials these teams had the responsibility of Rasing with community 
members to target materials to the most needy. 
By the 2 nd of February, one week after the disaster, the following quantities of relief 
materials had been distributed: 
* Up to 800 items of tents and tarpaulin materials in 50 villages in Kutch district, 
and 3500 tarpaulin sheets in 20 villages in Patan district. 
o Blankets numbering 8600,4600 and 3990 respectively in 50 villages in Kutch, 50 
villages in Surendranagar, and 20 villages in Patan. 
Family kits in 50 villages in Kutch and 1500 in another 50 villages in 
Surendranagar. 
Up to 1670 Kg of food as well as 3034 food packets and a number of boxes of 
biscuits in a total of 70 villages in the three districts. 
9A total of 91 bags of clothes in 100 villages in Kutch and Surendranagar districts. 
In addition, on the very day of the disaster, SEWA, with the help of the Community 
Health Centre and the Indian Medical Association, set up a medical camp with a 
fully fledged operating theatre where more than 1500 injured persons were either 
treated or referred. 
The SEWA office headquarters assumed a co-ordination function to ensure timely 
delivery of appropriate and adequate relief assistance to the affected communities. 
Co-ordination systems were established with other agencies involved in the relief 
process, among them the following: the government control room; the government 
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external aid cell; donor agencies; UN agencies; private institutions and agencies; 
NGOs; and health units. 
A team of 20 paid organisers in each of the affected districts were at the heart of the 
distribution system. These teams carried out the roles of co-ordination with 
government agents, the actual distribution of items to villages and maintaining of 
distribution and stock records. Relief materials were first transported from 
Ahmedabad, the nearest big city, to district centres at Bhuj, Dhrangadhra, and 
Raadhampur, from where they were forwarded to the affected villages. 
Distribution proceeded on the basis of lists and registration cards prepared and issued 
during the easement exercise. Distribution teams had a four-day rotation system to 
allow members enough time to rest before carrying on with the demanding work. 
Mid-Phase Action 
Mid-term relief action involved the continuation of some of the activities already 
started during the immediate phase. These activities included continuing the 
provision of temporary shelter to respond to the damage that was caused by after- 
shocks, provision of more food rations and provision of emergency livelihood 
opportunities. However, new activities were also begun, including a campaign on 
scientific building practices and the mobilisation of community workers. 
Provision of Temporary Shelter. 
The provision of temporary shelter to the affected families continued, awaiting the 
formulation of a government policy on housing reconstruction. Under this 
programme SEWA provided a total of 11,320 units of temporary shelter in a total of 
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184 villages divided as follows: 1083 units in 117 villages in the district of Kutch; 
7000 units in 34 villages in Patan district; and 937 units in 34 villages in 
Surendranagar district. It is important to mention that the provision of these units 
involved the full participation of the affected people, with many of them involved in 
identifying the beneficiaries and in distributing materials and actual construction. 
Campaign on scientific building practices. 
This initiative was launched on 26h February, exactly a month after the earthquake 
I 
struck. SEWA's grassroots community leaders, organisers and housing technical 
teams became involved in a vigorous campaign to encourage people to build houses 
on scientific principles of safety, especially as regards the construction of 
earthquake-resistant houses. The People's Science Institute and the Disaster 
Mitigation Institute, both local organisations, trained SEWA's teams. Different 
techniques and models of construction were discussed with community members 
from which they could choose the appropriate ones. The campaign involved the 
entire village community, including the panchayats, other government agents, 
women's producers' groups and the dairy co-operatives. 
Provision offamily kits 
The distribution of family kits provided by UNICEF continued. The family kits 
comprised blankets and household utensils namely, plates, glasses and bowls. The 
mid-term. programme involved the distribution of such kits to some 10,100 
households in 125 villages divided as follows: 1,940 households in 109 villages in 
Kutch district; 5,405 households in 34 villages in Patan district; and 2,762 in 
Surendranagar district. 
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Child Care Centres and counselling. 
While the survey conducted by the assessment teams of SEWA revealed the extent of 
damage to property, resources and physical injuries to people, daily contacts with 
them revealed that many were continuing to suffer from shock, fear and anxiety. 
Children's mental condition was particularly affected since all the school buildings 
had collapsed and schools had consequently closed. Having witnessed buildings 
collapse in their very sight, many children, and some adults, were afraid to enter 
buildings. There were reports of people sleeping outside houses that were still 
standing for fear of being caught out by another earthquake. To address this problem 
the mid-term relief action included psychosocial counselling, information 
dissemination regarding how to respond if there was another earthquake and 
intensification of day-care activities for children. In order to increase the 
effectiveness of these day-care centres SEWA initiated training in counselling and 
education for its existing health workers, childcare workers, organisers and trainers. 
SEWA training teams developed modules that took into account not only the cultural 
experiences of the people but also ensured that these were appropriate and workable 
in the particular rural setting. These modules included activities such as the sharing 
of experiences, discussion on what an earthquake really was and its causes, how to 
rebuild by examining success stories and cases and the role of collective action in 
overcoming challenges. 
The effectiveness of these child day-care centres was demonstrated by an increased 
demand to have them established where they were nonexistent before the earthquake. 
Responding to demand from village communities in Surendrenagar and Patan 
districts, SEWA, through its district associations (the Surendranagar Mahila Balvikas 
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Mandal and the Banaskantha Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas 
(DWCRA) Mahila SEWA Association), established 26 new centres each attending to 
between 50 and 70 children. In addition, session hours were extended from only 4 to 
5 hours to 10 hours a day. Furthermore, the age of children in the day care centres 
was also raised from the usual 2-6 years to 15 years to cater for the school-going 
children. Children attending the centres benefited from counselling services and 
activities geared at lessening the impact of their trauma such as singing, dancing, 
story telling, poetry recitals and so on. The day-care centres also provided a forum 
for village schoolteachers to provide school lessons to children. SEWA also 
established a mobile school to cater for some villages in Surendranagar district that 
were not able immediately to establish day care centres. 
The impact of these day-care centres, as well as the counselling sessions conducted 
by SEWA, was profound on both children and adults. At a village meeting in Dabhi 
village, when asked what their immediate thoughts were when the earthquake was 
taking place, some replied 'we thought it was a big plane passing overhead and 
causing a rumble'. Others said 'electric shock waves'. Most said that as a result of 
these assumptions they had not come out of their houses. However, with the 
education and counselling they received, they were now aware of what an earthquake 
was and their first reaction would be to get out of the houses. At the time of my 
interview many had gone back to sleeping in their houses, although the after shocks 
were still occurring. There were still some, however, who were yet to overcome their 
fear and were still sleeping outside. 
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The housing reconstruction Plan 
The housing reconstruction plan began as part of the mid-term phase of the relief 
programme and continued throughout the rehabilitation phase. In this plan SEWA 
targeted some 161 villages in the three districts of Surendranagar, Kutch and Patan. 
The total number of completely damaged houses in these districts was 16,000. 
Another 12,000 were rendered uninhabitable from severe cracks bringing the total of 
houses needing reconstruction to 28,000. Priority in the selection of villages was 
given based on the extent of damage and the strength of SEWA membership. Areas 
that were not covered by SEWA came under different management systems 
administered either by the state government or other NGOs. The reconstruction 
policy that was finally agreed between SEWA and the government was that the 
former would provide a flat amount of 45,000 Rupees to every beneficiary for the 
construction of a room and a veranda. Government would provide the remaining 
funds for the completion of the entire dwelling based on its own assessment of the 
size and extent of damage to the previous building. 
The SEWA-managed part of the scheme was owner-driven and involved broad-based 
participation of the affected people. There are at least ten major communities in the 
three districts concerned, each with its own housing style and design. "Ibe role of the 
SEWA administration was the provision of materials as well as a team of qualified 
civil engineers and architects from the Mahila Housing Trust, another local 
organisation, to work in consultation with the communities in the development of 
community-specific housing models. This was done to preserve the original integrity 
of the communities by avoiding scattered housing colonies. The variations of 
housing were quite apparent in different communities. I observed that in Patan and 
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Surendranagar most new housing units were detached, while in Kutch, there were 
several semi-detached houses. I was told that designs in the latter case were initiated 
by those villages where, traditionally, married brothers lived in the same compound. 
Through its district associations, SEWA identified 'peer groups' in the villages. 
These were groups of elderly couples from families representative of different 
communities that would act as pace setters in the design, layout, building materials 
and construction methods of the agreed traditional designs. Knowledge gained from 
collaboration with professional engineers and architects from the Mahila Housing 
Trust and The Disaster Mitigation Institute would be used to adapt the traditional 
housing designs to earthquake resistant standards. 
SEWA's district association field teams underwent orientation programmes to 
conduct sandesh yatras in the villages. Sandesh yatras are meetings aimed at 
orienting villagers on scientific and safe building standards. Gram sabhas followed 
the sandesh yatras in each of the villages. SEWA village-based organisers mobilised 
all village members to participate in the gram sabhas. The participation of SEWA 
members in the gram sabha represents one front where SEWA interfaces with 
village government. Gram sabhas are traditional meetings of all adult members of 
the community. Participation in these meetings was important because it was in the 
gram sabha that the main issues were discussed including the following: 
" The entire work plan and methodology to be followed in the reconstruction plan; 
" The need for total involvement and integrated village planning; 
" The identification of possible aspects and areas for the re-use of debris; 
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9 The formulation of the village committee with at least 50% women and 
agreement on the representative basis of this committee; 
* The restoration of the heritage monuments and the preservation of the village 
heritage; 
9 The preparation by the whole village of the village plan to integrate housing 
reconstruction, natural resource management and livelihood. Here the village 
would also plan the revival of wastelands, development of fodder farms, reviving 
and maintaining water resources, village roads and community and 
demonstration centres; 
9 The preparation of the time plans for the different stages of implementation 
namely: the identification phase, removal of debris, assessment of water 
availability, identification of local masons and their rates, and the procurement of 
construction materials; 
* The finalisation of village plans, preparation of cost estimates and discussion of 
the type of facilitation needed to get these plans and cost estimates approved by 
the government as well as facilitation needed during the procurement of 
construction materials; 
* Selection of masons to be trained by the Mahila Housing Trust. 
Each district had a fully-fledged housing team composed of village-based 
individuals. The village team was charged with the responsibility of re-assessment of 
damage to specific buildings, identification of families to benefit from the 
reconstruction programme, monitoring the legal aspects involved in the construction 
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process, rendering assistance in the procurement of materials, supervision and the 
maintenance of various types of records. 
The facilitation provided by these housing teams was quite impressive. I interviewed 
members of one such team in one village in the Radhanpur area in Patan district. 
This area has 45 villages. The team had seven members and I was told that this was 
standard for every village. Supervised by the Housing Team Leader, the team was 
also involved in the selection of the types of materials to be used in the construction 
process to reduce the susceptibility of houses to earthquakes. On this particular 
occasion I had the opportunity of seeing some stock of materials that had, actually 
been rejected by the housing team. 
The team also monitored construction standards. Each team member was well versed 
with the technical aspects of construction, including the acceptable height of the 
house; type, quality, quantity and cost of materials; time needed to complete the 
housing unit with given amounts of labour; etc. The team also kept meticulous 
records of various activities. I inspected at least four types, namely a purchase 
register, a distribution register and a receipt book, and a stock register maintained by 
the Housing Team Leader. These registers contained detailed information including, 
for example, name and signature of recipient, quantity and type of materials 
delivered, where materials were purchased, registration of vehicle and name of driver 
delivering materials etc. The Housing Team Leader would then periodically 
consolidate these registers and submit them to the Mahila Housing Trust for auditing. 
In addition to these activities, the housing team initiated a cost-sharing programme in 
which house owners would pay 2,500 Rupees out of the 40,000 Rupees provided by 
SEWA as part of the housing reconstruction relief programme. The initiative was 
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taken in order to translate into practical action SEWA's philosophy of ownership and 
beneficiary participation. Village-level meetings were held to discuss the creation of 
a community fund with the money collected from this programme. A separate 
account for this purpose was created and maintained by the village team. The money 
would be used to fund future village development plans. At a village meeting in 
Patan district, in order to enable as many people as possible to find it easier to 
participate in this cost-sharing scheme, the village level meeting decided that 1000 
out of the agreed 2,500 Rupees could be paid as a labour input equivalent. 
I asked the village members if they were happy with this cost-sharing idea. They 
admitted that the amount involved was high relative to their financial standing but 
that they felt the programme made sense since contributing to the house 
reconstruction programme would increase their pride in the completed product. In 
addition to making them feel attached to their houses because of the contribution 
they had made, they could also look forward to initiating certain plans in the village 
that had stalled because of lack of funding. One woman in Chhanasara village 
commented: 'we are very proud of these new houses. I never dreamed of having a 
house like this but now my children and grandchildren will have a strong house. 
The high levels of participation made it easy to spot any malpractices as well as to 
assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the housing programme in reaching the 
targeted population. Full participation of the affected population in programme 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation ensured ownership and success of 
the programme. By contrast, in several of the villages I visited people were 
complaining with the government handling of its part of the house reconstruction 
scheme. There were several allegations to the effect that government officials 
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exercised favouritism in the allocation of funds. Controlling for the size of previous 
building and extent of damage, people felt that not only were high status individuals 
attended to more quickly but they were also given larger amounts of money 
compared to low status ones. While I was in the area visiting villages I came across a 
UNDP mission that was going around introducing supportive and monitoring 
activities in villages covered by the housing reconstruction programme. The mission 
specifically told me that SEWA-covered areas were excluded from this mission 
because no problems were being faced in these areas. 
SEWA took several initiatives to complement the efforts made by the communities. 
One was the provision of a two-month training in masonry and construction not only 
to women but also to men and the youth. Each affected district had 10 batches of 
training, with at least 20 people being trained in each batch. This training was vital in 
enabling the villagers to undertake the reconstruction of a large number of buildings 
including houses, panchayat buildings, schools and water-harvesting structures. In 
addition, in anticipation of a heavy demand for building materials, SEWA also 
conducted training sessions on the making of some building materials such as roof 
tiles and concrete blocks. 
The rehabilitation of earthquake survivors through livelihood security. 
As pointed out earlier, assessment surveys immediately following the earthquake 
revealed that people's greatest demand was for employment. in response, and based 
on its experience with the previous year's drought mitigation programme, SEWA 
launched an integrated programme involving several schemes discussed below. The 
general implementation strategy involved several stages. 
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The village-level micro planning stage involved field teams using participatory 
procedures, such as those discussed in the previous sections, in assessment, planning 
and implementation. The lead participants in the implementation process were the 
village panchayats, the Self-help Group, the producer groups and collectives, the 
village water committees, the village watershed committees, forestry campaign 
groups and dairy cooperatives. This broad-based participation ensured that the 
village-level micro planning integrated livelihoods, animal husbandry, water 
resources, fodder and forestry. 
At the district-level planning and implementation stage the district-level federations 
and associations that are hierarchically above the community organisations 
consolidated the village micro plans into district rehabilitation and rebuilding plans. 
The district-level organisations were: the Kutch Craft Association, a membership- 
based local organisation working in 64 villages and with a membership of about 
10,000; the Banaskantha DWCRA Association, a 35,000-member strong local 
organisation active in 110 villages in Patan district; and the Mahila and Balvikas 
Mandal, active in 32 villages and with a membership of 6,000. These district-level 
federations were the main field-level implementation agencies, receiving facilitation 
and support from SEWA. 
SEWA also mobilised technical inputs to support the grassroots organisations in the 
areas of. housing; production and marketing for livelihood programmes; research and 
documentation; disaster preparedness; health and child development; and 
management and administration. These inputs were provided through SEWA's 
support organisations: the SEWA Bank, a registered 150,000-member cooperative 
bank owned and managed by the shareholders, with a capital of about $8 million 
280 
provided financial management inputs as well as meeting some of the credit 
requirements; the Mahila Housing Trust, an autonomous registered public trust, 
through its team of qualified engineers and researchers in the field of housing and 
construction, provided inputs in design and monitoring in construction; the SEWA 
Academy, a training, research and documentation wing of SEWA, provided inputs in 
training of trainers, designing participatory planning methods, and in research and 
documentation of the programme process; the Disaster Mitigation Institute, a 
community-based disaster mitigation organisation aimed at institutionalising local 
practices and knowledge in mitigation, management, preparedness and reduction of 
disasters, provided technical inputs in methods for preparing village micro plans, 
district plans, and designing the required training materials; The SEWA-AMA 
Centre, created primarily to provide management inputs and aid capacity building in 
CBOs, fulfilled this purpose. There were also other organisations ihat were consulted 
to provide various amounts and types of inputs. As a result of this institutional 
arrangement and implementation strategy, which involved the participation of 
grassroots communities, NGOs and CBOs the following further programmes were 
implemented: 
The craft workprogranune. 
Under this scheme 15,000 artisans in the three affected districts were targeted as 
follows: 7,700 in Kutch; 6,800 in Patan; and 500 in Surendranagar. Each family was 
provided with a craft packet1bag containing raw materials for one week's work. At 
the end of each week the spearhead teams collected the finished products and 
provided the families with a new consignment of raw materials. Payment was made 
upon collection in cash or kind, the components of which included food grains or 
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clothes or both depending on family needs. The artisan families were encouraged to 
initially produce items in line with local demand since many people had lost their 
clothes and belongings. For the non-artisans, SEWA initiated a training scheme in 
masonry and construction techniques. In collaboration with village structures, men 
and women, including boys and girls, were identified from each village and trained 
by a technical team of engineers. The trainees were provided with some cash and 
food grains to compensate for the time lost in searching for food. These schemes 
went on for five months. 
The gokul gram-link-age with ongoing self-employment programme. 
The government of Gujarat launched a programme of self-employment for families 
below the poverty line. This programme involved the provision of inputs such as 
credit, tools, technical training and market linkages based on a detailed needs 
assessment. Under this programme every village formed a representative Village 
Implementation Committee to facilitate its implementation. 
SEWA complemented this programme by conducting its own needs assessment of 
28,000 families and providing material packages to these families to start various 
livelihood activities. SEWA also strengthened the Village Implementation 
Committees by providing them with training in planning and disaster management 
and preparedness. In addition, SEWA planned district-wide federations of the 
Village Implementation Committees to strengthen the viability and sustainability of 
the programme in the long ten-n. Known as gokul gram, these federations would play 
an active role in disaster preparedness and mitigation, whether such disasters came in 
the form of drought, earthquakes or cyclones. These federations would effectively 
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become CBOs with which the government and NGOs could work in liaison and co- 
ordination in disaster relief programmes. 
Water Regeneration. 
Water security became one of the paramount community needs, given that many 
areas in the state of Gujarat were facing a drought for three consecutive years. 
Therefore, it was planned that part of the rehabilitation and rebuilding of livelihood 
security should include the construction of rainwater harvesting structures. This 
scheme involved a large-scale programme of* deepening and construction of village 
ponds for rainwater harvesting; construction of rainwater harvesting structures at the 
village level as well as at the household level; and village watershed development. 
Apart from improving the water resource base this scheme would also provide an 
important source of employment to communities because of the labour-intensive 
nature of the activities involved. 
Fodder Security. 
In this scheme SEWA planned to link up with the government fodder provision 
programme, which was part of drought relief. The scheme included plans to procure 
fodder locally or if necessary from other states. The latter would involve working out 
procedures for obtaining inter-state permits for the movement of fodder and 
transportation procedures. For the long term, village-wide fodder farms were 
planned. 
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Natural resource management campaign. 
A campaign was initiated to revive and improve the conservation of natural resources 
including land, water, forest and fodder. Village leaders and spearhead teams were 
strengthened to launch this campaign. Gram sabhas were conducted where the entire 
village was sensitised to the importance of village planning and the need for reviving 
village natural resources. This was followed by the mobilisation of the entire village 
to become involved in the campaign. Village committees were formed for any 
necessary follow-up activities: 'the entire earthquake rehabilitation (programme) will 
be turned into a village development programme exercise' (SEWA no dated. 4) 
Nutrition. 
The nutrition programme was introduced to militate against the expected decline in 
people's nutritional status that usually follows a disaster. The earthquake disaster 
resulted in losses of food stocks in many households. A nutrition programme was 
commenced to ensure that the required daily calorie and protein requirements, 
especially in women and children who tend to be more adversely affected, were 
maintained. The nutrition programme involved the following activities: 
Provision of low-cost mobile rations managed by the village women; 
Provision at child-care centres of foods of high nutritious content to infants, 
young children and pregnant and lactating mothers; 
Screening of anaernia and other nutritional deficiency diseases, such as night 
blindness, as well as the provision of vitamin A, iron and folic acid supplements; 
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* Provision in part of food-payments of women's earnings through craftwork, salt 
production and training stipends. The shakti packet programme was also 
expanded. The shakti packet is an on-going programme that involves the 
provision of daily necessities to women who work in the desert areas where there 
are no grocery stores. It is run by one of the women who are provided with 
transport and groceries by SEWA at a subsidised rate; 
9 Provision of nutrition education and the promotion of local foods and feeding 
practices that were in line with the objectives of the nutrition programme. 
Health care. 
This programme involved the promotion and monitoring of the health status of the 
people in the affected areas. Two of the districts (Surendranagar and Patan) already 
had spearhead teams engaged in health promotion and facilitating the 
implementation of health activities. In these districts, the programme concentrated on 
the expansion of the existing activities while in the one district without a health 
spearhead team (Kutch), new activities were initiated. The specific activities 
conducted included the following: 
* Strengthening and building up of spearhead teams and the so called 'barefoot 
doctors', including the provision to forty women of training in primary health 
care; 
9 Provision of primary health care and health education to the community by the 
spearhead teams; 
* Immunisation of all children and pregnant women; 
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Growth and health monitoring of children as well as monitoring the health and 
weight of pregnant women; 
Identification of village midwives (dais) and providing them with upgraded 
training, including providing and replenishing them with safe delivery kits; 
Strengthening of linkages with government health services to facilitate referrals 
and immunisations. 
Savings and Insurance Services. 
As regards the insurance programme, SEWA initiated the insuring of up to 15,000 
women in the affected districts against risks related to health, accidents, assets and 
even death. Such insurance would be extended to husbands for those women wishing 
to go for this option. The insurance scheme was operated through developing and 
strengthening spearhead teams in all the affected districts to promote insurance 
services as well as serving as a link between the women and the SEWA Insurance 
Scheme. The spearhead teams also helped in imparting knowledge regarding claim 
applications and procedures. In addition, SEWA provided short training programmes 
in the villages to explain the concept of insurance. 
Following the relief programme there was a surge of membership in certain activity 
groups, including insurance. Savings groups and Insurance groups almost doubled in 
villages where they were already existent while new ones mushroomed where there 
were none. For example, immediately following the earthquake, 435 new savings 
groups mushroomed with a total membership of 9,190 and total savings amounting to 
some 565,460 Rupees. Similarly, 20,000 new members joined the insurance 
programme. Within two weeks of the disaster SEWA was already looking into 2,500 
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claims relating to damage and loss (mostly related to damaged houses). In Bhuj, 
where there were no insurance activities prior to the earthquake, 8,000 new members 
registered. 
The benefits of belonging to such groups became apparent in efforts to deal with the 
effects of the disaster. Women who belonged to savings and insurance groups were 
able to recover more quickly than those who did not. Some were able to draw from 
their savings to meet the most pressing of needs that were not met by the relief 
programme. Others were able to claim damages from their insurance schemes. Still 
others who belonged to both savings and insurance groups were able to utilise both 
sources for the recovery process. Those who had neither saving nor insurance cover 
had to make do with the relief materials provided or borrow from official 
moneylenders for up to 10% interest compared to only 2% for SEWA members. 
One woman from Surendrenagar district stated: 'It wasjust a matter of 2 minutes. We 
lost an entire life's savings - all of our assets. There is no support system on which 
we canfall back Wefeel very vulnerable'. 
Another woman from the same village declared: 'Now I realise the importance of 
savings. I had a savings account of my own - at least I had some security and 
support'. 
Clearly, part of the long-term consequences of SEWA's involvement in disaster 
relief is the further and rapid expansion of the organisation: 
'SEWA's experience has shown time and again that disasters can be seen as 
an opportunity for social mobilisation and the empowerment of women and 
communities. More women become aware of their multiple vulnerabilities as 
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individuals and come to recognise the benefits of the solidarity and strength 
of the union. 7berefore, while SEWA's responsibility is to its members, relief 
is extended to all affected poor and self-employed women and their families 
who are, after all, potential members' (Polzer, 1998: 14). 
One implication of this organisational expansion is that participation becomes more 
and more broad-based as entire communities become re-organised through the 
organisation's structural framework. Thus, properly managed disasters can, 
ironically. provide an opportunity for strengthening forms of community planning 
that bring into the mainstream the neglected and vulnerable members of the 
community. 
Capacity building and participation: The case of Puriben. 
Part of SEWA's success in organising communities for participation lies in the 
emphasis placed on capacity building. Training and social mobilisation are core 
activities in daily operations. The demand-based nature of its operational framework 
encourages decision-making to occur at the very grassroots through the various 
leaders, organisers and committees. The story of Puriben provides an example of 
how SEWA has managed to empower women to take control of their own lives in 
normal circumstances as well as in times of disasters. 
I encountered Puriben in Vauva village in Patan district. Ae word Ben or Behn 
means sister in Gujarat. Puriben thus means sister Puri. Puriben is a married 
woman with three sons. Like many rural women she is illiterate. She has been a 
member of SEIVA for thirteen years, joining as a craft worker and becoming 
organiser two years after joining the organisation. She was the first SEWA member 
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in Vauva village. Soon after her joining, one other woman joined. Her influence as 
an organiser has been such that today, every woman in the village is a member. 
Puriben's success story did not, however, come easy. I was told that Gujarat society 
is an extremely male-dominated one. Perhaps a good indication of male domination 
is the fact that upon marriage a woman must not only pay dowry (groom wealth' as 
opposed to the more familiar bride wealth) to the groom's family but she must also 
move to her husband's village. A woman's place is strictly in the kitchen, or, if not 
cooking, generally around the home. Some men I talked to informally told me that in 
urban areas unmarried girls even in their twenties are not allowed to be away from 
home on their own beyondfive o'clock in the evening. Strict curfews in both rural 
and urban areas exist, barring womenfi-om going beyond certain distances. 
Against this back-ground, becoming a SETVA craft worker posed obvious immediate 
problems. Firstly, it meant moving out of the kitchen, her culturally legitimate place. 
Secondly, it meant travelling outside the village to the city to procure materials, sell 
products and sometimes attend training sessions at SEWA offices. 7he village would 
have none of this 'nonsense'. Opposition came from all fronts: her husband, her 
mother in-law and the community at large. But Puriben would not be deterred. She 
began her work- atfirst working around the home and avoiding travelling outside the 
village. But the time bomb was ticking. Soon SEWA invited her to attend a training 
workshop in Delhi. Not only would she be a long wayfirom home, but she would also 
be gone for several days! no would cook for the family? Mo would draw water, 
wash dishes, and look after the children? She had gone too far. Her farewell 
message, representing the sentiments in the community at large, came from her 
mother in-law, apparently the staunchest defender of tradition: 'you have insulted 
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our society. You go to Delhi, but don't come back. " Incredibly, Puriben leftfor Delhi, 
risking being ostracised upon her return. 
But her determination was about to pay off thanks, ironically, to a prolonged drought 
that hit the entire state of Gujarat. 77ze traditional fanning role of men became 
redundant. Men found themselves unable to do anything that could bring income and 
food into theirfamilies. Many poorfamilies suffered severe hunger. Puriben'sfamily 
could have been among them but income from craft production militated against the 
famine. In fact her family began to be seen as better off. Her husband became the 
first convert. Full support was declaredfor his wife, notjust morally but physically 
too. Not only did he encourage his wife, but also he went straight into the kitchen, an 
abominable place for men. He cookedfor the family, took care of the children and 
carried out the array of domestic chores. I would have gone back certain that it was 
all a good story designed specifically to impress me had it not been that mid-way 
through my interview, Puriben's husband emergedfrom the kitchen, teapot in hand, 
Assisted by his son, they served us tea as I talked to his wife and a group of about 
fifteen women craft workers from four villages. He made it clear to me that tea was 
not the only thing he had learned to cook but the entire range of traditional dishes 
and, if I could stay till suppertime, he would teach me how. I hadn't the slightest 
impression that he wasJoking. 
Vie standard of life of Puriben's family compared to others performed miracles. 
Converts camefrom bothfar and near. Within her village much of the resentment She 
had suffered gave way to admiration. Several men began to encourage their wives to 
start craft production, supporting them in ways similar to Puriben's husband, trying 
to make Puribens of them. 
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But old habits die hard A big order for crafts brought the women into a sharp 
conflict with community elders. 77ze order had a strict but very short deadline. 
Meeting it meant working non-stop and travelling intensively in the surrounding 
areas to procure materials. 77ds tight-schedule conflicted with the regular traditional 
cooking of community food 77ze men protested A few might be willing to help their 
wives in their households but cooking community food went beyond acceptable 
bounds, as was, the en masse absence of women from the village. From the village 
leadership a directive went out that women be allowed to work on the order only 
afterfulfilling their duty of cooking communityfood and a 10,000 Rupee fine was 
imposed on any woman found outside her village. However, it was impossible for the 
women to meet the order if they had to do the cooking as well, and without travelling 
out of their villages. 
The women were not about to be intimidated Led by Puriben they employed a new, 
andpowerful weapon: collective bargaining. Women from 24 villages mobilised and 
with a unitedfront made it known to the village leadership thatpreventing themfrom 
meeting this big order would only be counterproductive since they were not going to 
listen. 77ze power of this united front was such that the village leadership was left 
with no option but to give the women an unconditional go ahead. 
Such has been the influence of Puriben. From the comments and attitude of the 
villagers, there was no doubting that Puriben has become a phenomenon, an enigma, 
and a living legend 77zis woman who can neither read nor write has since attended 
international conferences in such far away and developed countries as Australia and 
the United States, where her story has mesmerised thousands. She has become the 
Pride of the village and its claim to fame. I was told that it is an honourfor one to be 
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able to say that 'Puriben comes from my village'. Having served us with tea, her 
husband sat watching me as I interviewed her. There was no hiding the pride, 
contentment and importance he was feeling. 14111agers say that they couldn't have 
fathomed that not just one of their own, but an illiterate woman wouldfly to such 
countries, an experience which almost all of them do not even dream about. 
Puriben says that the greatest satisfaction and pride from her struggle has been the 
ability to assert her individuality and attain her true identity. To be addressed or 
known as Puriben represents the realisation of these goals. Before that her 
individuality and identity were submerged beneath that of someone else. She was 
known and addressed only as somebody's wife or somebody's daughter. Now people 
know herfor who she "ally is: Puriben. 
The example of village leadership in collective action captured in the story of 
Puriben was not an isolated incident. Previously, a group of 100 women from 
Puriben's village had held a rally at the Gujarat Water Supply and demanded water 
from a pipeline the villagers knew passed near by. The force of 100 voices 
influenced the local legislative assembly to agree to this demand. 
There were other examples of women taking the initiative to address some of the 
problems arising from the earthquake disaster. Among such examples was the 
jeevanshala. This was a school started by self-employed women in six villages in the 
worst affected area of Santalpur. Every afternoon, the women came together and got 
some lessons. The teacher was one of the village women who was literate and had 
had an opportunity to be trained by SEWA. The women said that the idea of the 
school was one way of spending their lives meaningfully and coming out of the grief 
caused by the earthquake. 
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In addition the women also started a debris-clearing activity. The activity involved 
retrieving reusable materials such as roof tiles, wood, bricks and piling them 
separately from materials requiring disposal. At the village meetings, the village 
community decided on where to deposit the debris. Families brought in their 
equipment, such as bullock carts, camel carts and tractors to transport the debris to 
the designated sites. 
Conclusion 
The extent to which the affected population participated in the relief programme that 
followed the earthquake disaster appears to be clearly above that witnessed and 
reported in many emergency situations. Through a gradual process, SEWA has 
succeeded in building up grassroots structures and capacities that are actively 
involved in efforts to improve personal and community life. An integrated approach 
allows people to participate in a range of activities designed to address various needs. 
Affected people themselves determine their own needs through a demand-based 
mode of operation. This operational framework makes full use of local knowledge 
and culture and integrates it with modem scientific knowledge in dealing with 
problems. 
The case of SEWA is also further evidence of what participation can achieve in both 
development and disaster relief. It can be asserted that SEWA's response to the 
earthquake disaster was swift as it was efficient and effective in addressing the real 
needs of the affected population. Being a member-based organisation, it is in fact 
more accurate to say that the affected population itself, with material support from 
outside, gave a swift and effective response to the alleviation of its own suffering. It 
is true that the affected population was provided with relief materials from external 
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sources, but the determination of how, when and who as regards their use was done 
by the recipients. In addition, the communities initiated other actions that were not 
necessarily dependent on external help. Such activities included the treatment of 
psychosocial trauma, which, conducted by community members in a culturally 
appropriate way, was more effective than is usually the case in emergency situations. 
The case of SEWA also reveals that the participation of affected people in alleviating 
their own suffering is a powerful capacity enhancing element. The capacities 
developed and enhanced limit the need for external intervention in programme 
implementation only to very special circumstances. 
Rose notes SEWA's success in mainstrearaing women when she writes that: 
'I find myself continually impressed not only by what SEWA has 
accomplished in its 20 years of existence, but also by the magnitude of what 
it takes on. Based in Ahmedabad, the largest city of India's Western state of 
Gujarat, and working under a name which translates as "service", SEWA 
successfully integrates a complex myriad of lives, occupations and issues into 
one union' (Rose, 1992: 16). 
She also writes that: 
'Now as editor of a US-based journal for women on the economy, I am a 
happy (but not surprised) witness to the value of SEWA's model in 
communities and countries at all stages of development - women from 
Africa, the US, Thailand, Mexico, Poland and others - all places where the 
rapidly changing economy has left women with a vested interest in 
developing new and equitable solutions' (p. 10- 11). 
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The obvious important issue is the question of whether the SEWA model is 
replicable elsewhere. SEWA's leaders believe it is, not in terms of its specific 
features, historical development and operational environment, but in terms of its 
basic philosophy and principles. As shown above, its value is already becoming 
apparent in countries with diverse socio-economic characteristics. SEWA's leaders 
realise that there is no simple formula for replicating the model. However, what they 
believe is replicable is that 'people anywhere can organise, plan, pressure, and act 
together' (Rose, 1992: 270). 
It is true that SEWA's origins lie in charismatic leadership. But it is also probably 
true that people with leadership qualities, though not as charismatic as SEWA's 
founder, exist in all poor countries. The key issue appears to be the extent to which 
aid agencies can support potential leaders to develop structures for accountability of 
resources and for ensuring that the poor are brought into the mainstream. Again, 
while it is true that the State government of Gujarat, although not pro-active, has 
been relatively receptive and tolerant to SEWA's suggestions and initiatives, this has 
only come under tactful lobbying and the pressure generated by the power of the 
women's union. Thus, unionising, which, as the SEWA case has shown, need not 
follow the conventional models, can become a powerful tool through which the poor 
can influence policy in the direction of their realities. 
It is also true to say that the socio-economic conditions that exist in India have been 
important to the development of SEWA. In Gujarat, there are traditions of world- 
famous craft production non-existent in many poor communities. Owing to the 
pressures generated by SEWA, the informal economic sector, which is relatively 
large, is recognised and supported. This is in contrast to many developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, where the informal sector, though significantly large, is 
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generally left either unrecognised, or actively persecuted by the government. This 
means that, compared to many developing countries, India provides a relatively 
favourable market for goods produced in the informal economic sector, and thus a 
good basis for organisation for informal sector workers. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, studies have shown that organisations for the poor are likely to take root if 
organised around some economic activity. 
Nevertheless, while certainly different in nature, many types of informal economic 
opportunities exist in many developing countries that can form a basis for 
unionisation. The important feature about SEWA is that it brings together a myriad 
of informal sector activities into one large union to generate power that can then be 
harnessed to draw attention to the needs of specific groups. This is a feature that 
could be utilised in many varied socio-economic as well as political environments. 
Some of SEWA's activities are in fact neither directly economic in nature nor unique 
to Indian tradition. For example, childcare centres, which are in fact more associated 
with western culture, have been adapted to the traditional way of life. Such centres 
attain economic importance only because they allow women more time to engage in 
economic activities. In many developing countries childcare continues to be an 
important bottleneck for women's involvement in economic activities. In this 
respect, childcare centres could become an important avenue to establishing viable 
economic activities. T'herefore, looking at community development in an integrated 
way (as done by SEWA) can provide a way forward for particular communities to 
come up with a combination of undertakings that are likely to lead to longer lasting 
organisation of the SEWA model. 
The key issue, as demonstrated in this chapter, is that any organisation must learn to 
listen and appreciate the demands of women, having provided a climate and 
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opportunity for women to articulate their views in the first place. The facilitating 
organisation should then commit itself not to a patron-oriented management of the 
newly organising women, but get the women to enhance their capacities through 
participatory training and education. Providing a climate that makes women feel free 
to articulate their concerns has helped to increase confidence and commitment to the 
organisation. Personal commitment is also created through members' involvement in 
all SEWA's campaigns and all processes that affect their lives. In addition, part of 
SEWA's capacity building strategy involves educating its members about the lives of 
other self-employed women and creating an understanding and acceptance of women 
from different castes and religions (Polzer, 1998: 41). 
SEWA women talk of their organisation as their mother, a place of warmth and 
safety, where women feel welcome, relaxed and free. Part of the reason for this 
feeling appears to be the fact that much of SEWA's operational process is informal. 
Bureaucracy is almost non-existent. Any SEWA member regardless of their social 
standing can approach any member of staff or the executive when the need arises 
without having to make an appointment. Interactions between staffs and members are 
very informal, relaxed and cordial, which encourages open communication. This 
aspect of the organisation has played a key role in attracting more and more poor 
women, many of whom are illiterate and have low social standing in society. 
Personal commitment is also generated by SEWA's emphasis on solidarity and 
participation. While it is true that some of SEWA's key personnel such as the 
organisers are paid, it appears that pay is not the sole motivation for the high degrees 
of personal commitment and dedication observed. Rose (1992) observes that some 
workers in fact complained about salary levels but that SEWA's reputation for being 
an interesting place to work, as well as SEWA's patience in waiting for the right 
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individuals to take up certain jobs, have helped to build up a strong team of 
professional and non-professional managers. During disasters the personal 
commitment of SEWA workers is demonstrated not only in terms of long hours spent 
in relief work but also financial contributions. Every SEWA worker contributes at 
least a day's wage to the relief efforts. 
Training and education programmes enable SEWA's members to build up capacities 
and become confident to make decisions in everyday life. SEWA has strengthened its 
education and training programme by linking itself to locally based technical support 
organisations with various kinds of expertise. Such organisations provide technical 
training to SEWA members when demand arises. In addition, SEWA has developed 
its own structures that take on training and education functions. As Rose (1992: 274) 
observed: 
'Training is an integral part of organising women, formalising their skills, and 
involving them in shaping their occupations, incomes, and social policies. 
SEWA conducts standardised training for a broad section of women, and also 
specific training programmes for specialised skills. ' 
One indication of SEWA's success at capacity building is the mushrooming of semi- 
autonomous, production-based organisations such as the Kutch Craft Association and 
the Banascraft Association. Its success also results from linkages with other locally 
based organisations with different expertise. During the earthquake relief 
programme, SEWA continued to draw on such linkages to address some of the 
training and education needs of its members. For example, the Mahila Housing Trust 
provided training in housing re-construction, the SEWA Academy provided training 
for trainers and the Disaster Mitigation Institute was called upon to provide inputs in 
methods of village micro-planning as well as in training materials design. 
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The SEWA model brings into focus how, through this process, women can take 
centre stage in both development and relief, in contrast to their traditional positions 
of neglect and disadvantage. In addition, the model also appears to offer possibilities 
for re-structuring gender relations within communities so that both men and women 
become partners in meeting personal and collective needs both in normal times and 
in times of disaster. Rose (1992: 271-273) writes: 
'SEWA's work at changing women's work and living conditions owes to its 
grassroots, Indian soil origin, and women's ability to translate their values 
into working systems. Indian traditions are deeply imbedded in women, and 
SEWA starts from where women are: from their strengths, their needs, and 
their weaknesses... SEWA women... resist the process of change that 
marginalizes and downgrades the people who are part of the traditional 
system... (At SEWA) a woman learns to stand up, say her name out loud, 
address a group, and recognise her strength, both individually and 
collectively as a group'. 
Perhaps because it draws its membership from among women who see themselves as 
having a common base in terms of their socio-economic needs and status, SEWA 
also helps to forge a strong social cohesion among women who come from diverse 
backgrounds. One notable example is the way in which SEWA manages to get the 
majority Hindu women to work in partnership with their Muslim minority 
counterparts. In the various villages I visited the people I interviewed claimed that 
there was no discrimination between the too religious sects. I came across at least 
one Muslim organiser who verified this claim. Rose (1992), who spent a year and a 
half working with SEWA, seems to have made a similar observation when she states 
that: 
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'The spirit and diversity of SEWA would presently be hard to come by 
anywhere else, though this is what its members are working on promoting 
across India. Tribal Hindu, Harijan, migrant, and Muslim women; tattooed 
Vaghari women, women in purdah; sinewed (sic) muscular smiths; sun- 
darkened cart-pullers and agricultural labourers; young nimble girl bidi 
rollers with their mothers and grandmothers, progressively more thin and bent 
from years of sitting over their rolling work; street-wise and bawdy vendors 
alongside of women emerging from home-bound communities; all in 
different dress; speaking different languages and dialects; practicing different 
trades - all are coming together to generate strength. It is quite an amazing 
convergence to witness' (p. 20). 
Indeed other examples from Rose's account show that SEWA has in fact played a 
key role not only in mediating a number of Hindu-Moslem conflicts, but also in 
actively fighting against the discrimination and promoting the legal rights of Muslim 
women in government policy and other social processes. 
In so far as much of SEWA's action during disasters comprises the expansion of 
existing development programmes, this case study contributes towards existing 
efforts to understand the degree of convergence that exists between relief and 
development in general at the practical level. From a participation point of view, the 
linkages between development and relief appear to be even closer than some might 
suggest. Participation, already well instituted in ongoing programmes, only got 
strengthened during the disaster as more and more affected people came forward to 
join the existing structures. 
Given that many agencies that implement disaster relief programmes are also 
involved in development, the message coming out of this study, and indeed from 
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many other research findings, is that they need to re-think their traditional 
implementation strategies. Perhaps less effort should be made at direct 
implementation but more effort should be geared instead towards supporting 
organisations that can demonstrate intimate links with target communities. Indeed, 
there may well be a need for aid agencies to support the very development of such 
organisations. If there are no guarantees that specific organisations will foster the 
participation and well-being of intended populations, more efforts should be 
designed to identifying processes that can ensure such guarantees, other than to 
decide unilaterally that the solution therefore lies outside the affected communities. 
As research continues to demonstrate, direct implementation by aid agencies no 
longer holds much promise to addressing the problem of limited levels of 
participation in developing countries, be it in development or disaster relief 
However, this does not suggest that participation cannot take place in disasters where 
there are no established organisations of the SEWA type. As I have shown in the 
cases of both Malawi and Sudan, even if the populations were displaced, the social 
structure remained relatively intact. Aid agencies must therefore pay serious attention 
to ways in which they can incorporate existing social organisation in their 
programming. In addition, depending on the nature of the disaster, the case of SEWA 
has demonstrated that not only is it possible to carry out education and training, i. e. 
capacity building, during relief programmes, but disaster can in fact also provide an 
opportunity for imparting new forms of technical knowledge as well as new 
opportunities for community organisation and solidarity. As Polzer observes: 
'Ironically, crises... serve to strengthen SEWA as an organisation. 
Organisers, leaders and members are brought together in solidarity, working 
tirelessly day and night to help their sisters. Through the constant interaction 
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of planning and action as well as through sharing the emotional strain of 
witnessing such great suffering, deep personal ties are created within SEWA. 
Participating in the relief work was a major learning experience for many of 
the younger organisers from Ahmedabad, who were exposed to SEWA's 
rural operations for the first time. Communication channels are developed, 
and procedures, such as carrying out surveys or creating an action plan under 
time pressure, are practiced... Connections to other organisations are also 
solidified... The intense correspondence with individual government officials 
concerning relief co-ordination, compensation, etc. can lead to useful contacts 
for future work' (Polzer, 1998: 41-42). 
It is evident, then, that despite the historical specificity of some of the processes that 
led to the creation of SEWA, there are many aspects in the organisation's evolution 
that can offer valuable lessons in establishing an organisation that responds directly 
to the needs of poor people in general, and poor women in particular. The same 
principles discussed above could be used as a framework within which to support 
potential leaders in establishing new organisations or in streamlining existing 
organisations to make them fora for providing a voice for the poor and according 
them with an opportunity to influence the direction of their lives within the 
constraints and opportunities offered in their community, region and nation and 
beyond. 
302 
Chapter Seven. Comparison and Evaluation. 
Introduction 
In the foregoing three chapters, I have presented three case studies of participation of 
the affected population in disaster relief programmes. The contexts for these three 
studies are different, yet there are also many similarities with regard to the general 
features of disaster relief. In this chapter, I attempt to draw out comparisons and 
evaluate these case studies in terms of their contribution to the understanding of the 
issue of participation. 
Within the field of disaster relief and humanitarian aid, a primary distinction is made 
between complex emergencies and natural disasters. Complex emergencies are 
usually considered to be those that involve internal political and usually military 
conflict. Such conflicts may lead to displacement of populations internally or 
externally or may result in famine, as people are not able to carry out usual 
livelihood activities. Natural disasters are those generally resulting from the forces of 
nature such as cyclones, floods, earthquakes, drought etc. Natural disasters can be 
divided roughly into quick onset, like an earthquake and slow onset, like drought. 
The distinction between complex and natural disasters is useful because factors that 
affect issues of access, the distribution of relief materials and participation may 
sometimes crucially depend on the extent to which political factors impinge on the 
relief process. The case of famine in south Sudan (Chapter Four) is an example of a 
complex disaster or, as is more commonly known, complex emergency while the 
cases of floods in Malawi (Chapter Five) and earthquake in Gujarat, India (Chapter 
Six) are examples of natural disasters, both of which are quick on-set. 
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The south Sudan relief programme, typical of complex emergencies, was dominated 
by big international NGOs as well as UN agencies. In addition, it was managed 
under the UN negotiated access programme of Operation Lifeline Sudan containing 
agreements and ground rules for agencies that accepted to work under the 
programme. International NGOs played an almost exclusive leading role in 
designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the relief process. This situation 
was somewhat similar to the Malawi flood relief programme, where the World Food 
Programme, with inputs from the government and NGOs, dominated the relief 
process. By contrast, a locally based women's trade union, (SEWA) using 
community-based structures, and with resources from the government and 
international and local aid agencies, dominated the earthquake relief process in the 
state of Gujarat, India. 
In India, SEWA had become involved in poverty alleviation and sustainable 
livelihood activities, collaborating with, as well as lobbying, government to change 
policies in favour of poor women. For the four years preceding the time of the study, 
SEWA had become involved in disaster relief as various disasters began to affect its 
members. The situation in south Sudan was more varied than in India. There, some 
agencies like Oxfam and SCF had a long history of implementing both development 
and relief programmes while others went in specifically in response to the 1998 
famine relief. In the absence of a legitimate government there were equally varied 
attitudes among agencies towards the local 'de facto' authorities. The variations in 
attitude towards the local authorities inevitably affected issues of access, security and 
participation. In Malawi, the NGOs and government agencies had been involved with 
development issues at community level but there was an apparent lack of experience 
with disaster relief. A comparison and evaluation of the three cases helps to shed 
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more light on not only the role of participation but also factors that facilitated the 
process. 
The role of participation In assessment and Identification of 
'beneficiaries'. 
In general, assessing the extent of damage and particularly identifying the people 
who need to be assisted appear to be the most problematic stages of disaster relief. At 
one level, this difficulty is tied to the need for aid agencies to limit beneficiary 
numbers in line with resources at their disposal. At another, a feeling of mistrust 
between local authorities and aid agencies compounds the problem. In natural 
disasters, like in the case of Malawi, aid agencies are usually worried about inflated 
numbers of people in need, whether this is related to a lack of capacity, local politics, 
or corruption. In complex emergencies, as in the case of south Sudan, the concern 
may be with how to ensure that the conflict is not fuelled through relief aid reaching 
combatants. At a sociological and anthropological level, assessment of need may be 
hampered by the inability of aid agencies accurately to understand vulnerability in 
relation to the totality of social processes within a given community, resulting in 
narrowly conceived definitions of beneficiaries. Difficulties in assessing damage and 
identifying people in need of assistance are a serious setback to any relief effort 
because they are directly linked to efficiency and effectiveness issues. Unless 
beneficiaries have been accurately identified, distribution of relief material cannot be 
appropriate. 
One of the hypotheses underlying this thesis is that a relief programme that involves 
a high degree of the affected population within its management framework is more 
likely to experience minimal problems with understanding vulnerability and, 
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consequently, with determining who needs to be assisted. 'Mis hypothesis appears to 
be supported in a comparison of how beneficiaries were identified in the three case 
studies. 
In Malawi, where there was almost no participation of affected people at the 
grassroots in the planning and implementation of the relief programme, identifying 
people in need of assistance was most problematic. That the identification process 
was complicated was clear from the fact that the process itself involved at least three 
stages separated by considerable time-gaps. 
The first phase of the identification took place two days following the floods. This 
stage consisted of registration, by the office of the District Commissioner, of flood 
victims who had fled for refuge in various centres; such as school blocks, church 
buildings and community centres. This was the most undisputed part of the 
identification exercise as it was basically through self-presentation. However, this 
stage did not present the opportunity for comprehensive determination of affected 
numbers for several reasons. To begin with, this identification procedure did not take 
into account many who had taken refuge in friends' or relatives' accommodation. 
Secondly, it failed to capture those who did not evacuate their houses because they 
were still standing but who were, nevertheless, in need of assistance because they 
had lost most of their food stocks in the floods. In addition, there were some whose 
houses were not damaged by the floods but whose field crops were washed away. So 
even though preliminary food distribution began almost immediately, the distribution 
was extremely limited in coverage. Furthermore, the non-food requirements of most 
of the flood victims were unmet at this stage, for example, health and sanitation 
provisions as well as household utensils. 
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In the second stage of the identification process, carried out within three weeks of the 
floods, the government attempted to come up with a more comprehensive and 
extensive plan. Tbrough the office of the District Commissioner and with help from 
the offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, government agents used known data on 
family size and areas covered by the floods to assess the extent of damage and the 
number of people in need of relief assistance. This assessment also included numbers 
of Mozambicans who had displaced into Malawi from across the border. Ile 
government's assessment defined as affected all households who had lost either a 
home or crops in the field. The third and final stage, coming approximately two 
months after the floods, emanated from the international community's dissatisfaction 
with the government's assessment and culminated in defining as needing assistance 
only those whose houses had collapsed. This narrow definition showed a limited 
understanding of vulnerability by the international community. 
Evidently missing in the Malawi case was any attempt to consult with local 
structures of power and representation such as traditional leaders, grassroots 
development committees (e. g. school committees, health committees, water 
committees etc), all of which have various knowledge about people in their 
communities as well as knowledge regarding poverty and social equity. Furthermore, 
these community-based structures have various capabilities for community 
mobilisation that would have proved useful in determining the extent of need. 
One principal problem in the Malawi case was the lack of agreement on vulnerable 
individuals. International donors defined it in terms of loss of dwellings. Government 
and communities defined it in terms of loss of both dwelling units and crops still 
growing in the field. The latter view took into account the fact that the harvest of 
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crops was just weeks away when the floods came. Food security household surveys 
had shown that the majority of rural households run out of food several months 
before the next harvest. This finding had led to numerous studies into the survival or 
coping strategies of the poor that enable them to make it to the next harvest when 
food ran out. In view of this knowledge, donor insistence on assisting only those who 
lost dwelling units, and assuming that those whose dwellings were still intact had 
food, did not correspond to reality. It is possible that this view could have resulted 
from a lack of understanding but it appeared strongly that the main reason was the 
need to bring down numbers to match the amount of resources the donors were 
prepared to commit to the relief effort. This view seemed to be supported by the fact 
that donors had to slash the number of beneficiaries identified through an inter- 
agency verification exercise, which they (the donors) had themselves commissioned. 
It seems important therefore for donors and aid agencies to provide information 
regarding the amount of resources at their disposal to other parties in the relief 
process, including local authorities and recipients. Doing this might enable 
communities to come up with alternative ideas on how to distribute scarce resources. 
Knowledge of the quantity of material supplies might also help to involve 
communities in monitoring the effectiveness of the distribution process. 
The problem of the understanding of vulnerability also surfaced in the south Sudan 
case. To begin with, aid agencies failed to recognise the high degree of 
egalitarianism that already existed in Dinka society. Sharing of resources with 
vulnerable individuals, instituted within an intricate network of kinship relations, 
guarded against any severe inequalities within the society. The local definition of 
vulnerability itself did not correspond to conventional views. The result was that 
food received from aid agencies underwent a redistribution process to reflect local 
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views of vulnerability and fairness. Many agencies were uncomfortable with this 
system. It put them in no position to know just how fair and egalitarian the system 
was in order to be assured that the most vulnerable would be reached. Thus, one 
agency withheld a proportion of the total amount of materials to be distributed. After 
the first distribution through the local structure, agency staff carried out secondary 
distributions based on their own views and assessment of vulnerability. It was clear 
therefore that in using local social systems for participation, agencies must realise 
that they may lose a good measure of control over parts of the relief process. This 
means that aid agencies must develop trust in the local social systems they are 
dealing with. Acquiring this trust implies forging ever-closer links with communities 
informally as well engaging in formal efforts geared at understanding social 
processes. For example, in south Sudan, the south Sudan Vulnerability Study, carried 
out by an anthropologist over a twelve-month period under the auspices of the Save 
the Children Fund, provided a wealth of knowledge on Dinka concepts of 
vulnerability and fairness. But the process of developing trust also requires that 
instead of complaining about the unreliability of local structures, aid agencies should 
invest in training and enhancing the organisational capacities of local people in ways 
acceptable to them. 
In addition, there are other possibilities for gaining a considerable amount of 
knowledge for programme implementation. In south Sudan, one such tool was the 
formation of the SRRA-OLS Joint Targeting and Vulnerabilities Task Force. 
Although the task force offered only a partial picture of people in need of assistance, 
it was nevertheless instrumental in easing some of the problems regarding the 
targeting of assistance. 
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In contrast to south Sudan and Malawi, there were no serious problems in 
determining or registering people in need of assistance in the Indian earthquake 
disaster in districts in which SEWA was active. The issue of vulnerability almost did 
not arise, perhaps because women who join SEWA are those that already consider 
themselves vulnerable. Thus, at the time of the disaster, it was only a question of the 
vulnerable themselves identifying those that were seriously affected by the 
earthquake. Whereas the process of identifying people in need of assistance consisted 
of three stages and extended over a period of two months in Malawi, and was even 
more complicated in south Sudan, the identification process in India had only one 
stage that began one day following the earthquake and extended over a period of 
only one week. In addition, a fully-fledged operating theatre was set up in one of the 
affected areas on the day of the earthquake itself to cater for the health needs of the 
affected. Because the participation structure networked across the affected region, it 
was possible to mobilise human resources to conduct a comprehensive and extensive 
assessment of the extent of need and identify 'beneficiaries' swiftly. 
Participation and Distribution. 
Contrary to common practice of judging the success of a relief programme in terms 
of the number of people directly receiving relief materials, many evaluations of relief 
aid point to the importance of timely delivery as well as the appropriateness of the 
various activities initiated. It is obvious that unless relief materials can be delivered 
at the time they are required most, many lives may be lost and livelihoods destroyed. 
A similar importance is attached to ensuring that activities initiated and materials 
provided match the needs of the target population. Examining the three case studies 
presented, it is possible to see the ways in which participation (or lack of it) affected 
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issues of coverage, timeliness and appropriateness. 
The relationship between participation and capacity building comes out clearly in the 
Indian case when compared to the other two cases. This case reveals how, through 
training, education and daily involvement in planning and making decisions on 
issues that affect their lives, women in Gujarat have become capable of taking 
initiatives on their own to address common problems or influence village decision- 
making processes. Women like Puriben, who are illiterate, are able to organise other 
women to form a collective force to challenge discriminatory practices in village 
power structures as well as exert pressure on government authorities for the 
provisio n of essential services. In the earthquake disaster of 2001,1 have shown that 
women were able to start on their own activities that were not initiated by 
government or even SEWA headquarters. Examples of such activities included the 
jeevanshala, a school managed on a voluntary basis designed to teach illiterate 
women, and the debris-clearing activity designed to retrieve reusable materials from 
the rubble of fallen buildings. 
An additional indication of the decision-making capacities acquired by women was 
the frequency with which meetings took place in order to discuss courses of action 
throughout the relief process. Village meetings, well attended by women, were held 
as frequently as needed to come up with a consensus of what actions needed to be 
taken to address specific issues, such as the initiatives cited above. Other meetings 
were held to discuss the new role of the childcare centres during the disaster period 
as well as the contribution to be made to the housing reconstruction plan by all 
beneficiaries and ways in which such contributions could form a community fund to 
be used to address other community needs. Women also formed part and parcel of 
sandesh yatras, meetings designed to orient villagers to scientific and safe building 
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standards, as well as gram sabhas, meetings comprising all the adult members of the 
community at which a comprehensive implementation plan was discussed, debated 
and formulated. That women were active participants in these meetings was clear 
from their conduct when I conducted my own village meetings in several areas as 
part of the methodology of the study. In all the meetings I conducted, men were 
present but it was mostly women who spoke because they were the ones who had 
been directly involved in all the decisions regarding the relief process. Men had 
largely taken a complementary role, supporting women with the transportation of 
materials and taking on the more strenuous activities such as construction. 
Some examples from the south Sudan and Malawi case studies reveal the existence 
of capacities and potential for similar initiatives, albeit less organiscd than examples 
drawn from the Indian case study. In south Sudan, there were cases of volunteers 
working for several aid agencies in their feeding centres. Only the level of suffering 
observed and a sense of responsibility to the close-knit community of which they 
were a part motivated such volunteers. Three examples stood out: A Sudanese 
woman in Rumbek town who, on her own initiative, mobilised community support 
and local resources to open a feeding centre to respond to the problem of an 
increasing number of under-five deaths due to acute malnutrition; a community in 
Twic that, based on their own assessment of need, continued with a feeding centre 
programme using local personnel and resources long after Christian Aid had closed it 
down; In Mapel community members mobiliscd to turn into a school, a camp that 
had been originally built as part of a programme of treating traumatised 
unaccompanied minors. Rather than being seen as merely isolated instances (it is 
quite probable that there were other examples of this nature which I did not come 
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across) these incidences should be seen as an indication of the potential for a higher 
degree of local organisation, given support in terms of training and education. 
With regard to the example of the Sudanese woman who opened her own feeding 
centre, I noted that she was later incorporated into Oxfam's feeding programmes. 
One could argue that in so doing the potential for participation was curtailed. Perhaps 
a way of promoting wider participation would have been to support this woman to 
mobilise others from within the community and then provide them with technical as 
well as material support. This would have ensured that when Oxfam discontinued the 
programme, there was already an organised group of women who had the necessary 
knowledge to run feeding centres and transfer the skills to others. As it happened, the 
Sudanese woman was probably merely turned into an employee of Oxfam, and thus 
had to behave, not in accordance with community values only, but also with those of 
Oxfam. 
Meetings were also a feature of the south Sudan relief programme. Aid agencies tried 
hard to include local community representatives as well as representatives of the 
local authority in some of the meetings that took place in the affected areas. Many 
agencies conducted dialogue meetings with community leaders of target groups such 
as livestock owners, women's groups, and church groups. The one-day vulnerability 
workshops constituted one of the major fora through which community leaders 
interfaced with agency staff as well as members of the local authority (SRRA). 
However, there are important differences between the meetings in the south Sudan 
and Indian cases. Firstly, many of the south Sudan meetings only accorded the 
opportunity to articulate needs and influence decisions to community leaders, 
principally the executive chiefs and gol leaders, clan heads who were assumed to 
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have extensive knowledge of a given kinship group and thus able accurately to 
represent its interests. While this was generally true, the chiefs and gol leaders, 
because they looked only into the interests of the general community, sometimes 
could not effectively represent the specific needs of women and other groups. In 
practice, I noted that the executive chiefs and gol leaders played a key role mainly in 
the distribution process of the general ration and other items. A similar dominant role 
was missing in other programmes such as therapeutic feeding and health, in which 
pre-determined agency criteria dictated implementation. That the representative 
framework was too general and thus quite limited to address some specific needs was 
evident from two examples: one was that one of the most successful programmes 
from the point of view of both programme reviews and agency staff was the 
livestock support programme which involved the direct participation of livestock 
owners. The other was the fact that the involvement of women (decided by men) 
initially caused problems for women in their family relationships, requiring further 
meetings to address. In addition, it is important to reiterate what one agency felt to be 
the key lessons leamt as regards the role of gol leaders in the relief process. Firstly, 
many of them were illiterate and unable to fill in the record cards, limiting their 
involvement in monitoring activities. Secondly, households in remote villages did 
not always have their gol leaders present and, coupled with the fact that they were 
unable to contribute individuals to assist in portering materials, tended to receive less 
than others. Gol leaders tended to distribute on an equal basis and there was no way 
of knowing if the needs of all needy persons had been equally met. These 
observations led the agency to plan the modification of the distribution process 
through identification of literate persons from each gol to work with the gol leaders, 
and through employing community agents partly in a monitoring and training role. 
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This latter structure compares well with the case of SEWA in India where education 
and training, coupled with forging close working relationships between literate and 
illiterate individuals, have enabled even illiterate women, exemplified by the case of 
Puriben, to become leaders in planning and implementation of new initiatives. 
Clearly, much as representative participation offers many opportunities in its 
feasibility and practicality, it is important not to make the representation too general. 
From the evidence above, more promise lies in what can be termed stratified 
representation based on groups likely to have similar needs. One of the advantages 
offered by the SEWA model is that its members already belong to different activities 
and are thus familiar with the needs of a wide range of activity groups. Where 
feasible, whole village meetings are also necessary where all members can have an 
opportunity to contribute to unfolding decisions. Even though there was some degree 
of population movement in south Sudan, it was not a case of a floating population 
and much of the social structure was still intact. This was in fact the reason why the 
gol leaders were relevant at all. 
There is another important difference between meetings in India and in south Sudan. 
In India SEWA members held meetings to discuss plans and make decisions they 
would themselves implement. In south Sudan, agencies held meetings principally as 
an information-gathering tool designed to fill certain knowledge gaps and, in some 
cases, to vindicate pre-decided implementation plans. This was particularly true since 
some of the main planning meetings took place at their field offices in Kenya without 
any contributions from the communities. Therefore, the south Sudan framework 
thwarted, rather than promoted, local organisation and participation. Thus, even after 
ten years of Operation Lifeline Sudan, and despite signs of tremendous potential, 
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there were still no organised community responses to the 1998 emergency 
programme. 
The situation in Malawi was even worse than that in south Sudan. There, the vehicle 
for the participation of affected communities was limited to the presence of the 
Traditional Authority (TA) at the interagency meetings under the chairmanship of the 
District Commissioner. Held daily, these meetings in essence only focused on 
discussing logistics since the real planning had already been done by headquarter- 
WFP, agency and government staff at monthly meetings held in the major city of 
Blantyre. Therefore, even if the TA was able to attend the district-level meetings 
regularly, he was already made redundant by the fact that he could only influence 
logistics, not the structural aspects of the relief process. In practice, the TA could 
neither attend the meetings regularly due to transportation problems, nor represent 
the communities fully for reasons similar to those discussed above with regard to gol 
leaders in south Sudan. In one example, in order to be seen to be adopting egalitarian 
principles, one traditional leader refused to allow the targeted distribution of relief 
materials in his area. The community at large may not have supported such a 
unilateral decision. In addition, political by-elections in some areas had politicised 
relief to some degree and the TAs, being an extension of government administration, 
were likely to toe the government line. 
Several committees for addressing development issues at the grassroots level already 
existed in the affected areas including, for example, the Village Action Committees 
and the Area Action Committees, which are part of the local government machinery, 
as well as various committees for specific areas such as health, water and schools. 
Not much effort was made to encourage the participation of these committees. For 
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example, an increase in sanitation and water-related diseases immediately following 
the floods was partly attributable to a lack of sanitary and hygiene facilities and 
education, some of which could have been provided by the community members 
themselves. With the provision of tools, it was possible for affected people to dig 
their own pit latrines or supplement those provided by aid agencies, which were 
frequently found to be inadequate. Similarly, locally based primary health care 
personnel could have been mobilised to provide health education. As in the case of 
south Sudan, there were indications that the potential for an organised community 
response existed. As I have noted before, community members carried out much of 
the rescue operation using locally available resources such as canoes, bicycles and 
oxcarts. In addition, there was one example of traditional leadership facilitating relief 
activities by lobbying with local canoe operators to provide free rides for any trip 
connected with looking for work or food to meet relief needs. 
It was clear from the way the relief programme was run in Malawi that aid agencies, 
government and WFP treated flood-affected people as passive objects rather than 
active participants in the relief process. Officials were obsessed with providing for 
the needs of the affected people, evidenced by a large number of paid staff in every 
aspect of programme implementation as opposed to delegating some of the activities 
to the affected people themselves, who had already shown willingness and ability to 
contribute to the alleviation of their own suffering. As a result, opportunities for 
building capacities for future response to disaster were lost. 
In south Sudan the majority of aid agencies used the employment of local staffs as 
another attempt to increase the participation of affected communities. For example, 
Oxfam employed local supervisors for its OLS Livestock programme while Merlin 
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employed up to 70 women for its therapeutic feeding programme. 71bis method for 
increasing participation had some strengths but also some weakness. 
In the specific case of Merlin, I have mentioned some of the weaknesses of using 
local staffs in programme implementation in Chapter Four. These included, among 
others, the admission into feeding programmes by local staffs of children who did 
not meet the agency's admission criteria. The agency claimed that this practice 
reflected favouritism born of the social pressures and obligations these staffs were 
under. However, it could have also resulted from the staffs' own assessment of 
vulnerability which was different from the agency's. Another problem was that local 
health workers, apparently due to lack of proper training, tended to dispense 
unnecessarily large amounts of medicines. It is probable that other agencies had 
similar experiences that did not come to my notice during the short period of study. 
An inherent disadvantage with the employment of local staffs as a strategy for 
increasing participation is that, not properly done, its potential for a broad-based self- 
driven organisation may be limited. To begin with, some agencies employ local 
staffs as a matter of necessity rather than a strategy for allowing more participation 
by the affected people. While not wrong in itself, it is unlikely that such a framework 
can result in an aid agency using such local staff as a tool for forging closer links 
with beneficiary communities. Should such links occur, they are likely to be by 
default rather than by design and thus, unlikely to be well organised. Secondly, the 
employed individuals must behave according to the dictates of their agency superiors 
who are already motivated differently. Thirdly, participating local staffs acquire 
training as individuals, and because they are managed rather than becoming 
managers, there is no lasting organisational framework once the agency has 
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discontinued the programme. Fourthly, because they are employed in specific 
programmes, local individuals acquire only narrowly defined technical skills. Should 
another disaster occur, there is no mechanism through which the various technical 
competences; can be organised in a unified response. 
The disadvantages of employing local staffs are, of course, no justification for 
employing none at all. The absence of local staffs can be a serious setback to 
programme implementation. I have noted in the south Sudan case the example of a 
medical agency that imported expatriate staff numbering eighty, resulting in chaotic 
logistical arrangements. In addition, it is sometimes true that a good number of such 
staffs are usually intems out to gain a bit of practical experience for the purposes of 
inflating their Curriculum Vitae (CV). As noted in Chapter Four, the OLS 
programme review showed that the average contract for expatriate staffs in south 
Sudan was only three months. This situation can offer neither the continuity in 
agency knowledge nor real commitment and opportunity for agency staffs to 
strengthen community structures. Apthorpe (no date) argues that 'the merits of 
finding and using local expertise for social learning, where institutional barriers to 
this can be surmounted, are likely to outweigh its limits considerably' (p. 4). He 
notes, however, that this balance of merits and limits is likely to vary from case to 
case. In addition, we have already noted that participation serves different purposes. 
In some emergency situations broad-based participation may not be feasible in the 
short run. In such cases, the involvement of local staff could be one of the best 
available alternative forms of participation by the affected communities. Below, I 
discuss some of the merits of using local staffs. 
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To begin with, in the case of south Sudan, local staffs acted as sources of immediate 
knowledge about some general local conditions that needed to be taken into account 
in programme planning. For this reason, almost all agencies employed local staffs 
and expertise in various numbers. As reported in the case of Merlin, their clinic and 
health surveillance activities were direct responses to community demand. Local 
staffs also bridged the language gap between agency staffs and community leaders. 
In addition, local staffs were crucial for the very implementation of certain 
programmes because of the sheer amounts of labour that were needed to run them. 
Merlin, for example, conceded that labour requirements were so great that they 
would not have been able to run the programme without extensive local staff 
recruitment. The aid agency also claimed that extensive employment of local staffs 
helped to promote the acceptance of the programme in the community. 
In addition to these examples, the south Sudan case also showed that involvement of 
local people in the relief process could help to inspire a sense of ownership and the 
security of relief materials. For example, putting security issues in the hands of local 
civil administration and recipient communities solved the problem of looting of relief 
materials from the storage point as well as from women on their way from a 
distribution point. Similarly in India, beneficiaries played a key role in procurement 
and storage of materials. Participation in these activities did not only help to create a 
sense of ownership of materials but it saved the agencies money in terms of extra 
resources that would have been deployed to ensure security. For example, in Malawi 
the army was used to provide security for both storage and distribution, costing the 
government considerable amounts of money in transportation and allowances for 
soldiers. 
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Participation and appropriateness of the relief process. 
Another argument that has been used in favour of increased levels of participation is 
that it helps to improve the effectiveness of relief by making it more appropriate to 
the recipients. Evaluations and reviews of relief programmes are full of instances in 
which inappropriate materials were supplied to affected populations and in some 
cases where entire activities well ill conceived. What evidence from the three case 
studies I have presented supports this argument? 
In south Sudan, there were in fact several examples of mismatches between needs 
and provisions made to meet them. One such example was the way in which one aid 
agency attempted to treat the psychological trauma suffered by children whose 
parents had either been killed in the war or simply went missing. It should be 
mentioned that there is a general difficulty and sometimes neglect on the part of aid 
agencies to address the trauma, whether of adults or children, that results from 
experiencing the terrible events of disasters. ln, ýnany cases such efforts have centred 
on either the construction of centres; where foreign 'experts' conduct various forms 
of Western psychotherapy. Such therapy is also done in refugee camps. However, it 
is generally true that children's (of the adolescent age) psycho-social, as well as 
educational needs have tended to be neglected during disaster relief as agencies get 
pre-occupied with administering therapeutic rations to under-fives, distributing 
supplementary and general food rations, and mounting health, sanitation, tools and 
seeds distribution, and livestock programmes. 
In the south Sudan case, the Save the Children Fund (UK) constructed a camp where 
unaccompanied minors were taken for care and some form of counselling until aid 
workers had managed to trace the children's parents or other guardians. The camps 
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appeared to have an initial appeal but subsequently lost support as community 
members who felt that putting children in such camps contravened their child rearing 
customs secretly whisked children away by night. The camp had to close and, as 
mentioned above, be turned into a school at the community members' own initiative. 
South Sudanese local staffs told me that because of the customarily strong and 
extended kinship ties that exist in south Sudanese communities it is anathema to 
consider any child as having no parents. Because the adult relations of the child hold 
the same responsibility for care as the child's dead parents, the concept of an orphan 
is non-existent. Putting a child in somebody else's care is thus equal to abdicating 
one's duty and responsibility and therefore regarded as something shameful and 
abhorrent. Such sentiments also exist in the Indian case and yet the childcare centres 
there experienced a high degree of success. What factors might have accounted for 
this difference? 
The answer seems to lie in the fact that whereas in the south Sudan case childcare 
camps were an exotic import introduced during the emergency itself, albeit in 
consultation with community members, the Indian childcare centres had been 
established as part of an integrated approach to the process of building livelihoods to 
allow mothers more time for economic activities. The kind of resistance faced by the 
south Sudan camps had long been dealt with in a gradual process of education, social 
mobilisation, trust winning and experience. Indian women had, as in the case of 
south Sudan, initially resisted the idea of committing children to the care of someone 
else outside the family circle, expressing sentiments such as the following (quoted in 
Parikh, 1996: 14): 
'It is good to keep the child with the mother only! How can we trust our child in 
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anybody's hand? ' 
'Children are god's (sic) gift. Who knows what will theyfeed or leach in Balwadi? ' 
'Ben, we have been toiling in mud since many generations. Our children get used to 
hardships'. 
Such sentiments and fears had resulted in women either leaving children at home 
unattended, leaving them with another sibling or a neighbour, or taking the children 
with them to play in the hazardous dust and desert heat. 
Educational and social mobilisation campaigns centring on the dangers of leaving 
children unattended at home or exposed to salty dust and desert heat, and the 
economic benefits to be had from leaving children in a childcare centre slowly 
yielded fruit and the first centre was established with six to seven children whose 
mothers would sneak around to make spot checks on how their children were being 
treated. Gradually the women's trust was won. Coupled with experiences that women 
who had put their children in the childcare centres were becoming economically well 
off as a result of having more quality time to spend on their economic activities, 
more women began to send their children in. 
By the year 2000 there were some 117 centres in four districts with a total of 5750 
children and 289 childcare workers (SEWA, 2000). It is important to note that the 
opening up of new childcare centres has long become demand-based. Poor women 
themselves mobilise and submit requests to SEWA for the establishment of new 
childcare centres in their villages when they feel that they are ready to run them. 
SEWA provides backing in terms of resources, education and training to help the 
women blend the running of these centres with their own cultural experiences. A 
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1996 survey to determine the changes that had taken place in the lives and income of 
the salt workers as a result of the establishment of the childcare centres reported that 
'these centres have become quite favourite (sic) both among parents and children. 
They love to play there' (Parikh, 1996: 15). 
Clearly, one lesson for aid agencies working in both development and relief is the 
need for an integrated approach to programme implementation. Such an approach 
can dissolve resistances to certain activities through participation and the experiences 
of the programme beneficiaries. 11rough a process of education and negotiation, aid 
agencies can assist some members of the community to take a lead and become 
catalysts of new initiatives. It is easier for other members of the community to accept 
new initiatives based on the experiences and advocacy of some of their own. 
In addition, the SEWA example also offers some lessons even for agencies working 
in emergencies that want to establish certain projects not previously established as 
part of their development work. Firstly, the examples point to the need to establish 
through participation local views about the project to be initiated and the bases for 
such views. This would enable agency staffs to adopt implementation strategies that 
facilitate adoption. In the south Sudan case, for example, rather than presenting them 
as primarily centres for trauma treatment, one way of facilitating acceptance might 
have been to clarify with concerned communities that the camps were merely 
temporary and principally a tool for re-unification between children and their 
guardians. In addition, community members, rather than foreign experts, should have 
been used extensively as child carers. Because of the extended kin ties, this would 
have made the community members more comfortable as they would have, in 
principle, been looking after their own children. Since later action by the community 
demonstrated that they. had no misgivings about sending children to the camp when it 
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was turned into a school, with community involvement, the camps could have been 
initially established as such. In time the agency would have been able to demonstrate 
the economic benefits of the camp as a reduced childcare workload would have 
allowed parents more time for supplementary survival strategies to the relief 
assistance. 
The roots of the problems faced in south Sudan lay in the attempt to implement a 
blueprint programme of childcare and trauma treatment. I have noted, for example, 
how some agency staffs, writing in independent capacities (e. g. Salama and Collins, 
1999), have argued that the popular practice of ignoring adolescent and adult 
malnutrition did not correspond to reality in certain areas and certain stages of the 
emergency, where deaths resulting from malnutrition were higher than in children. 
However, there were no attempts to involve communities to address this problem or 
to adjust this blueprint approach. By contrast, in the case of SEWA in India, 
implementation did not follow traditional assumptions of what is likely to happen in 
emergency situations. Thus, experiences that even adults needed treatment for 
trauma led to a programme that incorporated both adults and children. 
But even if programmes or activities are appropriately conceived, there is also 
evidence suggesting that participation can be a tool for fine-tuning them. There are 
many examples of cases in disaster relief where materials provided fail to meet the 
specific needs of recipients. It is not uncommon, for example, to find relief materials 
branded 'not to be sold' right on the market. One example in south Sudan was the 
provision of Kenyan tilling tools (called Jembes) to south Sudanese, which, despite 
being superior to local tools, were never used because of lack of knowledge of their 
use. The local population was melting down other similar tools in order to make 
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more appropriate ones. There was also a case in which aid agencies were providing 
unpopular varieties of seed that were being rejected by the recipients. Had there been 
a market for them it is possible these items might have found their way there too. 
These examples contrast with the implementation of the earthquake disaster relief 
programme in India where participation ensured that activities were tailored to suit 
local conditions and way of life at the planning stage. For example, with regard to the 
housing reconstruction plan, sandesh yatra and gram sabha meetings gave the 
affected people the opportunity to plan housing units that were commensurate with 
culturally acceptable settlement patterns. In addition, they were able to integrate the 
housing reconstruction plan with natural resource management and livelihood 
activities. Similarly, in the livelihood security programme, village-level micro-plans 
formulated with the participation of village panchayats, and various committees for 
water, forestry, watershed, dairy cooperatives, producer groups etc., provided the 
basis for fine-tuning macro-plans and integrating livelihoods, animal husbandry, 
water resources, fodder and forestry programmes. 
Participation and 'exit strategies'. 
In beginning, it is important to recall that relief programmes usually have three 
phases, namely, the immediate emergency phase, the mid-tenn relief phase and the 
rehabilitation phase. The rehabilitation phase partly covers activities sometimes 
referred to as 'exit strategies'. Simply speaking, it is inappropriate for agencies just 
abruptly to shut down emergency activities without introducing other activities that 
will ensure continuity to the time when communities can revert back to their usual 
livelihood activities. In the foregoing sections, I have discussed how issues of 
vulnerability, beneficiary identification and the distributional aspects of coverage, 
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timeliness, and appropriateness, dominate the first two phases. I have provided 
examples from the three case studies demonstrating the advantages and sometimes 
the disadvantages of participation in these stages. 
The emergency and mid-term stages of the relief programme tend to attract more 
attention and enthusiasm from both aid agencies and donors. Frequently, 
disproportionately little attention is paid to the equally important stage of 
rehabilitation. There may be several reasons why this is the case. It is possible that a 
reduction or an end to the initial images of acute suffering in the media, coupled with 
new images and reports of so much aid reaching so many affected people, wane the 
urge to help in the rehabilitation phase. Another possibility is that its close interface 
with development activities obscures the urgency of the rehabilitation phase to aid 
agencies and donors. A third strong possibility is that, since agencies and donors are 
keen to avoid huge expenditures, they deliberately give a blind eye to rehabilitation 
activities. Since the images of starving children may have stopped showing, and 
everyone has seen how caring they are through their swift response to the emergency 
phase, no one can accuse them of non-action. However, rehabilitation is a crucial 
aspect of relief that can reduce vulnerability and determine a community's resistance 
or response to another disaster. In this phase, as in the other two, participation plays a 
key role. 
In Malawi, rehabilitation did not seem to have received serious attention. Attempts to 
infuse rehabilitation activities into the relief programme appear to have been limited 
to the distribution of seeds by Action Aid to flood victims. However, unilateral 
planning and the need to conform to demands from international donors for the 
verification of beneficiary figures led to too much seed being distributed too late (an 
unusual departure from the more common too little too late). In addition, lack of 
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engagement between government, aid agencies and traditional leaders resulted in 
failure to find a viable rehabilitation plan for people permanently living in flood 
prone areas. As it stood, another flood the following year or the year after would 
have necessitated a similar relief programme. 
Possibilities for using an envisaged food for work programme as a means for 
rehabilitation were curtailed because the programme had encountered problems in its 
embryonic phase when it was being planned as part of drought rehabilitation. The 
study revealed that part of the reason for the problems faced was the lack of 
participation by communities. Firstly, in planning the implementation of the 
programme, WFP created a laborious bureaucratic procedure that discouraged 
possible participants. Additionally, there was a failure to agree beforehand with 
communities as regards the difference between activities that would qualify for the 
programme and those that could be regarded as part of on-going self-help 
programmes. The latter problem resulted in people rejecting the programme when 
WFP started refusing to give food for certain activities, arguing that such activities 
fell under traditional self-help community programmes. In general, it was clear that 
the relief programme did not result in the communities either becoming more 
organised and prepared for the floods and drought, or developing resistance through 
enhanced local-level organisation. Given that the affected area was prone to both 
floods and drought, the need for integrated micro-level planning was paramount. 
In the case of south Sudan there was a blurred picture of the rehabilitation 
programme. This lack of clarity could have been due to the fact that the emergency 
and mid-term phases of the relief programme were still in process at the time of the 
study. However, it seemed also to have resulted from a narrow focus by aid agencies 
f 
328 
that did not include rehabilitation activities in the planning process. This lack of 
adequate planning was reflected in a shift of objectives in the later phases of the 
relief programme from purely relief ones to those that included enhancing 
livelihoods and promoting and protecting the rights of war-affected civilians. An 
increased emphasis on the provision of agricultural inputs and a reduction in the 
provision of food items was one result of this change in objectives. Yet, as observed 
in Chapter Four, many agencies were facing problems finding suitable exit strategies. 
One of the recommendations that came out of the Programme Design Consultancy 
on OLS (Grunewald et. a], 1998) was that agencies should ensure that priority to 
food in the short-term does not harm equally important priorities for raising 
productive potentials. The consultancy team noted that: 
'When logistics are the limiting factor, it is too often the case 
that the contradicting priorities bring about frustrations at the 
institutional and personal levels. But the real issue is what has 
to be preserved and protected during the crisis? I. Aves or 
livelihood? The answer is both. A proper mechanism to 
arbitrate between the two (life-saving food and support to 
survival means) needs to be put in place, which does not 
depend solely on WFP requests or priorities. In fact one of the 
most striking weaknesses of OLS is its propensity to be drawn 
into complex implementation details and maintain a capacity 
to keep up with the global picture in a proactive manner' 
(P19). 
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While it may be possible to save lives without much beneficiary participation, the 
experiences of the agencies show that beneficiary participation may be almost 
indispensable in any attempts to save livelihoods. A complex web of socio-cultural 
relations that criss-cross with environmental conditions constitutes livelihoods. This 
means that local views are key to any efforts geared at saving livelihoods. This might 
suggest that exit strategies might not pose particularly difficult challenges to CBOs 
or organisations working through local partners. In the first instance, the knowledge 
gained during the emergency stays within the community and can be used for 
recovery initiatives. Secondly, the local organisations remain within the area after aid 
agencies have left, ensuring programme continuity. Moreover, on-going 
rehabilitation programmes for these organisations establish a network for 
participation and social learning and constitute in-built exit strategies. International 
NGOs, particularly those without any experience in the targeted community, need to 
make extra efforts to establish an effective participatory framework that incorporates 
local organisations or representation. 
The key role that participation and local organisation can play in rehabilitation was 
again clear in the case of the relief programme in India. To begin with, because of 
their experiences in participating actively in previous relief programmes, 
communities in India were already aware that rehabilitation activities need to be built 
into the relief programme at the outset, hence, the frequently heard request from the 
affected people: 'give us work-, not relief. As a result, we find that rehabilitation 
activities in the Indian case were introduced much earlier in the relief process in 
comparison with not only south Sudan and Malawi but many disaster relief situations 
as well. Examples of these activities, established in response to the direct demands of 
the affected people, included the craftwork programme, the gokul gram-linkage with 
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ongoing self-employment programme, water regeneration, fodder security, natural 
resource management campaigns, nutrition, healthcare, and savings and insurance. 
The implementation of these programmes demonstrated how participation gave 
various activities potential for sustainability way beyond the relief period. To 
mention just a few cases, self-employment programmes would, for example, be 
sustained through strengthened Village Implementation Committees. The gok-ul 
gram, a federation of Village Implementation Committees, would attain the status of 
CBOs with which the government and NGOs would work. Through gram sabhas, 
village committees were formed for the implementation of the natural resource 
management campaign with the primary objective of transforming the earthquake 
rehabilitation programme into a development programme. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the strengths and weaknesses of participation (or 
lack of it) in three different case studies. In essence the three case studies could be 
seen as having three different forms of participation. In the Malawi case study, there 
was an absence of any meaningful levels of direct participation or consultation with 
grassroots structures in the affected communities. On the part of government there 
was neither the will nor know-how for participation. The government lacked proper 
organisation for the involvement of affected communities. On the part of the 
international community, there is strong evidence to suggest that lack of consultation 
and participation was not merely a matter of technical know-how. It also resulted 
from the fear that participation was going to lead to views of assistance that would 
not match the level of resources they were prepared to commit. Consequently, 
participation was limited to the formal involvement of official local leaders who 
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were not given the opportunity to participate effectively. This participatory 
framework was not very effective because such leaders were not part of an active and 
representative community organisational structure. Their participation was also 
limited by practical problems such as difficulties in travel to attend planning and 
coordination meetings. It was also evident that the local leaders had limited influence 
over the decision-making process. In many cases, they attended meetings only to be 
told of distribution plans that had already been decided so that they could pass on the 
message to their respective villages, or to organise people at distribution centres. 
In south Sudan, there was an attempted integration of the local decision-making 
machinery into agency programmes. To a large extent, participation was used to fill 
knowledge gaps, staff requirements, solve emerging problems and fine-tune specific 
aspects of implementation. Different agencies used different participation procedures 
with different degrees of intensity. Participation offered clear advantages, but there 
were also instances where participation presented causes for discomfort for aid 
agencies. A major problem for agencies appears to be the extent to which they can 
trust local systems in ensuring that relief reaches what the agencies consider to be 
vulnerable individuals. This is particularly true with complex emergencies that 
provide many possibilities and motivations for misusing or diverting aid. But while 
some agencies sought the solution to this problem in disengaging with communities 
and local authorities, others approached it through increased levels of engagement. In 
general, those that followed the latter alternative faced fewer and less serious 
problems than those who used the former approach. 
In the Indian case, participation was instituted through delegation of control and 
responsibility to a well-established local organisation that had grass-roots 
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participatory structures already in place when a disaster occurred. This led to relief 
needs and beneficiaries being identified and met quickly. Also, it was possible to 
integrate relief with other livelihood programmes to enhance sustainability. 
Participation of beneficiaries in planning and implementation also made it possible to 
tailor activities to local conditions. Ongoing involvement in decision-making 
processes, together with on-going education and training of village-based people, 
built local capacities and enhanced the degree of community organisation enabling 
them, in turn, to participate effectively in issues affecting their lives and livelihoods. 
A close look at the three case studies reveals that key to the issue of participation is 
the extent to which aid agencies can trust local structures and thus be in a position to 
give up a considerable measure of control of how the resources will be used. 
Accountability is thus a key issue defining the participation process. On the one 
hand, agencies have to be sure of the egalitarianism and accountability of local 
structures. On the other hand, they must themselves be accountable to their donors in 
a particular fashion that does not necessarily coincide with the accountability 
procedures and priorities of local structures. On the basis of evidence from all the 
three case studies it appears that, in so far as tackling these accountability problems 
is concerned, training, education and capacity building of local community structures 
must be a key ingredient of the relief process. The rehabilitation phase of emergency 
programmes could include this training-education component that could be carried 
over as part of the development process. For some disasters, as shown in the case of 
India, even the emergency phase provides opportunities for training, education and 
reorganisation of community structures. 
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Chapter Eight. Conclusion. 
It is important to keep in mind that much of what has been and can be said, and 
indeed much of what is happening with regard to disaster relief, is taking place in the 
context of a changing humanitarian landscape. Clearly, modem humanitarianism 
transcends philanthropy in its traditional sense. As indicated in Chapter 711ree, not 
only has the volume and movement of humanitarian assistance increased immensely, 
but also assistance is increasingly being providcd not solely on humanitarian 
grounds. Politically oriented and other motivations have become increasingly 
enmeshed in humanitarian assistance. 
One of the latest examples, although an extreme case, was the simultaneous dropping 
of bombs and relief packages by the United States military in Afghanistan in its war 
on terror following the terrorist attack on New York on September 11 2001. The 
'food bombs' were dropped so indiscriminately, prompting one aid worker to assert, 
during a television interview, that this method of distributing relief was analogous to 
dropping a bunch of five pound notes on Oxford Street in London from a helicopter 
and expecting them to benefit the most vulnerablel It may be true that there was a 
genuine concern to help people who had already been suffering from the effects of 
drought exaggerated by the war, but there were also some who saw the simultaneous 
dropping of food and bombs as politically motivated. This example serves to show 
how combining humanitarian motives with political or other motivations in 
humanitarian assistance can affect participation. In all respects, the distribution in 
this example was truly non-participatory. The degree of non-participation or 
participation is of course likely to vary with different programmes, but it appears 
certain that participation will necessarily be limited when motives other than 
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humanitarian find their way into disaster relieL 
Relief programmes that include non-humanitarian motives will find it hard to 
conform to the key aspects of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (ICRC, 1996), which 
many see as a true representation of the humanitarian spirit. With respect to 
participation, it is important here to recall some of its tenets. The code states that: 
o The humanitarian imperative comesfirst, 
- Aid is given regardless of race, creed or nationality of the recipients without 
adverse distinction of any kind. Aidpriorities are calculated on the basis of need 
alone; 
* Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint, 
* We shall respect culture and custom; 
* We shall attempt to build response on local capacities, 
e Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of 
relief aid; 
o Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as 
meeting basic needs; 
* We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from 
whom we accept resources. 
Being a voluntary code, conformity to it, of course, depends on the willingness of 
organisations that accept to work within its tenets. However, that this has not 
necessarily taken place at an acceptable scale is evident in the mushrooming of 
several other projects and initiatives, reviewed in this thesis, aimed at increasing the 
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accountability to affected populations of the very organisations that have agreed to 
work under the code. Paradoxically, it is these same organisations that are going 
about forming new 'humanitarian umpires'. But unlike umpires in sport who can 
enforce the rules of the game, 'humanitarian umpires' can only blow the whistle 
while the play continues on the basis of the players' preferences. But however rough 
the humanitarian terrain (or because of it) efforts devoted to understanding 
participation must continue to clear the uncertainties that surround it. 
So what issues come out of the three case studies in terms of the uncertainties of 
participation highlighted at the beginning? The fore-going chapter has already 
answered many of the key questions asked by making reference to specific examples 
drawn from the cases. The following discussion provides a summary only and places 
the findings in the broader context of planning and implementing relief programmes. 
In terms of why participation? The data analysed in all the three case studies 
demonstrate the value of participation in making relief programmes more effective. 
Effectiveness may be with regard to: 
a) Providing appropriate types of assistance: For example, culturally appropriate 
tools or projects (south Sudan) and culturally appropriate housing units 
(Gujarat). 
b) Timeliness: grassroots participation in Gujarat led to a swift response compared 
to the severe delays in responding to a flood disaster in Malawi. The response 
in Gujarat was much quicker despite the fact the very quick onset and lack of 
predictability of an earthquake disaster. By contrast, the slow response in 
Malawi involved floods whose onset is that as quick and which can also be 
fairly accurately predicted. 
I 
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c) Utilisation of existing humanitarian instincts of as well as the resourcefulness 
of individuals, communities and societies: All the three case studies 
demonstrate the willingness of people to use their own material resources, 
time and energy to help others in times of heightened need. 
d) Provision of assistance in ways that do not create further problems for 
individuals and communities that receive assistance: participation can prevent 
potential conflicts in households and in communities. (For example with 
respect to gender relations and cooperation between adjoining villages). 
However, participation during disaster relief must not be loaded with issues 
that go beyond humanitarian assistance, for example, attempting to transform 
societal gender relations (discussed in more detail later). 
It must be noted here that 'effectiveness' as discussed above is conceptualiscd from 
the perspective of beneficiaries of assistance through analysing their own statements, 
their behaviour during a disaster as well as the experiences of aid agencies in trying 
to involve beneficiaries in their programmes. 
As regards the determination of who should participate, the data presented point to 
the need to involve both directly affected individuals as well as those with whom 
such individuals have social relations. The wider the circle of social relations, the 
more the likelihood of understanding what participation will mean for a particular 
'affected population', and who the 'affected' actually are. While the social relations 
may change during a disaster (changes of which need further in-depth study) the 
three case studies presented show that the social structure may not be easily 
destroyed, even where populations have been displaced. Ibus rather than focusing on 
individuals, their social relations need to be established. 
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As demonstrated by the case studies, where participation was minimal (Malawi and 
Sudan) externally imposed pre-conceived notions of vulnerability, some of which did 
fit the reality on the ground, predominated. Such notions only succeeded in creating 
tensions between aid agencies and affected people. Where there were high levels of 
participation (Gujarat), the question of vulnerability seemed to pose no problems. 
The behaviour of aid agencies Malawi shows that their notions of vulnerability may 
be constructed to match beneficiary numbers with available resources. 
Part of the answer to the question of who should participate lies in understanding the 
ways in which individuals and communities understand the concept of vulnerability. 
Many agencies claim that their interests are aligned with those of the so-called 
vulnerable groups. They frequently state that, in the face of limited resources, their 
priority is to target the vulnerable. While the idea is nobly conceived, putting this 
claim into practice presents difficulties that could undermine the success of the relief 
programme. From the case studies presented, as well as from the available literature, 
the heart of the problem appears to lie in the fact that many aid agencies attempt to 
define, unilaterally, who the vulnerable of a particular emergency or community are. 
Development literature, for example, is full of cases where aid agencies pre-select 
certain sections of a community or certain individuals, such as female-headed or 
landless households, as vulnerable. In emergency relief, as seen in the case of south 
Sudan, female-headed households, under-five children, and women in general, were 
all usually defined as vulnerable. Pre-conceived definitions of vulnerability tend to 
blind aid workers to realities in different emergency or development contexts. So for 
example, despite the traditional focus on under-five children as a vulnerable category 
in emergencies, adult deaths resulting from famine exceeded under-five deaths at 
some stages of the emergency in south Sudan and yet nothing was done to address 
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this problem. Also, many recommendations were made by headquarter gender 
sexperts' on how female-headed households should have been registered in the relief 
process, ways which were, with respect to realities in south Sudan, not quite 
appropriate. In Malawi, false assumptions regarding people's supply of food stocks 
in various seasons resulted in a narrow definition of vulnerable individuals and 
created problems in targeting assistance. 
Preconceived ideas regarding vulnerability on the part of aid agencies result from the 
fact that agency staffs have not allowed the affected populations to become involved 
in the defining process. The exclusion of affected populations from the deflning 
process can have multiple causes. In the case of south Sudan this was sometimes due 
to the fact that the staffs had limited capability to interpret local conditions and 
engage with the appropriate social structures that would have enabled them to 
understand how vulnerability was understood locally. It cannot be ruled out that a 
spirit of superiority, one that gave agency staffs the belief that they already knew 
who the vulnerable were, played a part in this situation. Hence, I have noted that 
some staffs made recommendations on how to register female-headed households 
without any consultation with affected communities. Others reserved a proportion of 
relief items to be distributed to those who had not received relief assistance 
distributed through the local structures but whom the agency staff regarded as 
vulnerable. Apart from the sheer spirit of superiority and lack of capability, aid 
agencies can exclude affected populations from the defining process deliberately so 
that their definition of vulnerability coincides with the resources at their disposal. 
This was certainly the case in Malawi, where WFP's definition of vulnerability 
excluded many who had been affected in a different way but who clearly needed 
similar assistance. 
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The lesson for aid agencies is clearly that they need to make genuine efforts to 
understand how affected communities understand vulnerability and incorporate this 
understanding in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating relief 
programmes. This requires close linkages with and participation of the affected 
people. The definition of vulnerability, like that of participation generally, will 
change with changing emergency contexts and, therefore, agencies should refrain 
from putting a premium on pre-conceived definitions or perceptions. This does not 
mean that they should totally abandon existing knowledge and experience. Indeed, an 
idea of who is likely to be affected in different types of emergencies and in what 
ways is important since it helps agencies to develop pre-packed kits that can be 
shipped away swiftly when an emergency takes place. However, the urgency is not 
sustained throughout all the stages of the relief programme and some aspects of 
distribution, such as the general ration, have very little to do with pre-packaging. 
Therefore, existing knowledge and experiences of aid agencies should again merely 
be used as guiding principles which can be adjusted according to realities in different 
contexts. 
Related to the problem of preconceptions regarding vulnerability and who should 
receive assistance is the practice by aid agencies in many emergencies of having 
standardised tools for identifying such individuals or groups. For example, 
nutritional assessments such as Weight for Height (VY7/HT) and Mid-Upper Arm 
Circumference (MUAC) have long been taken for granted as indicators of need for 
therapeutic and supplementary feeding for under-five children. I have already noted 
how this standard practice may overlook the problem of adult malnutrition. The same 
can be said of adolescent malnutrition. But in the case of south Sudan, attempting to 
use these indicators to measure adult malnutrition posed additional problems for aid 
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workers. The tall but lean physical stature of the Dinkas automatically placed large 
sections of the population below the desired nourishment levels, leading some 
agencies to abandon the standardised measurements prescribed by UNICEF and 
OLS. 
For children, standardised nutritional assessments resulted in two practices. Agencies 
that had a good supply of resources were able to relax the rules and admit children 
that the method of observation revealed needed immediate attention despite falling 
outside the threshold of nutritional indicators. Agencies with limited resources found 
the same rules too relaxed and tightened them to bring down the number of children 
to be assisted, thus denying assistance to deserving ones. Clearly in this instance, the 
definition of who was vulnerable had nothing to do with realities on the ground. It 
had everything to do with the amount of resources at the disposal of the agency. 
In this example lies a key point as regards the realm for participation for affected 
communities. Both the Malawi and the south Sudan case studies lend support to the 
argument by several commentators that in disaster relief it is policy that defines the 
numbers (or even groups) of affected persons rather than the numbers and groups of 
affected populations defining policy. The amount of available resources plays a key 
role in the definition of policy. Given that aid agencies are unlikely to have enough 
resources to assist all those affected, it would seem that the solution to the problem 
should be sought not in developing standard ideas and indices for identifying need 
but in ever-closer engagement with community structures. It has already been 
indicated that even in emergencies communities do not lose the capacity to identify 
and care for their vulnerable individuals. Unscrupulous behaviour by a few should 
not be used to stigmatise whole communities. For many poor communities the 
distribution of scarce goods is a frequent undertaking. If egalitarianism cannot be 
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guaranteed, it is the agency's job to work with existing structures to see how this can 
be improved rather than to replace them with totally new processes. What is being 
advocated here, therefore, is not total transfer of responsibility to community 
structures but close collaboration with them. It may well be that in the collaboration 
alternative many people still do not receive assistance, but the community is left 
feeling that the best that could be done was done. This feeling might prove crucial 
for cooperation between the community and the agency in any subsequent 
rehabilitation, rebuilding and development programmes. 
The issue of preconceived views regarding vulnerability is also not unrelated to the 
view by some agencies that emergencies can be used as a vehicle for social 
transformation, particularly as regards gender relations. For example, as shown in the 
cases of Malawi and south Sudan, WFP and Oxfam have tended to take the view that 
the implementation of emergency programmes should contain objectives that relate 
to the transformation of gender relations within affected communities in order to 
improve the status of women, who frequently occupy a disadvantaged position in 
many poor societies. The prevailing view is that putting women in the forefront of 
the relief process or assigning certain types of activities to them will help to 
empower them, despite the fact that, usually, there is no attempt to understand the 
specific ways in which women in specific communities are not empowered. Thus in 
Malawi, for example, WFP claimed that distributing ration cards to women rather 
than to men was a step towards women's empowerment. In south Sudan, an Oxfam 
nutritionist specifically advised that the implementation of the relief programme 
should not only challenge traditional inequalities between men and women as regards 
the latter's alleged subservient role and marginalisation in the community, but should 
actually make the transformation of gender relations one of the core objectives. 
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It is true that women occupy a disadvantaged position in many poor communities 
vis-A-vis men, and that emergencies can be used as opportunities for encouraging 
attitudinal and behavioural changes. It is also true that women as a group face unique 
problems in emergencies. Any relief programme should definitely endeavour to 
establish how the unique problems of women ought to be addressed. However, it is 
doubtful whether the most beneficial way of doing this is for external 'gender 
experts' to introduce such issues in an almost authoritarian fashion. In any case, a 
distinction should be made between problems that arise or are accentuated for 
women because of the emergency and general issues of gender relations that are part 
and parcel of a particular community's social process. 
Gender relations in any community are always a complicated issue and it is 
important to be sure that any efforts to achieve this will not introduce frictions that 
will last long after the emergency programme has ended. It appears in fact doubtful if 
long-lasting social changes, particularly the empowerment of women, can occur 
without their acquisition of, or improved access to, economic resources. The Indian 
case study demonstrates that the process of transformation of gender relations that 
benefited women had, as its key, new and improved access to economic resources. In 
addition, SEWA's educational and training programmes, and allowing women to 
participate freely in women-only community-based structures equipped women with 
new knowledge and skills to negotiate and assert themselves in the existing male- 
dominated community. 
In both Malawi and south Sudan there was lack of trust of local social structures and 
government structures (de facto government in the case of the latter) by international 
aid agencies, in contrast to Gujarat where international agencies as well as the 
government put high levels of trust in a grassroots-based organisation. It is possible 
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that reports and experiences of misuse of relief funds and materials may play an 
important role in defining the behaviour of aid agencies towards recipient 
populations. Thus, recipient populations are stigmatised and their real overall 
problems and strengths overlooked. Recipient or affected populations are not in 
essence crooks bent on playing a cat and mouse game to outwit those who are trying 
to assist them. Much of their behaviour is defined by the sheer need to survive under 
adverse livelihood conditions. It is true that in some complex emergencies, relief 
may be diverted to assist combatants but such problems may occur in unique rather 
than all circumstances. Much of the mistrust of recipient populations is thus 
unjustified and yet its effects on participation can be profound. 
Mistrust can result in aid agencies not giving serious consideration to local social 
structures in emergency programmes as partners in planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. Local structures are seen as a serpent that can strike 
unpredictably, and thus to be treated with caution, rather than an advantage to be 
utilised to benefit the programme. Any contact with them is thus limited to only the 
level that the aid agency feels necessary to fulfil its own mandate defined in its own 
terms. Local people are intelligent and observant enough and they quickly recognise 
the lack of trust that the behaviour of agency staffs represents. Tbus in turn, local 
people may develop their own resentment and suspicion of aid agencies. The 
experiences of some aid agencies in south Sudan show that closer cooperation, rather 
than disengagement from local structures, including local authorities (government or 
default), may be the way forward to resolve some of the issues of mistrust between 
the agency and affected populations. Agencies that forged closer links with local 
community structures as well as local authorities found it easier to deal with issues of 
access, beneficiary and needs identification, resource utilisation, security, and how to 
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interpret neutrality in a complex political situation. By contrast, those that did not 
forge such links faced more serious difficulties on such issues. For example, some 
had difficulties implementing appropriate programmes while others had severe 
security and access problems, sometimes resulting in closure of operations 
altogether. This means that in complex emergencies aid agencies must be careful in 
the way they interpret 'neutrality' otherwise their interpretations can greatly affect 
participation and thus, the programme as a whole. 
Organisations that can be trusted cannot mushroom out of the blue. SEWA's case, 
depicting an organisation that, through development work, has successfully brought 
women's participation to the forefront through technical support, training, education 
and creation of an enabling environment where poor women feel free, stands as a 
rebuke to many international development agencies who have continued to prefer 
direct implementation and only paid lip service, if at all, to enhancing of capacities, 
even supporting the creation, of viable grassroots structures. The case of SEWA 
points the way forward to the linking of development to relief. 
In addition, one of the advantages of the SEWA model lies in the fact that 
'facilitators' of various activities have daily contact with the members over long 
periods of time. The operational procedures of international aid agencies may put 
their staff in a position not well suited to understanding social concepts such as 
vulnerability. Specifically, the practice of many aid agencies of sending young and 
inexperienced staffs, sometimes not even appropriately trained, goes some way to 
limiting the agency's ability to forge the necessary links with communit structures y 
for authentic participation. The limited capacity of young and inexperienced staff to 
foster participation may be due not only to their lack of know-how but also to the 
possibility that their overall motives are more aligned with inflating their own CVs 
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for a better job later rather than a genuine concern for the poor. Such staffs cannot be 
expected to spend time and make concerted efforts to understand the social context 
within which the aid programme is situated and achieve the necessary balance 
between community priorities and agency accountability requirements. Any 
experience (or interest for the poor) such staffs might have acquired, even for those 
not necessarily young, is usually limited by very short contracts (about three months 
in the case of many agencies in south Sudan) available to field staffs. Thus, one of 
the defining features of many aid agencies is lack of institutional memory that only 
worsens the situation. 
In terms of understanding how participation should be done, we must begin by 
observing that in many emergency situations, including the two case studies of 
Malawi and south Sudan presented here, not much effort is made by agencies to 
understand the various notions of participation held by the people who will be 
assisted. Unless aid agencies are clear on how participation should be understood we 
should, even if they were genuinely interested in it, expect a myriad of interpretations 
(and thus practices) among them, with each one claiming, as they often do, that their 
programmes are participatory. Given that aid agencies have various reasons for 
claiming to be participatory, some of which have very little to do with the interests of 
the poor or the affected populations, they cannot be entrusted with the responsibility 
of defining the ways in which participation ought to be understood. Neither can we 
take as blue prints the a priori theoretical concepts developed by academics and some 
practitioners on what authentic participation entails. 
The fact seems to be that the ways in which affected populations can and wish to 
participate are governed by many factors, including their own understanding of the 
social and political environment within which they live, their livelihood priorities, 
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and their perceptions regarding the agency providing them with assistance. 
Therefore, it is apparent that participation even from the point of view of affected 
populations will have various interpretations and practices. In this scenario, aid 
agencies will do well to use theoretical concepts and their own experiences only as 
guiding principles. In the field the practice of participation should proceed from what 
is actually found on the ground, incorporating affected people's views of what 
participation will actually mean in the specific context in which the relief programme 
is taking place. 
Understanding that forms of participation can and will vary in different contexts 
means that it is also erroneous to assume that there is a predefined package of 
methodological tools that can be used to foster participation. The question of what 
methods are feasible and appropriate in emergencies is a key feature of the concern 
for increasing participation of affected communities. As discussed in previous 
sections, there are problems and limitations associated with almost every method. 
To begin with, many methodological tools have been borrowed from the 
development field where, as discussed earlier, broad-based participation has only 
managed to find limited examples. Part of the problem in both development and 
emergencies appears to be the tendency by many implementers to think that the use 
of the tools will in itself bring about a desirable nature and level of participation. 
This feeling has led to the use of methodological tools in a checklist, technical 
fashion, without backing them with the passion and spirit to listen to voices of 
people, as well as taking into consideration the social and geographical conditions 
that transcend the methodology itself. 
Much has been said, for example, regarding how PRA methodologies can provide 
effective tools for participation. In northern Sudan, I have noted how, by implying 
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that the quality of assistance was an issue, a household questionnaire became the 
centre of controversy between the UN and the government of Sudan. In both the 
northern and southern sectors, PRA methodologies specifically, and qualitative 
methodologies in general, also generated frictions. In any case it has already been 
mentioned that PRA methodologies need to be used with caution for they may 
sometimes achieve results quite contrary to the intended ones. In Colombia, a 
researcher reported at a workshop that focus group discussions could not be used in 
many cases because any gathering beyond two to three individuals carried 
undesirable and dangerous political implications. 
In contrast to these examples, an Action Aid workshop report (1999) documents how 
in south Sudan civilians have been able to make peace between warring factions 
using traditional methods that include story telling and potent symbols. In one 
instance people used the white Ador Bull, an age-old symbol of peace and 
reconciliation, in order to trace their common heritage and bury their more recent 
affiliation. The report asserts that: 
'This method is very effective for people-to-people negotiation and not so 
easily applicable in government-to-government or people-to-govemment 
situations. It does have potential to operate well between rebels and 
paramilitaries. Its primary function is to breakdown the element of "myth 
making" that is present in all conflicts and develop new perceptions among 
and between protagonists. It is a method that requires much time, 
commitment and conviction based on a general pressure for peace among the 
local population. Then all you have to do is listen and allow it to happen' 
(P-9). 
Yet, in spite of the potential for traditional methods exemplified above, it is very rare 
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for one to come across examples where aid agencies attempt to integrate traditional 
methods for participation and decision-making in their programmes. 
In many cases, aid agencies are quick to give lack of enough time and the urgency of 
the programme as key factors limiting the use of participatory methodological tools. 
However, different emergencies provide different possibilities for using different 
methods. The case of south Sudan shows how, in prolonged emergencies, it is 
possible to conduct an anthropological study for a deeper understanding of social 
issues. The use of local expertise, despite its limitations, also proved to be an 
important part of programme planning and implementation in south Sudan. Some of 
the most successful programmes were those that had made extensive use of local 
expertise. Done properly, use of local expertise has the additional advantage of 
contributing towards capacity building in the affected communities. 
Collaboration with local structures, including local authorities, apart from generating 
valuable information regarding local conditions and helping to involve local people, 
is also important with regard to the issue of access. In complex emergencies like 
south Sudan where security is an issue, international aid agencies tend to bunch up in 
the 'safe' areas, thus providing a range of services in such areas and depriving those 
that are deemed to be unsafe. In such situations, certain local organisations may 
know how to or be in a position to send assistance to such areas. Indeed such 
organisations may already be operating in these unsafe areas. In natural disasters, 
international agencies may fail to reach certain areas because of difficult 
geographical features and poor transportation conditions. In most cases, international 
agencies rely on four-wheel drive vehicles for travel, but even these become 
unusable in certain conditions such as floods or very steep terrain where no roads 
exist. Local people are able to use local forms of transportation such as canoes, 
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oxcarts, horses etc. to reach such areas. For example, canoes became an important 
part of transportation in the Malawi floods not only for evacuation purposes but also 
for transporting relief goods that people had received as well as for going to areas 
where people could find paid casual work. 
The examples and issues mentioned above mean that it is not appropriate to go into 
an area having already decided that such and such a method will be used to foster 
participation. Methodologies should be decided and modified according to different 
contexts, taking into account political, social, climatic and even geographical factors. 
In any case, questions of how participation can be done in disaster relief appear more 
relevant where external agencies are involved in implementing programmes at the 
local level. The case of SEWA suggests that where grassroots structures are already 
involved in participation, such questions would have already been dealt with during 
the course of implementing development programmes and the people affected will 
already be aware of the ways in which they can participate. 
Areas for further research. 
A study that could be conducted in several different communities could focus on 
ways of identifying and assisting vulnerable members. Who is involved and at what 
levels? How have these processes worked in times of less severe disasters where 
external assistance has not been involved? How does external aid impact the existing 
processes? 
The current study provides an indication that certain processes in a community might 
change during disasters. However, there is need for more in-depth studies of what 
changes occur in various social systems under conditions of stress? Are changes 
structural or is it a matter of changes in degree only? This question could be 
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examined in terms of long-term (e. g. prolonged drought or civil war) versus short- 
term disasters. 
Further research could also focus on views of external aid held at different levels 
within affected countries e. g. government, local government, NGOs, village 
leadership and individuals. This aspect could also include views, perceptions and 
attitudes of people about the work of aid agencies, including the conduct of their 
personnel, working in their area as well as people's perceptions on how scarce 
external resources can be distributed during disasters. This work could be part of a 
broader investigation into the principles behind, and the efficacy of, various targeting 
methods employed by aid agencies. A related area of study could be with regard to 
the perceptions and attitudes of people affected by disasters on the various 
methodological tools used by aid workers to enable them to participate in relief 
programmes. 
There also seems to be need for an interagency study (not specifically sociological) 
with regard to organisational structures, lines of command and, recruitment and 
staffing policies and procedures. This work could produce knowledge on the extent 
to which field-level experiences permeate through the decision making structure. In 
addition, this work would also assess the extent to which aid agencies keep abreast 
of, and consider work on participation being done by various forums and structures, 
some of them reviewed in this thesis, created with the purpose of promoting their 
accountability to the people they assist. 
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